Essays on strategic communication by Kolotilin, Anton
Essays on Strategic Communication
by
Anton Kolotilin
B.Sc. Applied Physics and Mathematics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology 2005
M.Sc. Applied Physics and Mathematics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology 2007
M.A. Economics, New Economic School 2007
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 2012
@ 2012 Anton Kolotilin. All rights reserved.
ARCHNVES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OP TECHNOLOGY
JUN 0 8 2012
LIBRARIES
The author hereby grants to Massachusetts Institute of Technology permission to
reproduce and
to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.i2-
Signature of Author .................... ...............................
Department of Economics
May 15, 2012
Certified by............
Certified by..
Accepted by .....
...............................................................
Robert S. Gibbons
Sloan Distinguished Professor of Management and Economics
Thesis Supervisor
Q) ...............................Muhamet Yildiz
Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor
.................. ..... .... ...........
Michael Greenstone
3M Professor of Environmental Economics
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Studies
Essays on Strategic Communication
by
Anton Kolotilin
Submitted to the Department of Economics
on May 15, 2012, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Abstract
The first chapter studies optimal information revelation with one-sided asymmetric information.
A sender chooses ex ante how her information will be revealed ex post. A receiver obtains both
public information and information revealed by the sender, and then takes one of two actions. The
sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender
optimally reveals only whether the receiver's utility is above a cutoff. The cutoff is such that the
receiver is indifferent between the two actions when he learns that his utility is above the cutoff.
The sender's welfare increases and the receiver's welfare does not change with the precision of the
sender's information. The sender's welfare decreases and the receiver's welfare increases with the
precision of public information.
The second chapter studies optimal information revelation with two-sided asymmetric infor-
ination. A sender chooses ex ante how her information will be revealed ex post with the goal of
persuading an informed receiver to take one of two actions. The sender faces a tradeoff between
the frequency and the persuasiveness of messages: sending positive messages more often (in terms
of the sender's private information) makes it less likely that the receiver will take the desired action
(in terms of the receiver's private information). Under the optimal mechanism, the sender's and
receiver's welfare is not monotone in the precision of the receiver's private information. I provide
necessary and sufficient conditions when the full information revelation is optimal and when the no
information revelation is optimal.
The third chapter (co-authored with Li Hao and Wei Li) studies a principal-agent problem
where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes
following a report by the informed agent. Compared to no commitment, the principal improves
the quality of communication from the agent. An ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal
corresponds to a finite partition of the state space, and each retained decision is suboptimal for
the principal, biased toward the agent's preference. Generally an optimal equilibrium does not
maximize the number of decisions the principal can credibly retain.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert S. Gibbons
Title: Sloan Distinguished Professor of Management and Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Muhamet Yildiz
Title: Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Optimal Information Revelation with
Uninformed Receiver
1.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the optimal design of information revelation by a sender who has an interest in
a non-contractible action taken by an uninformed receiver. The central questions of this chapter are:
First, how much and which part of information is optimally revealed by the sender? Second, how
do the sender's and receiver's expected utilities under the optimal revelation mechanism depend on
information structure?
To answer these questions, I consider the following sender-receiver game. The receiver has a
binary action choice: to act or not to act. The sender's utility depends only on the action taken by
the receiver, and she prefers the receiver to act. The receiver's utility depends both on his action
and on information. The receiver takes an action that maximizes his expected utility given his
belief. He forms his belief based on public information and information revealed by the sender.
The sender chooses ex ante how information will be revealed to the receiver ex post. Formally, she
can choose any conditional distribution of messages given information. I call this distribution a
mechanism. The sender chooses the mechanism that maximizes the ex ante probability that the
receiver will act. No monetary transfers between the sender and receiver are allowed.
The drug approval process by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a good example of
my model. It takes on average between 8 to 12 years of studies and testing for a pharmaceutical
company (PC) to get a new drug approved by the FDA. The FDA requires a PC to submit a research
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protocol for each test that the PC is planning to undertake. The research protocol includes both
required tests (for example, Ames test on toxicity) and tests designed by the PC. The FDA closely
monitors the record keeping and the adherence to the research protocol. If the test results are
satisfactory, the PC submits an application that contains all the information obtained during the
testing phase. Penalties for fraudulent or misleading claims are imposed. Finally, the FDA either
approves the drug or rejects it.1
To see that my model is a good approximation of the drug approval process, let us reinterpret the
PC as the sender, the FDA as the receiver, the FDA's approval decision as the receiver's action, the
research protocol as the sender's choice of a mechanism, the results of the required tests as public
information, and the results of the remaining tests as a message. Note that because of the length
of the drug approval process, the PC has presumably little information at the beginning of the
process. Furthermore, because of the large cost of the process (averaging more than $500 million)
and large benefits of approval, the PC has strong incentives to optimally design tests to maximize
the probability of the FDA's approval. In particular, the PC chooses dosage and characteristics
of volunteer patients, such as gender, age, and health condition. Due to the FDA's regulation
and close monitoring, the FDA essentially observes both the design and results (whether they are
positive or negative) of all tests. Finally, based on the results of these tests, the FDA approves the
drug if its benefits outweigh its costs and risks.
Note that I study a general problem of information revelation that fits many real-life examples
well, such as scientific experiments by interested parties, grading policy chosen by a school, and
accounting rules chosen by a firm. Of course, my model does not fit any of these examples perfectly.
For example, in contrast to my model, the FDA has some commitment power in its approval
decision, the PC cares not only about the probability of approval, the PC has constraints on its
research protocol. However, to give economic meaning to my results, I will explain them using the
drug approval example despite the inconsistencies between the model and the example.
Under the optimal design, the tests produce only two possible outcomes: a positive outcome that
gives minimal evidence sufficient for approval or a negative outcome that gives maximal evidence
against approving. More specifically, if the drug quality is above the cutoff, then the optimal
tests produce the positive outcome that persuades the FDA to approve the drug, otherwise the
tests produce the negative outcome that persuades the FDA to reject it. The cutoff quality is
determined by the condition that the FDA is indifferent between approving and rejecting the drug
The description of the drug approval process is taken from Lipsky and Sharp (2001).
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when the FDA gets positive news from the PC. 2 This design maximizes the probability of drug
approval given the feasibility constraint that the FDA cannot be fooled on average.
How does the PC's welfare (the probability of the drug approval) depends on information
structure? First, if the PC is able to design more informative tests, then its welfare increases. This
is because the PC can choose any mechanism, so it has free disposal of information. For example, if
the PC is allowed to run tests on 500 subjects, it can actually run tests on only 100 of them. Second,
if the FDA is optimistic about the drug quality, then the PC's welfare increases as well. This is
because the PC finds it easier to persuade the FDA to approve the drug if the FDA believes that
the drug is good in the first place. Interestingly, these two conditions are not only sufficient but also
necessary for the PC's welfare to increase regardless of the FDA's opportunity cost of approving
the drug. Finally, if public information becomes more precise, the PC's welfare decreases. That is,
if there are more required tests that the PC must to carry out, then the probability that the FDA
will approve the drug decreases because the PC has less freedom in manipulating the FDA.
How does the FDA's welfare (the expected quality of approved drugs) depend on information
structure? Surprisingly, the FDA's welfare does not change if the PC is able to design more
informative tests. This is because the optimal design of tests leaves no rent to the FDA. However,
the FDA's welfare increases with the precision of public information. That is, the quality of
approved drugs increases if the FDA requires the PC to run more tests.
Although the above monotone comparative statics results are intuitive, they do not generally
hold in the large existing literature where the sender chooses what information to reveal when
she already has her private information. In particular, they do not hold under cheap talk and
verifiable communication. This happens because in this literature, the sender faces an incentive
compatibility constraint on information revelation, which is missing in my model because the sender
has commitment in information revelation.
What happens if the FDA has some private information that is supported by hard evidence?
For example, the FDA has applications from other PCs that tested similar drugs. In this case, the
PC optimally elicits all private information from the FDA and then implements the optimal design
of tests as if this private information was public.
What happens if the PC has some private information before it submits the research protocol?
For example, the PC develops a drug and carries out preclinical trials. In this case, the PC reveals
recorded information and suppresses unrecorded information.
2 This result is closely related to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), which I discuss in Section 1.3.1.
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There is a large literature on strategic communication. In the cheap talk literature (Crawford
and Sobel (1982)), the sender sends an unverifiable message to the receiver who then takes a non-
contractible action, so it must be incentive compatible both for the sender to send her equilibrium
message and for the receiver to take his equilibrium action. In the delegation literature (Holmstrom
(1984)), the receiver can commit to how he uses the information revealed by the sender, so only
the sender faces an incentive constraint. In contrast, in Rayo and Segal (2010), Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011), and this chapter, the sender can commit to how she reveals the information to
the receiver, so only the receiver faces an incentive constraint.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) consider a much more general model than mine, with an ar-
bitrary set of actions, and arbitrary sender's and receiver's utility functions. They derive some
interesting properties of the optimal mechanism. To completely characterize the optimal mecha-
nism, I impose more structure on the problem that still fits many real-life examples well. Moreover, I
derive general monotone comparative statics results that relate the sender's and receiver's expected
utilities to information.
There is literature on equilibrium rather than optimal information revelation in environments
similar to mine (e.g.,Lerner and Tirole (2006) and Benoit and Dubra (2011)). There is also literature
on optimal information revelation in environments where monetary transfers are allowed (e.g.,
Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), and Eso and Szentes (2007)).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a model. Section 1.3
completely characterizes the optimal revelation mechanism and presents monotone comparative
statics results. Section 1.4 extends the model to allow the receiver's verifiable private information
and the sender's ex ante private information. Section 1.5 concludes. All proofs and technical details
are relegated to the appendix.
1.2 Model
Consider a communication game between a female sender and a male receiver. The receiver takes
a binary action a = 0, 1. Say that the receiver acts if he takes a = 1 and the receiver does not act
if he takes a = 0. The sender's utility depends only on a, but the receiver's utility depends both
on a and on (s, r), where components s and r denote the sender's and public types. Without loss
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of generality, the sender's utility is a, and the receiver's utility is no if a = 0 and s if a = 1.3 Before
(s, r) is realized, the sender can commit to a mechanism that sends a message m to the receiver as a
(stochastic) function of (s, r); specifically, the sender chooses the conditional distribution # (mIs, r)
of m given (s, r).
Assume that the set of messages M contains at least two elements mo and mi, the set of
sender's types S is [s, -] where s < 0 < -, the set of public types R is an arbitrary set that satisfies
regularity conditions that ensure that all conditional expectations exist. The information (s, r) has
some joint distribution. For this distribution, assume that the marginal distribution G (r) of r and
the conditional distribution F (sir) of s given r admit strictly positive densities g (r) and f (sir).
The timing of the communication game is as follows:
1. The sender publicly chooses a mechanism # (mIs, r).
2. A tuple (m, s, r) is drawn according to d, F, and G.
3. The receiver observes (m, r) and takes an action a.
The solution concept used is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). At the third stage, the
receiver forms a belief and acts if and only if the conditional expectation EO [sirm, r] of s given
(m, r) is at least uo. (Note that a PBE requires that the receiver takes the sender's preferred
action whenever he is indifferent between the two actions.) At the first stage, the sender chooses
an optimal mechanism that maximizes her expected utility, the probability that the receiver acts.
Using the revelation principle, restrict attention to mechanisms that send only two messages:
mo that persuades the receiver not to act and mi that persuades the receiver to act. Adopt the
convention that # (miIs, r) denotes the probability of the message mi given (s, r). Hereafter, all
notions are in the weak sense. For example, increasing means not decreasing and higher means not
lower.
1.3 Analysis
1.3.1 Optimal Mechanism
The optimal mechanism #* has a simple cutoff structure:
Indeed, suppose that the receiver's utility is uo (s, r) if a = 0 and Ui (s, r) if a = 1. Because the action is binary,
only the difference ui (s, r) - uo (s, r) matters for the receiver's choice of action, so uo (s, r) can be normalized to Uo
(or even to 0). Further, for any given r, which is observed both by the sender and the receiver, the sender's type can
be transformed according to u1 (., r).
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Theorem 1.1 The optimal mechanism is given by
1) if s > 9(r),#(mils, r) = s~ ) (1.1)
0 if s < 9(r) .
If f7 sf (sir) ds > uo, then 9(r) = s; otherwise 1(r) < 0 is the unique solution to J( sf (sir) ds
u0 .
Clearly, the optimal mechanism is conditioned on each piece of public information r. This
implies that it does not matter whether the sender commits to a mechanism before or after the
realization of r. I give the intuition for Theorem 1.1 conditional on some value r. If it is not
possible to induce the receiver to always act, then the optimal mechanism induces the receiver to
act if and only if his utility is above the cutoff. The cutoff is such that the receiver is indifferent to
act whenever he acts. Intuitively, the optimal mechanism has two defining features: (i) it makes
the receiver be indifferent to act whenever he acts; and (ii) it makes the receiver know whether his
utility is above the cutoff. If the first feature were violated, then the receiver would strongly prefer
to act whenever he acts. Thus, it would be possible to increase the probability that the receiver
acts by sending mi for a slightly large set of types s. If the second feature were violated, then it
would be possible to construct a mechanism that sends mi with the same probability but to higher
types s. This mechanism would violate the first feature, so it would be possible to increase the
probability that the receiver acts.
Theorem 1.1 extends when the distribution of (s, r) does not admit a density. The only difference
is that the optimal mechanism may randomize over messages at the cutoff as the following example
shows. Suppose that there is no public information and F is a discrete distribution that assigns
probabilities 1 and to 1 and -1. The optimal mechanism sends the message mi if s = 1, and
the messages mi and mo with equal probabilities if s = -1. As a result, the receiver who gets mi
is indifferent to act and the probability of mi is .3.
Weaker versions of Theorem 1.1 appear in the literature. Lerner and Tirole (2006) show that
the mechanism from Theorem 1.1 is optimal in a smaller class of feasible mechanisms in a more
specific setting than mine. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) establish Theorem 1.1 for the above
example. For a more general setting than mine, they derive interesting properties of the optimal
mechanism, which can also be used to establish Theorem 1.1.
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1.3.2 Comparative Statics without Public Information
For simplicity, assume in this section that there is no public information. Theorem 1.2 presents
the monotone comparative statics results that relate the sender's and receiver's expected utilities
under the optimal mechanism to the distribution of the sender's type. This theorem uses the
standard definitions from the literature on stochastic orders. Let Pi and P2 be two distributions.
P2 is higher than Pi in the increasing convex order if there exists a distribution P such that P2
first-order stochastically dominates P and P is a mean-preserving spread of P1 .4
Theorem 1.2 5 Let F1 and F2 be two distributions of s that do not depend on r.
1. The sender's expected utility is higher under F2 than under F1 for all uo if and only if F2 is
higher than F1 in the increasing convex order.
2. The receiver's expected utility is higher under F2 than under F1 for all uo if and only if
E F2 [s] > EF1 [s].
Part 2 holds because the optimal mechanism is as uninformative as possible from the receiver's
perspective as follows from Theorem 1.1. Indeed, under the optimal mechanism, if the receiver
acts, then he either holds the prior belief or is indifferent to act. Thus, the receiver's expected
utility under the optimal mechanism is max {E [s], uo}, which is equal to his expected utility under
a mechanism that sends the same message regardless of s.
Part 1 is more interesting. Suppose for the sake of argument that there is an underlying binary
state w that can take only two values wi < 0 and W2 > 0. The receiver's utility is w if he acts (and
uo if he does not). The sender's type s is a noisy signal about w and is normalized to the expectation
of w given s; specifically, the posterior Pr (w2 |s) is equal to W . If F is a mean-preserving spread
of F1 , then distribution of posteriors under F is a mean-preserving spread of that under F1 by the
linearity of Pr (w2|s) in s. This can be interpreted as F being more informative about the state
(Blackwell (1953)). Since the sender can choose any mechanism in my model, all mechanisms under
F1 are also feasible under F, which immediately implies that the sender's expected utility is higher
under F. If F2 first-order stochastically dominates F, then F2 is more favorable for acting and thus
the sender can persuade the receiver to act more often. This intuition shows that F2 being higher
4 See Definition 1.1 and Lemma 1.1 in the appendix for more definitions and results on stochastic orders.
5 The assumption that distribution of s admits a density is not critical for this theorem. Further, as follows from
the proof, it is straightforward to write a strong version of this theorem in which the sender's and receiver's expected
utilities are strictly higher under F 2 .
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than Fi in the increasing convex order is sufficient for the conclusion that the sender's expected
utility is higher under F2 . It turns out that this condition is also necessary if the conclusion is
required to hold for all uO.
Based on this intuition, the comparative statics results can be extended beyond this model as
long as the sender can choose any mechanism at the ex ante stage. This assumption, however, is
critical for the results.
Under a cheap talk version of my model, the sender would not be able to reveal any information
because she always prefers the receiver to act. Thus, the sender's expected utility would not
change as her information becomes more precise. More generally, Green and Stokey (2007) and
Ivanov (2010b) show that the sender's expected utility may strictly decrease in the precision of
her information. This happens because having less precise information may reduce the sender's
incentive to misrepresent information.
Similarly, under a verifiable communication version of my model, the sender would completely
reveal her information (Milgrom (1981)). Thus, by Theorem 1.1, it is optimal for the sender to
know only whether the receiver's utility is above the cutoff, which is less informative than knowing
the receiver's utility exactly. That is, the sender's utility may strictly decrease as her information
becomes more precise.
1.3.3 Comparative Statics with Public Information
This section generalizes the previous section and obtains comparative statics results with respect
to public information. To present the comparative statics results, we need to extend the stochastic
orders introduced in Section 1.3.1 to the multidimensional case. 6 The multidimensionality arises be-
cause each piece of public information r is associated with a conditional distribution of the sender's
type s. Therefore, to compare distributions of r, we essentially need to compare distributions of
distributions of s.
Theorem 1.3 presents the monotone comparative statics results that relate the sender's and
receiver's expected utilities to the distribution of public information. This theorem uses a new
stochastic order. P2 is higher than P1 in the increasing concave order if there exists P such that
P2 first-order stochastically dominates P and P1 is a mean-preserving spread of P.
6 See Definition 1.2 and Lemma 1.2 in the appendix for definitions and results on multidimensional stochastic
orders.
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Theorem 1.3 Let P be the set of distributions on [s,s]. Let r be identified with the conditional
distribution F of s given r. Let G1 and G2 be two distributions of r such that F (.1r) admits a
strictly positive density for all r in the supports of G1 and G 2.
1. Let a partial order on P be the increasing convex order; specifically, for all r 1 , r 2 - P, r 2 is
higher than r1 if F (.|r2) is higher than F (.|r1) in the increasing convex order. If G 2 is higher
than G1 in the increasing concave order, then the sender's expected utility under the optimal
mechanism is higher under G2 than under G1 .
2. Let an order on P be the mean order; specifically, for all r1 , r2 E P, r2 is higher than r1
if EF [sir2] EF [slr1- If G2 is higher than G1 in the increasing convex order, then the
receiver's expected utility under the optimal mechanism is higher under G 2 than under G1.
We first discuss part 1 of Theorem 1.3. If G2 is higher than G1 in the increasing concave
order, then there exists G such that G2 first-order stochastically dominates G and G1 is a mean-
preserving spread of G. First, G2 puts a higher probability than G on public types r that result
in a higher probability that the receiver acts conditional on r by Theorem 1.2 part 1. Therefore,
the unconditional probability that the receiver acts is also higher under G2. Second, based on the
intuition from the previous section, the receiver is less informed about s under G than under G 1,
and, therefore, it is easier to persuade him to act. Intuitively, since the sender can choose any
mechanism in my model, she can use a mechanism that sends two messages sequentially. The first
stage of this mechanism will then make public information more precise and the second stage can
be designed to reveal the optimal amount of information given more precise public information.
We now turn to part 2 of Theorem 1.3. Theorem 1.1 implies that the receiver has the same
expected utility under the optimal mechanism and the mechanism 0 that sends the same message
regardless of s. If G2 is higher than G1 in the increasing convex order, then there exists G such
that G2 first-order stochastically dominates G and G is a mean-preserving spread of G1. First,
G2 puts a higher probability on public types r that are more favorable for acting by Theorem
1.2 part 2. Thus, overall, G2 is more favorable for acting than G1. Taking into account that the
receiver's utility from not acting is fixed, and the receiver acts only if his expected utility from
acting conditional on his information exceeds his expected utility from not acting, we get that the
receiver's expected utility under #,, is higher under G2 than under G. Second, public information
is more precise under G than under G1. Therefore, under #,,, the receiver takes a more appropriate
action and, thus, the receiver's expected utility is higher under G than under G1.
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Although the receiver's expected utility increases with the precision of public information, the
social welfare does not necessarily increase even if it includes the sender's expected utility with
a very small weight. Indeed, suppose that initially there is no public information. As public
information appears, the marginal increase in the receiver's expected utility is 0 by the envelope
theorem (Radner and Stiglitz (1984)), but the marginal decrease in the sender's expected utility is
strictly positive.
1.4 Extensions
1.4.1 Receiver's Verifiable Private Information
In this section, the receiver is allowed to have verifiable private information. As usual, verifiable
information is the information that cannot be lied about but can be concealed. In this case, the
sender extracts the receiver's information at no cost and then reveals her information optimally as
if the receiver's type was public. Therefore, all results of Section 1.3 apply.
To illustrate this result, assume that the type r is privately known by the receiver rather than
publicly known. In other respects, the environment is the same as in Section 1.2. In particular,
players, actions, information structure, and preferences are the same. In addition, assume that the
set of receiver's types R is given by [r, r] and is ordered in such a way that §'(r) is strictly increasing
in r where 9(r) is given by Theorem 1.1.
Similarly to Milgrom (1981), assume that the set of receiver's reports is N (r) [r, r]. That
is, the receiver can report any type that is lower than his true type. Informally, the report n can
be viewed as the receiver's claim that his true type r is at least n and the receiver's claims are
required to be truthful in that r must belong to [n, T).
Now a mechanism # sends a message m to the receiver as a (stochastic) function of (s, n). Finally,
the timing of the game is as follows: 1. The sender publicly chooses a mechanism # (mIs, n). 2.
The receiver's type r is drawn according to G. 3. The receiver makes a report n. 4. A vector (m, s)
is drawn according to # and F. 5. The receiver gets a message m and takes an action a.
Theorem 1.4 characterizes the unique PBE of this game:
Theorem 1.4 7 In the unique PBE, the receiver reports his true type n = r and the sender chooses
the optimal mechanism <0* given by Theorem 1.1.
7 Formally, a PBE is not necessarily unique, but all PBE have the same equilibrium mapping from (s, r) to the
receiver's action a. See the proof for details.
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This theorem shows that without loss of generality we can view the receiver's verifiable private
information as public information. This result is in spirit of the standard unravelling result due
to Milgrom (1981) who show that generally all verifiable private information is revealed in an
equilibrium.
Note that the mechanism #* and truthful reporting of the receiver constitutes a PBE even if
the sender has partial commitment in that she can choose a mechanism only after the receiver's
report. However, this PBE is not unique in this new model. For example, there exists a PBE in
which the receiver always reports n = 0.8
1.4.2 Sender's Ex Ante Private Information
In this section, the sender is allowed to have private information before she chooses a mechanism.
As a result, the sender reveals all of her verifiable information and none of her unverifiable informa-
tion. Thus, without loss of generality, the sender's verifiable information can be viewed as public
information, and the sender's ex ante unverifiable information can be integrated out.
To illustrate these results, assume that the type r is privately known by the sender rather than
publicly known. In other respects, the environment is the same as in Section 1.2. In addition,
assume that F(r) > s for all r C R where .?(r) is given by Theorem 1.1 and the set of receiver's
types R is given by [r, T] and is ordered in such a way that 9(r) is strictly decreasing in r.
The timing of the game is as follows: 1. The sender's type r is drawn according to G. 2. The
sender makes a report n. 3. The sender publicly chooses a mechanism # (mis, n). 4. A vector
(m, s) is drawn according to # and F. 5. The receiver gets a report n and a message m and takes
an action a.
Theorem 1.5 characterizes the unique PBE for both verifiable and unverifiable information of
the sender. If the sender's information is verifiable, then the set of her reports is N (r) = [r, r]. If
the sender's information is unverifiable, then the set of her reports is N = [r, T] regardless of r.
Theorem 1.5 9 If the sender's ex ante private information is verifiable, then in the unique PBE,
the sender reports n = r and chooses the optimal mechanism #* given by Theorem 1.1.
8
ndeed, suppose that the sender believes that each out-of-equilibrium report n , 0 is made by the receiver with
type r = n. Note that under such a belief, the sender chooses a mechanism #* (mis, n) for any n 0 0. Thus, the
receiver's interim expected utility from reporting n f 0 is max {uo,E [s~r}}, which is smaller than that from reporting
n = 0.
9 Again, a PBE is not unique, but the equilibrium mapping from (s, r) to a is unique.
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If the sender's ex ante private information is unverifiable, then in the unique PBE, the sender
reports some fixed n regardless of r and chooses the optimal mechanism #** given by Theorem 1.1
where F (sir) is replaced with fR F (sjr) g (r) dr for all r.
The sender reveals all her verifiable private information is again due to the standard unravelling
argument (Milgrom (1981)). The sender conceals all her unverifiable private information because
regardless of her information she always wants to pretend that she has one piece of information
rather than another. Note that if the sender could commit to a mechanism before realization of
r, then by Theorem 1.1, the optimal mechanism would be #** where #** is defined in Theorem
1.5. That is, the full commitment optimum is achieved as the equilibrium outcome if the sender's
information is unverifiable. This observation is consistent with Theorem 1.3, which shows that the
sender's expected utility decreases with the precision of public information.
1.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have studied optimal information revelation mechanisms. I have imposed the
following key assumptions. First, the sender can choose ex ante how her information will be revealed
ex post in that she can choose any conditional distribution of messages given her information.
Second, the receiver has a binary action choice. Third, the sender's utility depends on the receiver's
action but does not depend on information. Fourth, the receiver is uninformed.
The optimal mechanism has a particularly simple structure. It reveals only whether the sender's
utility is above the cutoff where the cutoff is such that the receiver does not get any rent from
learning whether his utility is above or below it.
The sender's and receiver's welfare is monotone in information. The sender's welfare increases
with the precision of her potential information and decreases with the precision of public informa-
tion. The receiver's welfare does not change with the precision of the sender's potential information
and increases with the precision of public information.
I have also analyzed the extensions where the sender and the receiver are allowed to have
ex ante private information. However, in this chapter, I have not explored an environment in
which the receiver has unverifiable private information. Generically, the receiver does have some
private information at least by the time he takes an action. For example, the FDA carries out
an independent review after receiving the application from the PC. Moreover, the PC is uncertain
about preferences and beliefs of the FDA regarding the safety and efficacy of a new drug. Since the
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optimal mechanism leaves no rent to the receiver if the receiver is uninformed, as a trivial result, we
get that the optimal mechanism is (weakly) more informative if the receiver is privately informed.
The detailed analysis of this environment is the central goal of the next chapter.
1.6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1.1. The optimal mechanism #* solves
maximize f (sjr) g (r) 4 (mils, r) drds
e~m|sr)[01]SxR
subject to
sf (sIr) d (mils, r) uo.
The Lagrangian for this problem is given by:
S= (1+ sA (r))f(sIr) g (r) 0 (mis, r) drds,
where A (r) g (r) is a multiplier for the constraint. Since the choice variable 4 (mi Is, r) belongs to
the unit interval, we get that #(mils,r) = 1 if s > -g and #(mils,r) = 0 if s < - 1 where
A (r) is 0 if EF [sjr] > no and is such that the constraint is binding if EF [s r] < uo. M
Definition 1.1 Let X 1 and X 2 be two random variables with distributions P1 and P2 on (x, |-
Say that
1. P 2 first-order stochastically dominates P 1 (denoted by P2  st P1 ) if P2 (x) : P1 (x) for all x.
2. P2 is a mean-preserving spread of P1 (denoted by P2 >cx P1 ) if there exist two random
variables X 2 and k 1 , defined on the same probability space, with distributions P2 and P1 such
that E $j2|$,_1 = $ 1.
3. P2 is higher than Pi in the increasing convex order (denoted by P2 kicx P1 ) if there exists a
distribution P such that P2  st P >cx P1 .
Lemma 1.1 Let P1 and P2 be two distributions that admit densities on [x,T].
1. P2 >st P1 i and only if E [h (X 2 )] > E [h (X 1 )] for all increasing functions h.
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2. P2 >c P1 if and only if E [h (X 2)] ;> E [h (X1) for all convex functions h.
3. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) P 2 >icx P1 ; (b) E [h (X 2 )] E [h (X 1 )] for all increasing convex functions h; (c) j P2  (p) dp
fP- (p) di3 for all p [ (0,1].
Proof of Lemma 1.1. See Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) Section 1.A.1 for part 1, Section
3.A.1 for part 2, and Section 4.A.1 for part 3. m
Proof of Theorem 1.2. I start by proving the first part. Let si be given by Theorem 1.1
where F is replaced with Fi. If F2  i F 1 (Definition 1.1), then the sender can induce the receiver
to act with higher probability under F 2 than under F1 because
sdF2 (s)- F 1 (p) di > F 1 (p-)d= sdF1(s) uo,
.jF2 (Fi(1)) F1 (1) . F1 (i). 1
where the equalities hold by the appropriate change of variables, the first inequality holds by
Lemma 1.1 part 3(c), and the last inequality holds by Theorem 1.1. Conversely, if F2  ic F 1, then
there exists p such that f P j (p5) dj@ < fp P7 1 (p) dp. Setting uo =f}-i sdF2 (s) and using an
analogous argument, we get that the receiver acts with a strictly higher probability under F1 than
under F2 :
sdF1 (s)= F (p)d< F (p)dy=5 sdF2 (s)= uo.
,] Fi1(p) p jp F2 (P
Now I prove the second part. The receiver's expected utility under Fi is max {EFi [s] , uo
by Theorem 1.1. Clearly, if EF2 [s] EF1 [s], then max{EF2 [s] , uo} max {EFi [s] , uo for
all u0 . Conversely, if EF2 [s] < EFi [s], then max {EF2 [s] , uo} < max {EFi [s] , uo} for any uO E
(EF2 [s] , EF1 [s]) -
Definition 1.2 Let P be the set of distributions on [x, x] endowed with some partial order >p. Let
X1 and X 2 be two random elements with distributions Q1 and Q2 on P. Say that
1. Q2 first-order stochastically dominates Q1 (denoted by Q2 mst Q1) if PrQ2 (X 2 E U) >
PrQ, (X 1 E U) for all measurable sets U C P such that P >p P' and P' E U imply P E U.
2. Q2 is a mean-preserving spread o~f Q1 (denoted by Q2 mcx Q1) if there exist two random
elements X 2 and X 1 , defined on the same probability space, with distributions Q2 and Q1
such that E [ 2 |1k1] = 1.
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3. Q2 is higher than Q1 in the increasing convex order (denoted by Q2 micx Q1) if there exists
a distribution Q such that Q2 mst Q mcx Q1.
4. Q2 is higher than Q1 in the increasing concave order (denoted by Q2 micv Q1) if there exists
a distribution Q such that Q2 mst Q and Q1 mcx Q.
Lemma 1.2 Let Q1 and Q2 be two distributions on P.
1. Q2 mst Q1 if and only if E [h (X 2 )] > E [h (X 1 )] for all increasing functions h in that
h (P2 ) h (P1 ) for all P1,P 2 E P such that P2  p P1.
2. Q2 >mcx Q1 if and only if E [h (X 2 )] ! E [h (Xi)] for all convex functions h in that h (aPi + (1- a) P 2)
ah (Pi) + (1 - a) h (P 2) for all P1, P2 E P and all a E (0, 1).
3. Q2 >micx Q1 if and only if E [h (X 2 )] E [h (X 1 )] for all increasing convex functions h.
4. Q2 micv Qi if and only if E [h (X 2 )] l E [h (X 1 )] for all increasing concave functions h.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. See Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) Section 6.B.1 for part 1, and
Section 7.A.1 for parts 2, 3, and 4. m
Proof of Theorem 1.3. The probability that the receiver acts is fR p* (r) dG (r) where
the conditional probability p* (r) that the receiver acts is given by 1 - F (-(r) Ir) with F(r) given
by Theorem 1.1. The function p* is increasing in r (in the increasing convex order) by The-
orem 1.2 part 1. Moreover, p* is concave in r. For concavity, it suffices to show that there
exists a mechanism # that induces the receiver to act with probability ap* (ri) + (1 - a) p* (r2)
when the distribution of s is aF (sirI) + (1 - a) F (sIr2). Without loss of generality, suppose
that '(ri) > -8(r2 ). The required mechanism is as follows. If s > -8(ri), the receiver gets the
message mi. If s C [9(r 2 ) , 9(ri)), the receiver gets the messages mi and mo with probabilities
Pi F((I -) r(F((r1) I r2)-F((r 2)Ir 2)) and 1 - pi, respectively. If s < 9(r2), the
receiver gets the message m. Since p* is increasing and concave in r, part 1 of the theorem follows
by Lemma 1.2 part 4.
Theorem 1.1 implies that the receiver's expected utility is
max uo, j sdF (slr) dG (r).
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Both the constant no and fsdF (sir) are inear and increasing in r (in the mean order). Since the
maximum of two increasing linear functions is increasing and convex, part 2 follows by Lemma 1.2
part 3. m
Proof of Theorem 1.4. I start by showing that the described strategies constitute a PBE.
If the receiver reports n = r, then his interim expected utility is max {uo, E [sIr] } as follows from
Theorem 1.1. If the receiver reports n < r, then his interim expected utility is again max {uO, E [sir]}
because (r) is increasing in r. Thus, given the mechanism #*, it is a best response for the receiver
to report his true type n = r. To see that it is optimal for the sender to choose #* at the first
stage, note that #* is the optimal mechanism in the relaxed problem where r is publicly known, so
#* gives a higher expected utility to the sender than all other feasible mechanisms.
To complete the proof, I show that in all PBEs, the sender chooses #* and the receiver reports
n = r if 9(r) > s. However, for r such that '(r) = s, the receiver can make any feasible report in
a PBE, but all these reports result in the message mi sent by the mechanism #*. Suppose to get a
contradiction that there exists another PBE. In this PBE, the sender's expected utility is strictly
less than in the above PBE because #* is the optimal mechanism in the relaxed problem. Consider
a mechanism # that sends the message mi if and only if s > (r) + 6 where 8 > 0 is sufficiently
small. Under this mechanism, the receiver strictly prefers to report his true type r and the sender's
expected utility is arbitrarily close to that under #*. A contradiction. m
Proof of Theorem 1.5. Suppose that given the sender's report n, r is distributed accord-
ing to G,. Given this report, the receiver believes that s is distributed according to F" (s) =
fR F (sIr) dGn (r). By sequential rationality, at the third stage, the sender chooses the optimal
mechanism #* that sends ml if and only if s > where - is given by Theorem 1.1 where F (sir)
is replaced with Fn (s).
I start by considering the case where the sender's information is verifiable. In this case, the
sender r can make a report n only if r > n. Thus, the support of G, does not intersect [r, n).
Suppose to get a contradiction that there exists an equilibrium report n such that H, is supported
on [rn, T2 ] with 7, > n. This means that with a strictly positive probability, the sender Tn makes
the report n and induces the receiver to act with probability 1 - F (8nIT). If this sender made
the report in instead, then she would induce the receiver to act with a strictly higher probability
because §#n < 9n, which leads to a contradiction." Thus, G, assigns probability one to r = n,
10 The inequality T, < holds because < (T<() < . Suppose to get a contradiction that 9, < (7n), then
f sdFn (s) =fZ (f sf (sir) dr) dGn (r) < 0, contradicting the definition of 9 . The equality holds by Fubini's
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which means that the sender reports n = r for all r.
Now, I consider the case where the sender's information is unverifiable. Suppose to get a
contradiction that there exist two equilibrium reports ni and n2 such that sl < n2 . Then the
sender would always prefer to report ni regardless of r. A contradiction. *
Theorem and the definition of F, (s). The inequality holds because 9(r) < 0 is strictly decreasing in r and thus
f sf (sjr) ds < f) sf (sjr) ds = 0 for all r < 7. Noting that the support of G-, does not intersect [r, r.) and
using a similar argument gives , i(m).
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Chapter 2
Optimal Information Revelation with
Informed Receiver
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies optimal information revelation from an informed sender to an informed re-
ceiver. Most of the literature on communication assumes that only the sender has private infor-
mation.1 But generically, each player has private information. The central goal of this chapter is
to understand economic aspects of optimal information revelation when agents obtain information
from various sources.
In my model, the receiver decides whether to act or not to act. The sender's utility depends
only on the action taken by the receiver, and she prefers the receiver to act. The receiver's utility
depends both on his action and on information. The receiver takes an action that maximizes his
expected utility given his belief that is based on his private information and information revealed
by the sender. Before obtaining her private information, the sender can commit to how her private
information will be revealed to the receiver. Formally, the sender can choose any (stochastic)
mapping from her information to messages, which I call a revelation mechanism. The sender
chooses the revelation mechanism that maximizes the ex ante probability that the receiver will act.
For example, consider a school that chooses a grading policy for a student in order to persuade a
potential employer to hire him. The school has a lot of freedom in choosing which part of available
information about the student will appear on his transcript, which will be observed by the employer.
'Notable exceptions include Watson (1996) and Chen (2009).
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Moreover, the school chooses its grading policy before it learns anything about the student. The
employer obtains private information from conducting an employment interview. Similarly, the
school uses the same grading policy for all students who apply to various jobs. In terms of my
model, this also contributes to the receiver's private information.
There are many other examples that fit my model well, such as scientific experimentation by
interested parties, and there are still other examples that fit my model somewhat imperfectly: An
advertising agency emphasizes special attributes of a product to persuade consumers to buy it.
A political party outlines its political platform to persuade citizens to vote for it. A sponsor of
a proposal presents details of her proposal to persuade a committee to approve it. In these latter
examples, the sender typically cannot directly commit to a revelation mechanism ex ante. However,
as I discuss in the appendix, there are three other kinds of situations that are formally equivalent
to assuming that the sender has commitment power.
Since the receiver has private information, he acts or does not act depending not only on a
message received from the sender but also on his private information. Thus, from the sender's
perspective, each message generates a probability distribution over receiver's actions. At the ex
ante stage when the sender chooses how to reveal her information ex post, she faces a tradeoff
between the frequency and the persuasiveness of messages that she sends ex post: sending positive
messages more often (in terms of the sender's private information) makes it less likely that the
receiver will act (in terms of the receiver's private information). The optimal revelation mechanism
balances these two conflicting objectives. For example, the school may choose lower standards
for getting good grades. In this case, more students will get good-looking transcripts. However,
employers will rationally account for this and each student with a good-looking transcript will find
it harder to get a job.
Interestingly, under the optimal revelation mechanism, the sender's and receiver's expected
utilities are not monotone in the precision of the receiver's private information. 2 First, as the
receiver becomes more informed, his expected utility may decrease despite the fact that he is
the only player who takes an action that directly affects his utility. This happens because the
optimal revelation mechanism changes with the precision of the receiver's private information,
and the sender may prefer to reveal significantly less information as the receiver becomes more
informed. Thus, it may be beneficial for employers to commit to less informative interviews because
2In contrast, in the previous chapter, I show that the sender's and receiver's expected utilities are monotone in
information if the receiver does not have private information.
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it motivates schools to design more informative grading policies. 3 Second, it may be easier for the
sender to influence a better informed receiver. This happens because the sender may optimally
choose to target only the receiver with positive private information. In this case, it becomes easier
for the sender to persuade the receiver with more precise positive information.
Under a weak assumption that receiver's types can be ordered according to their willingness
to act, the sender's problem of finding an optimal mechanism reduces to a linear program, which
is similar to a transportation problem. Duality theory allows us to characterize when a candidate
mechanism is optimal. For example, schools choose various grading policies and duality theory
allows us to find primitive conditions on the environment that justify each particular choice of a
grading policy. In particular, the full revelation is optimal if the sender prefers to separate any two
of her types than to pool them. In contrast, the no revelation mechanism is optimal if the sender
prefers to pool any three of her types than to pool two of them and reveal the third one. Under
further assumptions, the amount of information that is optimally revealed is determined by the
convexity properties of the distribution of the receiver's private information.
In the benchmark model, I assume that the receiver does not communicate with the sender.
This assumption fits many real-life examples. In particular, the school gives the same transcripts
to students, regardless of where students are applying for a job. Similarly, the employer conducts
an interview after it receives a student's transcript. However, this assumption is not without loss
of generality because the sender can potentially increase the probability that the receiver acts by
conditioning the mechanism on the receiver's report. I give examples when allowing more general
mechanisms with two-way communication helps the sender and when it does not.
Similar to this chapter, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010), Rayo and Segal (2010), and Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011) study environments where the sender can commit to a revelation mechanism.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) consider a much more general model than mine. However, they
focus on the case where the receiver does not have private information. In contrast, the main
focus of this chapter is on the case where the receiver does have private information, where both
the results and analytical techniques are very different. Similar to this chapter, Rayo and Segal
(2010) assume that the receiver has a binary action choice, but they allow the sender's utility
to depend not only on the action but also on information. To make the analysis tractable, they
impose a special assumption on the receiver's information structure that would make my model
trivial in that the sender's expected utility would be the same under any revelation mechanism, as
3 Arvey and Campion (1982) summarizes research on the reliability and validity of interviews.
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follows from my Theorem 2.1 part 1. Similar to this chapter, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) study
information revelation in matching markets. The most important difference is that they study
equilibrium rather than optimal information revelation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops a general model and discusses
the commitment assumption. Section 2.3 presents two examples that illustrate the main tradeoff of
the sender, non-monotone comparative statics, and informativeness of the optimal revelation mech-
anism. Section 2.4 partially characterizes the optimal revelation mechanism and derives primitive
necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality of full revelation and no revelation mechanisms
for the case where the sender's and receiver's information has a fairly general structure. Section
2.5 extends the model to allow two-way information revelation between the sender and receiver.
Section 2.6 concludes. Appendix A completely characterizes the optimal revelation mechanism for
the case where the sender's and receiver's information structure is binary. Appendix B contains all
formal proofs. Appendix C discusses the sender's commitment assumption.
2.2 Model
Consider a communication game between a female sender and a male receiver. The receiver takes a
binary action a = 0, 1. Say that the receiver acts if he takes a = 1 and the receiver does not act if he
takes a = 0. The sender's utility depends only on a, but the receiver's utility depends both on a and
on (r, s) where components r and s denote the receiver's and sender's types, respectively. That is,
the sender's utility is a, and the receiver's utility is au (r, s) where u is a continuously differentiable
function. Before s is realized, the sender can commit to a mechanism that sends a message rn to
the receiver as a (stochastic) function of her type s; specifically, the sender chooses the conditional
distribution # (mis) of m given s. With a slight abuse of notation, the joint distribution of (m, s)
is denoted by # (m, s).
Note that the model assumes that the receiver does not communicate with the sender. This
assumption fits many real-life examples. In particular, the school gives the same transcripts to
students, regardless of where students are applying for a job. Similarly, the employer conducts an
interview after it receives a student's transcript. However, this assumption is not without loss of
generality because, the receiver has private information in my model. In this case, the sender can
potentially increase the probability that the receiver acts by conditioning the mechanism on the
receiver's report. Section 2.5 extends the model to allow communication from the receiver to the
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sender.
Assume that the set of messages coincides with the real line, the set of receiver's types R is
[r, r], and the set of sender's types S is [s, -]. The information (s, r) has some joint distribution.
Unless stated otherwise, assume that for this distribution, the marginal distribution F (s) of s and
the conditional distribution G (rls) of r given s admit strictly positive continuously differentiable
densities f (s) and g (rIs).
The timing of the communication game is as follows:
1. The sender publicly chooses a mechanism # (m s).
2. A vector (m, r, s) is drawn according to #, G, and F.
3. The receiver observes (m, r) and takes an action a.
The solution concept used is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). At the third stage, the
receiver forms a belief about s and acts if and only if the conditional expectation EO [u (r, s) In, r]
of s given (m, r) is at least 0. At the first stage, the sender chooses an optimal mechanism that
maximizes her expected utility, the probability that the receiver acts.
Hereafter, use the following definitions and conventions. All notions are in the weak sense,
unless stated otherwise. For example, increasing means not decreasing and higher means not lower.
Two mechanisms are equivalent if they result in the same probability that the receiver acts. One
mechanism dominates another mechanism if the former results in a higher probability that the
receiver acts than the latter. The full revelation mechanism (denoted by f ull) is a mechanism that
sends a different message for each s. The no revelation mechanism (denoted by #,, 0) is a mechanism
that sends the same message regardless of s. The survival function H of a random variable with
distribution H is defined as HT 1 - H.
2.3 Examples
In this section, I discuss two illustrative examples. For these examples, I derive the optimal mecha-
nism and the central tradeoff that the sender faces. Further, I show that the sender's and receiver's
expected utilities are non-monotone in information. Finally, I discuss what determines how much
of information is optimally revealed.
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2.3.1 Binary Example
In this example, the sender's and receiver's types are binary. Further, the sender is perfectly
informed, but the receiver is imperfectly informed. That is, the sender knows the receiver's utility
exactly, but the receiver only gets an imperfect signal about his utility.
More formally, the receiver's utility from acting is equal to the sender's type s that takes two
values: s = 1 with probability 1 and s = -1 with probability 1. The receiver's type (equivalently
signal) r also takes two values r = 1 and r -1 according to the following conditional probabilities:
Pr (r = 11s = 1) =Pr (r = -1|s = -1) = p.
The parameter p captures the precision of the receiver's private signal. For example, this may
correspond to the quality of an interview conducted by an employer. Without loss of generality,
assume that p E [1, 1]. For a given mechanism, the receiver r = 1 assigns a higher probability that
s is 1, than the receiver r = -1. Moreover, the difference in their assessments of the probability that
s is 1 increases in p. Thus, p can be alternatively viewed as the measure of polarization between
the optimistic receiver (r = 1) and the pessimistic receiver (r = -1).
A message m under a mechanism > generates a posterior probability Pro (sIm) of s given m for
each value s. The probability Pro (s = In, r) that s is 1, given the receiver's message m and signal
r, can be calculated using Bayes' rule. The receiver acts if Pro (v = 1|m, r) 1. It is straightforward
to calculate that upon receiving m, the optimistic receiver acts if Pr, (s = 1m) > 1 - p, and the
pessimistic receiver acts if Pro (s = 1m) 2 p. Clearly, if m induces the pessimistic receiver to act,
it also induces the optimistic receiver to act. Thus, by the revelation principle, we can restrict
attention to mechanisms with three messages: (i) me that induces the receiver not to act regardless
of his signal (Pro (s = 1|me) E [0,1 -- p)), (ii) mil that induces only the optimistic receiver to act
(Pro (s = 1mi) C [1 - p, p)), and (iii) ri,_ 1 that induces the receiver to act regardless of his signal
(Pro (s = 1|mi,_i) E [p, 1]). Because the sender's expected utility is equal to the probability that
the receiver acts, she would strictly prefer to send ml,_1 over mi and mi over me if there were no
constraints on how often she can send various messages.
The prior distribution of s, however, imposes a constraint on how often the sender can send
various messages:
1
Pr 4 (s = 1|m) Pr 4 (m) = Pr (s = 1) =, (2.1)
m5
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where Pr 4 (m) denotes the probability that m is sent under #. Constraint (2.1) implies that to
maximize the probability of the messages mi,_1 and ml, the sender should choose a mechanism
that satisfies: Pr4 (s = 1|mr) = 0, Pr4 (s = 1|mi) = 1 - p, and Pr4 (s = 1|mi,_1) = p.4 That is,
me gives the most possible evidence against acting; mi gives the minimal possible evidence to make
the optimistic receiver act; and mi,_1 gives the minimal possible evidence to make the pessimistic
receiver act. These observations imply that the sender's expected utility simplifies to:5
2p (1 - p) Pr (i) + Pr (mi,1) , (2.2)
and constraint (2.1) simplifies to:
1(1 - p) Pr (mi) + p Pr (mi,-1) -. (2.3)5
The sender's problem of finding the optimal mechanism can be viewed as a problem of maxi-
mizing the linear utility function (2.2) over probabilities Pr (m), Pr (i), and Pr (mi,_1) subject
to the budget constraint (2.3). That is, the price and the marginal utility of persuading the receiver
not to act are both equal to 0; the price and the marginal utility of persuading only the optimistic
receiver to act are equal to 1 - p and 2p (1 - p), respectively; and the price and the marginal utility
of persuading the receiver to always act are equal to p and 1, respectively. Thus, the sender faces
a tradeoff between the frequency and the persuasiveness of messages. Sending me is free, but it
persuades the receiver not to act. Sending mi is more expensive and it persuades the optimistic
receiver to act. Finally, sending mi,_1 is the most expensive, but it persuades the receiver to act
regardless of his signal. This tradeoff is resolved by a choice of a mechanism that sends messages
with the highest marginal utility-price ratio.
Figure 2-1 shows the sender's and receiver's expected utilities under the optimal mechanism.
Naive intuition may suggest that (i) the sender's expected utility should decrease in p because it
is harder to influence the better informed receiver and (ii) the receiver's expected utility should
increase in p because the better informed receiver takes a more appropriate action. This naive
intuition, however, does not take into account that the optimal mechanism changes with p, and it
may reveal significantly less information if the receiver is better informed. Contrary to the naive
4 Formally, the optimal mechanism for this example is derived in Proposition 2.6.
5 Equation (2.2) is obtained using the fact that ml,_1 induces the receiver to act with probability 1, mi induces
the receiver to act with probability pPre (s = 1lmi) - (1 - p) Pro (s = -1|mi), and me induces the receiver to act
with probability 0.
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Figure 2-1: The sender's and receiver's expected utilities as a function of the precision of the
receiver's private information.
intuition, this effect may result in the receiver being worse off and the sender being better off as
the receiver becomes more informed. In fact, the receiver's expected utility jumps down to zero as
p exceeds , and the sender's expected utility strictly increases in p for p E , .
I stress that these non-monotone comparative statics results with respect to the precision of
information arise only when the receiver is privately informed. If the receiver does not have private
information, then both the sender's and receiver's expected utilities are monotone in the precision
of the sender's private and public information as I show in the previous chapter.
Figure 2-1 also sheds light on the extent to which information revelation can affect the receiver's
action and on the informativeness of the optimal mechanism. As the left panel of Figure 1 shows,
for a wide range of p, the probability that the receiver acts is considerably higher under the opti-
mal mechanism than under the two benchmark mechanisms: the full revelation and no revelation
mechanisms. As the right panel of Figure 1 shows, from the receiver's perspective, the optimal
mechanism is maximally uninformative if p = or p E [, 1] , and its informativeness gradually
increases in p for p E . Indeed, if p = or p E [-, 1], then the receiver's expected utility
is the same under the optimal and no revelation mechanisms. If p E ,
expected utility under the optimal mechanism is strictly higher than under the no revelation mech-
anism and strictly lower than under the full revelation mechanism. I now explain the three forms
that the optimal mechanism can take as p increases from i to 1.
First, if the receiver's signal is imprecise in that p is close to j, then it is almost as cheap to
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persuade the pessimistic receiver to act so as to persuade the optimistic receiver to act, because
the prices p and 1 - p are close. Thus, the sender prefers to target the pessimistic receiver, so
the optimal mechanism sends the messages mi,_1 and m. As p increases, it becomes harder to
persuade the pessimistic receiver to act and, thus, sending ml,_1 becomes more expensive. As
a result, the sender's expected utility _, which is equal to the frequency of the message mi,_1,
decreases in p. The optimal mechanism gives no rent to the pessimistic receiver, but it gives a
strictly positive rent to the optimistic receiver. The receiver's expected utility increases in p for
two reasons. First, for a given mechanism, the better informed optimistic receiver gets a higher rent
from acting when he receives mi,-1. Second, the optimal mechanism makes mi , _1 more favorable
for acting in that Pro (s = 1Imi,1) = p increases in p. This effect further increases the rent of the
optimistic receiver when he receives ml,_1.
Second, as p exceeds - (but falls behind 1), the polarization between the optimistic and pes-
simistic receivers becomes so high that it becomes much more expensive to persuade the pessimistic
receiver to act than to persuade the optimistic receiver to act. Thus, the sender prefers to target
only the optimistic receiver, so the optimal mechanism sends the messages mi and m. In other
words, the sender switches from the more expensive and more persuasive message mi,_1 to the less
expensive and less persuasive message mi. As p increases, the price 1 - p of sending mi decreases
because it becomes easier to persuade the optimistic receiver to act. As a result, the sender's ex-
pected utility 2p increases in p. The receiver's expected utility jumps down to 0 as p exceeds ,
and it stays at 0 because the optimal mechanism makes the receiver indifferent to act whenever he
acts.
Third, as p exceeds , the receiver's signal becomes so precise that the sender can persuade
the optimistic receiver to act by revealing no information. Thus, the sender prefers to target the
optimistic receiver with certainty and the pessimistic receiver with some probability, so the optimal
mechanism sends mi and mi,_1. As p increases further, the sender can persuade the pessimistic
receiver to act more often, so the optimal mechanism sends mi,_1 with a higher probability. But
the probability of the receiver being optimistic decreases, so mi induces the receiver to act with a
lower probability. In my example, the latter effect dominates the former, so the sender's expected
utility decreases in p.6 The receiver's expected utility increases in p because the better informed
6 The latter effect would always dominate the former in a more general setting if the precision of the receiver's
signal is sufficiently high. In this case, the sender can persuade the receiver to act, essentially, only if his utility is
positive. But the sender can always achieve the same result by fully revealing the receiver's utility.
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receiver takes a more appropriate action and the optimal mechanism gives no rent to the receiver.
The sender's tradeoff between the frequency and the persuasiveness of messages illustrated here
carries on to a general version of the model. As I show in Section 2.4 and Appendix A, this tradeoff
is resolved by the choice of messages with the highest marginal utility-price ratio as long as (i)
the sender's signal has a binary structure, and (ii) one sender's signal is more favorable for acting
than the other sender's signal, regardless of the receiver's signal. However, if (i) is violated, the
tradeoff becomes more intricate because the budget constraint becomes multidimensional (Sections
2.3.2 and 2.4); and if (ii) is violated, the tradeoff becomes more intricate because the prices of some
messages become negative (Appendix A).
2.3.2 Continuous Example
In this example, the receiver's utility is additive in sender's and receiver's type that are continuous
and independent of each other. More formally, u(r, s) = s - r where r and s are independently dis-
tributed according to distributions G and F that admit strictly positive continuously differentiable
densities g and f everywhere. The supports are such the receiver r always acts (r < s) and the
receiver T never acts (7 > s).7 For example, s may correspond to the ability of the student, and r
to the employer's opportunity cost from hiring a student instead of an experienced worker.
I start this section by formulating the sender's problem as a problem of maximizing the expec-
tation of G (m) subject to the constraint that the distribution of m has to be less variable than the
prior distribution F of s. Thus, the shape of the optimal mechanism is determined by the curvature
of G. This observation allows us to relate the expected utilities to information structure.
Proposition 2.1 formulates the sender's problem. Note that a message m under a mechanism 4
induces the receiver to act if and only if r < IEO [s~m]. Thus, I identify each message m with the
receiver's type that is just indifferent to act such that m induces the receiver to act if and only if
r < m.
Proposition 2.1 Let H denote the marginal distribution of m under the optimal mechanism. Then
H
maximizes G (m) dH (im) (2.4)
7 This example is more general than it may seem. In particular, it includes the case where the receiver's expected
utility depends on the belief about s only through the expectation of h (s) for some function h, provided some
regularity conditions are satisfied. To see this, note that in this case, the receiver is indifferent to act whenever
r = 1 (fs h (s) dp (s)) for some functions 1 and h and all distributions pi. An appropriate rescaling and reordering of
S and R yields that h (s) = s and 1 (E, [s]) = E, [s], as required.
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subject to F is a mean-preserving spread of H.
The intuition for Proposition 2.1 is as follows. The objective function (2.4) is simply the
probability that the receiver acts under the mechanism d. If F is a mean-preserving spread of H,
then F is more informative about the underlying (hypothetical) state than H (Blackwell (1953)).
Since the sender has full commitment, she can garble her information to achieve any less informative
distribution H than her prior distribution F. If she then fully reveals this garbled information to
the receiver, then the distribution of m will be H. Conversely, since the sender cannot make her
information more precise in any sense, then for any feasible mechanism, F is a mean-preserving
spread of H.
Proposition 2.1 implies that the set of feasible mechanisms expands as F becomes more infor-
mative in the mean-preserving spread sense. Thus, the probability that the receiver acts under the
optimal mechanism increases as F becomes more informative. In the two extreme cases, if F were
to put probability one on some s, then the only feasible H would put probability one on m = s,
but if F were to put strictly positive probabilities only on s and -, then all marginal distributions
H of m on S for which the mean of m is EF [s] would be feasible.
Similarly to the previous example, the probability that the receiver acts (2.4) does not neces-
sarily decrease as the receiver's private information becomes more precise in that G becomes more
variable in the mean-preserving spread sense. To see this, consider F that puts probability one on
s and note that G (s) changes ambiguously. However, the probability that the receiver acts (2.4)
unambiguously increases as the receiver's private information becomes more favorable for acting in
that G increases pointwise (first-order stochastic dominance).
Proposition 2.2 shows that the optimal mechanism depends on convexity and concavity prop-
erties of G on the set S.
Proposition 2.2 In this example:
1. All mechanisms are equivalent if and only if G is linear on S.
2. $, is optimal if and only if G is convex on S.
3. #5o is optimal if and only if the concave closure G of G on S is equal to G at rno =Eo F s n
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Figure 2-2: The distribution G and its concave closure G for r E S.
that'
G(rno) r2 - roG(ri) + rno - rl G(r 2 )
r2 -rl r2~r1
for all r 1 ,r 2 E S such that rno E (rl,r2).
4. If G is convex on [s, si], concave on [sj, and G(rno) > G (rno), then the optimal mechanism
sends m = s for s < sc and m = r, = [sIs > sc| for s > se where se is uniquely pinned down
by
,r G (re) -G (sc)G' (re) =.
Tc - sc
The first three parts of Proposition 2.2 are immediate because the optimal mechanism is the
solution to problem (2.4). First, if G is linear, then the sender is risk neutral, so all mechanisms are
equivalent. Second, if G is convex, then the sender is risk loving, so the full revelation mechanism
is optimal. Third, if G is concave, then the sender is risk averse, so the no revelation mechanism is
optimal.
8 Intuitively, a concave closure of a function (defined on a convex set) is the smallest concave function that is
everywhere greater than the original function.
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The last part of Proposition 2.2 derives the optimal mechanism under a natural assumption that
the distribution G has an "S" shape as shown in Figure 2-2.9 Let G denote the concave closure
of G on S. Assume that EF [s < st, otherwise <,, is optimal by part 3. If F were to put strictly
positive probabilities only on s and s, then the optimal mechanism would send two messages s and
st and the probability that the receiver acts would be G (ro). This mechanism, however, is not
feasible for F that admits a density because s is equal to s with probability 0. Thus, the optimal
mechanism reveals s for s < sc and sends the same message for all s > sc where the cutoff se is
such that the sender is indifferent between revealing sc or pooling it with s > sc.
2.4 General Case
This section generalizes the examples of Section 2.3. The key assumption that is maintained
throughout this section is that the receiver with a higher type is always more willing to act.10
Section 2.4.1 develops necessary machinery and partially characterizes the optimal mechanism.
Section 2.4.2 completely characterizes necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality of the two
most important mechanisms, the full revelation and no revelation mechanisms.
2.4.1 Characterization of Optimal Mechanism
I start by discussing the key assumption. Then I turn to the characterization of the optimal
mechanism. If the sender's type is binary, then similarly to the binary example, the optimal
mechanism maximizes the linear utility function subject to the linear budget constraint. However,
if the sender's type is not binary, then the budget constraint becomes multidimensional and it
becomes hard to find the optimal mechanism. Nevertheless, the optimal mechanism still solves
a linear program and thus duality theory applies. Using duality theory, I characterize general
properties of the optimal mechanism and show how we can solve the inverse problem. Namely, the
inverse problem is to find necessary and sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model that
ensure that any candidate mechanism is optimal. For example, we can find primitive conditions on
the environment that guarantee that a grading policy chosen by a school is optimal.
In this section, I impose the following single-crossing assumption. If the receiver with a given
9 1t is straightforward to characterize the optimal mechanism if the distribution G has more than one inflection
points at which the curvature of G changes sign. Details are available on request.
'
0 In the binary example, the optimistic receiver is more willing to act. In the continuous example, the receiver
with a higher type r = -r is more willing to act.
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type prefers to act upon receiving a certain message of an arbitrary mechanism, then the receiver
with a higher type also prefers to act upon receiving the same message. Moreover, for each s
there exists the unique and distinct type r such that the receiver r is indifferent to act. Formally,
this assumption can be stated as follows. The function VH (r) fg ii (r, s) dH (s) crosses the
horizontal axis once and from below for all distributions H that have the same support as F, where
ii (r, s) _ u (r, s) g (rIs). Moreover, r(s) is strictly decreasing in s where F(s) is the unique r that
solves u (r, s) = 0."
The single-crossing assumption allows us to restrict attention to mechanisms # such that a
message m induces the receiver to act if r > m. Both examples of Section 2.3 satisfy the single-
crossing assumption, but the binary case with misalined preferences in Appendix A does not. To
illustrate broad applicability of this assumption, Proposition 2.3 gives primitive sufficient conditions
for a weak version of the single-crossing assumption.
Proposition 2.3 If u (r, s) is strictly increasing in both r and s, and the density g (r~s) has the
monotone likelihood ratio property in that g (r2|s2) g (r1|si) - g (r2|s1) g (rl|s2) 0 for all s2 81
and r 2 > r 1 , then vH (r) crosses the horizontal axis at most once and from below for all distributions
H .
Before turning to the general problem where both the sender's and receiver's types are contin-
uous, it is instructive to consider the case where the receiver's type is continuous but the sender's
type is binary in that G (r|S) admits a density g (rls) but F is supported on s and -. For all
r E R = [F(§) , F(s)], denote p (r) as the probability of - at which the receiver r is indifferent to
act. Thus, in the optimal mechanism, the distribution H of messages
maximizes Pr (r > mim) dH (m)
subject to p (m) dH (m) = Pr (9) .12
JR
"I believe that it is sufficient to assume that VH (r) crosses the horizontal axis at most once and in the same
direction. Extending u (r, s) to I? -D R for all s and making g (rIs) infinitesimally small for all s and r ( R yields that
VH (r) crosses the horizontal axis exactly once on R. Reordering R yields that vH (r) crosses the horizontal axis from
below. Considering H that puts probability one on s yields that u (r, s) crosses the horizontal axis once for all s, so
F(s) is well defined. Finally, reordering S yields that F(s) is decreasing.
" Explicitly, p (r) =)and Pr (r > m~m) = p(r)T (rls) + (1 - p(r))7U(rls).
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The objective function is the probability that the receiver acts and the constraint is the feasibility
constraint that requires that posterior probabilities Pr (j9m) average out to the prior probability
Pr (9). Again, the objective function can be interpreted as a linear utility function and the constraint
as a Bayesian budget constraint. As a result, the sender faces the same tradeoff between the
frequency and the persuasiveness of messages as in the binary example of Section 2.3. Sending
a lower message m is more expensive (the price p (m) is higher), but it has a greater impact on
the receiver (the marginal utility Pr (r > mim) is higher). To resolve this tradeoff, the optimal
mechanism sends at most two messages with the highest marginal utility-price ratio Pr(r mlm) 13
In general (if the sender's type is continuous), the optimal mechanism is a distribution # that
maximizes J (rls) d# (r, s) (2.6)
subject to d (r, s) f (s) ds for any measurable set 5 C S, (2.7)
J Rx SJS
IR (r, s) d# (r, s) 0 for any measurable set t C R. (2.8)j Rx S
The objective function is the probability that the receiver acts under the mechanism #. The first
constraint (2.7) is the requirement that the marginal distribution of s for # is F. Intuitively, (2.7) is
a multidimensional Bayesian budget constraint. The second constraint (2.8) is the requirement that
a message r makes the receiver r indifferent to act. Intuitively, (2.8) determines multidimensional
prices of various messages.
The problem (2.6) is called the primal problem. This primal problem is a linear program,
which is analogous to the mass transfer problem, an infinite dimensional extension of the well-
known transportation problem. However, the transportation problem is notorious for being hard
to analyze. The dual problem is to find bounded functions rj and v that
minimize n (s) f (s) ds (2.9)
subject to r (s) + i (r, s) v (r) ;> Z (r ls) for all (r,s) E R x S. (2.10)
Say that # is feasible for (2.6) if it is a distribution that satisfies (2.7) and (2.8). Similarly, say
that 7 and v are feasible for (2.9) if they are bounded functions that satisfy (2.10). Feasible # and
1 3The optimal mechanism is a solution to a linear program, so it is an extreme point of the constraint set. Thus,
if s is binary, the optimal mechanism sends at most two messages.
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(j, v) that solve their respective problems (2.6) and (2.9) are called optimal solutions.
The properties of the primal and dual problems are intimately linked by duality theory. Only
weak duality is used to establish the coming results:
Lemma 2.1 If # is feasible for (2.6), and (y, v) is feasible for (2.9), then
Jr(s) f (s) ds ;> J (rIs) d (r, s). (2.11)
Moreover, if inequality (2.11) holds with equality, then # and (q, v) are optimal solutions, and
((s) + ii (r, s) v (r) - T7 (r Is)) d# (r, s) = 0. (2.12)
.Rx S
Strong duality establishes the existence of an optimal mechanism and other interesting proper-
ties of optimal solutions to problems (2.6) and (2.9):
Lemma 2.2 There exists an optimal mechanism #, an optimal solution to the primal problem
(2.6). There exists an optimal solution to the dual problem (2.9) such that functions 'q and V are
continuous. Inequality (2.11) holds with equality for these optimal # and (q, v).
Now I show how, using duality theory, we can find necessary and sufficient conditions on the
primitives u, F, and G that guarantee that a given mechanism is optimal. For a given candidate
optimal mechanism #, the complementarity condition (2.12) implies that (2.10) holds with equality
(7 (s) = T (rIs) - ii (r, s) v (r)) at each (r, s) in the support of # for a candidate optimal solution
(q, v) to the dual problem (2.9). Then we can find primitive conditions on u (r, s), F (s), and G (rls)
such that the constraint (2.10) of the dual problem (2.9) is satisfied for all (r, s) E R x S and some
v (r). Weak duality implies that these conditions are sufficient for # to be optimal, and strong
duality implies that these conditions are necessary for # to be optimal. It turns out, however, that
the necessary conditions can be easily established directly without the need for strong duality.
I conclude this section by introducing a few new definitions that are used in the next section.
Let r,, be the unique r that solves f ii (r, s) f (s) ds = 0. Note that the no revelation mechanism
#no sends the same message rno for all s E S, whereas the full revelation mechanism #Ofu sends
the message F(s) for each s E S.
For any si < S2, and r E (F(s2 ),F_(si)), the sender prefers to reveal si and S2 than to pool
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them at r if
G (F (s 2 ) 5s2) - G (rls2) > G (r (si) |si) - G (rsi). (2.13)
- (r, s 2 ) i (r, si)
Similarly, the sender prefers to pool si and 82 at r than to reveal them if inequality (2.13) is reversed
to "<". Finally, the sender is indifferent to reveal si and S2 or to pool them at r if (2.13) holds
with equality. To provide the intuition for these definitions, suppose that the prior distribution of
s puts probabilities i(r,s) on si and T(r,s2) on 52. If inequality (2.13) holds, then theS2)-iii)-iS1r8 2)
full revelation mechanism, which sends F(si) and F(s2 ) for si and S2, respectively, dominates the
no revelation mechanism, which sends the same message r for si and s2.
Say that si, S2, S3, r are feasible if (s 3 - 32) (S2 - s1 ) > 0, and there exists the prior distribution
that puts probabilities pi, P2, P3 on si, s2, S3 such that E3 pis (rso, si) -0, and E2 pi (r, si) =
0.14 For any feasible si, s2, 83, r, the sender prefers to pool si, S2, 83 at rno than to pool si, S2
at r and to reveal S3 if for the above prior distribution, the no revelation mechanism, which sends
rno for si, S2, 83, dominates the mechanism that sends r for si, s2 and F(s 3 ) for S3.15 The obvious
modifications of this definition are constructed similarly to the previous paragraph.
2.4.2 Optimality of Specific Mechanisms
By definition, a mechanism # is optimal if and only if it dominates all feasible mechanisms. This
gives trivial necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality of #. However, to check these con-
ditions, one needs to compare # to all feasible mechanisms, which requires a lot of comparisons.
It turns out that for the optimality of #, it is necessary and sufficient to check that only certain
deviations from # do not increase the probability that the receiver acts.
Using duality theory, this section presents necessary and sufficient conditions for (i) all mech-
anisms to be equivalent, (ii) the full revelation mechanism #fui; to be optimal, and (iii) the no
revelation mechanism #no to be optimal. There are at least two reasons that make mechanisms
Ono and of,,,, prominent. First, if S did not have full commitment, then #,o would be the unique
equilibrium outcome if the sender's information were unverifiable in the sense of Crawford and
1 4The existence of such p1, p2, P3 is equivalent to (ro - F(si)) (ro - F(ss)) < 0, and (r - F(si)) (r - F(s2)) < 0.
"5 Mathematically,
1 (rno s2) - (rIsS2) + " (F(s3) 183) -G (rn o ls3))( .
> (((roIs1) - 0 (rIsi) + " (( (S3) Is3) - U(rnolsa)))
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Sobel (1982), and #f,,, would be the unique equilibrium outcome if the sender's information were
verifiable in the sense of Milgrom (1981).16 The second reason is that these two mechanisms are
extremal as Proposition 2.4 shows.
Proposition 2.4 Let the single-crossing assumption holds.
1. The receiver's expected utility under #,o is strictly lower than under any other mechanism.
2. The receiver's expected utility under #f5ull is strictly higher than under any other mechanism.
A more informed receiver is better at maximizing his expected utility by taking a more appro-
priate action, so a weak version of Proposition 2.4 is immediate. The single-crossing assumption
guarantees the strict version of Proposition 2.4. Note that the strict version does not hold when the
receiver is uninformed. Indeed, in the previous chapter, I show that in the case of an uninformed
receiver, the optimal mechanism is different from Ono, yet the receiver's expected utility under the
optimal mechanism is the same as under Ono.
The next result, which is the main result of this section, characterizes when each of the above
mechanisms is optimal.
Theorem 2.1 Let the single-crossing assumption holds. Then:
1. All mechanisms are equivalent if and only if there exists a positive function b (r) such that for
all r C (F (9) , F (s)), ii (r, s) is
r (F(s) Is) - G(rls)
r (r, s) = (2.15)
2. #full is optimal if and only if the sender prefers to reveal s1 and S2 than to pool them at r for
all 81, S2 C S and r E (F(s2) , F(s1)), so that (2.13) holds.
3. #no is optimal if and only if the sender prefers to pool s1 , S2, S3 at ro than to pool 81, S2 at
r and to reveal s 3 for all feasible s1, S2, s3, r, so that (2.14) holds.17
16Under unverifiable communication, if the sender sent two different messages ri and r2 in equilibrium, then the
sender would strongly prefer to send min{ri,r 2} regardless of s, which leads to a contradiction. Under verifiable
communication, if the sender sent the same message r for two or more different s in equilibrium, then there would
exist i such that the sender sent r for i but u (r, -) > 0, which leads to a contradiction because the sender with W
would strongly prefer to reveal 9.
17 As the proof of this part shows, the condition of this part can be replaced with two weaker conditions: (i) the
sender prefers to pool si and s2 at r,, than to reveal them for all si and 82 such that r G (F (s2) , F (S1)); (ii) the
condition of this part holds only for s3 -* sn, where suo is the unique s that solves u (r,,,, s) = 0.
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The "only if' parts of Theorem 2.1 are straightforward because for optimality of a candidate
mechanism, we need to check all deviations from this mechanism, including those described in the
theorem.
To provide the intuition for "if' parts of Theorem 2.1, I present Lemma 2.3, which is not used
in the formal proof of the theorem. Note that a message m generates a lottery # (.Im) over S that
makes the receiver indifferent to act if r = m. This intuitive lemma shows that this lottery can be
decomposed into simpler lotteries indexed by e in such a way that (i) the support of each lottery e
contains at most two elements, and (ii) each lottery e makes the receiver r indifferent to act.
Lemma 2.3 Let the single-crossing ass'nmption holds. For each mechanism # (r, s), there exists a
mechanism o (m, s) with two dimensional messages m = (r, e) E R x [0, 1] that satisfies the following
properties:
1. For each m = (r, e), f i (r, s) dp (slm) = 0.
2. For each m, the support of o (.|m) contains at most two elements of S.
We now discuss each "if' part of Theorem 2.1 in turn. We start with part 1 of Theorem 2.1. If
all mechanisms are equivalent, then the sender is indifferent to reveal si and S2 or to pool them at r
for all possible si, s2, and r, because mechanisms that differ only in that one reveals si and 82 and
the other pools them at r, are equivalent. Therefore, all conditions (2.13) must hold with equality,
which is equivalent to ii (r, s) being given by (2.15), so the "only if' part follows. Conversely, if
the sender is indifferent to reveal si and S2 or to pool them at r for all possible si, s2, and r, then
all mechanisms are equivalent because by Lemma 2.3 we can focus on mechanisms in which each
message is sent only by some two types si and s2. Consider such a mechanism. Since the sender is
indifferent to reveal si and S2 or to pool them, this mechanism is equivalent to the mechanism that
differs only in that it reveals si and S2. Sequentially modifying the mechanism for each message,
we get that any mechanism is equivalent to #f,,,, so the "if' part follows.
As part 1 shows, all mechanisms are equivalent in the knife-edge case when ii (r, s) has repre-
sentation (2.15). If s and r are independent, then without loss of generality we can assume that
r is uniformly distributed on [-1,0] and r (s) = -s. In this situation, part 1 essentially states
that all mechanisms are equivalent whenever u (r, s) = ' for some positive function b (r) wherebFr)
18 Redefining r as -T (r) and s as T (r (s)) gives the required properties. It is clear that all functions are smooth and
the single-crossing assumption holds for the model with redefined r and s because smooth increasing transformations
are used.
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r ~ U [-1,0], and the support of s is contained in the interval [0,1]. Note that the continuous
example of Section 2.3 assumes the same functional form of the receiver's utility, but it does not
assume that r is uniformly distributed. 19
Rayo and Segal (2010) analyze a similar model with a few distinctions. Similar to this chapter,
they assume that actions are binary and the sender has full commitment. In contrast to this
chapter, they allow the sender's utility to depend on both the action and the state. However, they
assume that the utility of the receiver from acting is u (r, s) = r+s, where r is uniformly distributed
on [-1, 0], and the support of s is contained in the interval [0,1]. This assumption allows them to
bypass the effects analyzed in this chapter and get tractable results.
We now turn to part 2 of Theorem 2.1. The "only if' part holds because 4fu; dominates the
mechanism that differs only in that it pools si and S2 at r. The "if' part holds again because we
can focus on mechanisms in which each message is sent only by some two types si and s2. Consider
such a mechanism. Since the sender prefers to reveal si and 82 than to pool them, this mechanism is
dominated by the mechanism that differs only in that it reveals si and 82. Sequentially modifying
the mechanism for each message, we get that of,,I dominates all mechanisms, so the "if' part
follows
Finally, we discuss part 3 of Theorem 2.1. The "only if' part holds because 4, dominates the
mechanism that differs only in that it pools si, 82 at r and reveals 83. I provide the intuition for
a weaker version of the "if' part. Namely, if the sender prefers to pool si, S2, 83, 84 at rno than
to pool si, S2 at ri,2 and to pool 83, 84 at r3,4 for all feasible si, S2, rl,2, 83, s4 , r3,4, then 0,/ is
optimal. Again we can focus on mechanisms such that any message rl,2 < rno is sent only by some
two types si and 82 and any message r3,4 2 r,, is sent only by some two types 83 and s4. Any
such mechanism is dominated by the mechanism that differs only in that it sends the message rno
instead of ri,2 and r3,4 . Sequentially applying this argument for pairs of messages, we get that 4,
dominates all mechanisms, so the weaker version of the "if' part follows.
2.5 Extensions: Two-Way Communication
This section extends the benchmark model of Section 2.2 to allow communication from the receiver
to the sender. Assume that the sender has full commitment in that she chooses a mechanism before
19 To map the example, we need to redefine r as -r and drop b (r) that does not affect the receiver's behavior for
any message.
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(s, r) is realized and therefore before the receiver makes a report to the sender. In this case, the
revelation principle applies (Myerson (1982)).20
Thus, it is without loss of generality to consider the following timing: 1. The sender publicly
chooses a mechanism, a conditional distribution y (mIs, n) of a message m given the sender's type
s and the receiver's report n. 2. The receiver's type r is drawn according to G. 3. The receiver
privately observes r and makes a report n E N. 4. A vector (m, s) is drawn according to y and F.
5. The receiver gets a message m and takes an action a.
Further, it is without loss of generality to focus on an incentive compatible direct mechanism.
In a direct mechanisms, (i) the set of receiver's reports N coincides with the set R; and (ii) a
mechanism y sends only two messages mi and mo.21 In an incentive compatible direct mechanism,
also, (iii) the receiver r prefers to report n = r; and (iv) the receiver prefers to act if he receives
mi and not to act if he receives me, regardless of r and n.
Under certain assumptions, which, in particular, allow the binary example, it is without loss of
generality to consider benchmark mechanisms where the receiver is not allowed to make reports:
Proposition 2.5 In the binary example of Section 2.3, the set of mappings from (s, r) to the
receiver's action a that can be supported by an incentive compatible mechanism is the same under
4 (mIs) and under y (mIs, n).
The following example shows that Proposition 2.5 does not hold generally:
Example 2.1 Let s = (Si, S2) E {0, 1} x {0, 1} and r c {ri, r2, r3}. Moreover, let all combinations
of (s, r) be equally likely. Finally, let u (s, ri) = s1 - 1, u (s, r2) = S2 - 1, and u (s, r3) - - 812.
Consider the following mechanism of the two-way communication game:
(miIs, n) = 1 if n = ri and si = 1, or if n = r2 and S2 = 1, or if n = r 3
,
0 otherwise.
Intuitively, this mechanism reveals the component si if the receiver reports rl and reveals the
component S2 if the receiver reports r2 . Clearly, under this mechanism, it is incentive compatible
2 0 To map my model into Myerson (1982), assume that the principal is the sender who designs a mechanism for
two agents. The first agent has type s, has no action to take, and always gets 0 utility. The second agent has type
r, privately chooses a = 0, 1, and his utility is av (0, ts).
21In this case, -y (ml Is, n) denotes the probability of the message m1.
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for the receiver to truthfully report r and act whenever he receives mi. Thus, the probability that
the receiver acts under y* is:
2
Pr , (a = 1) = Pr (r = ri) Pr (si = 1) + Pr (r = r 2 ) Pr (s2 = 1) + Pr (r = r 3 ) = 5~
However, the sender cannot induce the receiver to act with probability in the benchmark
model. To see this, note first that the receiver r1 acts only if he is certain that si = 1, and the
receiver r 2 acts only if he is certain that 82 = 1. Thus, under any mechanism #, the probability
that the receiver acts cannot exceed . The only possibility of how the sender could achieve this
probability would be to reveal both si and 82, but in that case the receiver with r 3 would not act
when (si,82) = (1, 1).
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have studied optimal information revelation mechanisms with two-sided asym-
metric information. The receiver bases his action not only on the information revealed by the
sender but also on his private information. Thus, from the sender's perspective, each message
results in a stochastic action by the receiver. The analysis reveals an important tradeoff between
the frequency and the persuasiveness of messages. The optimal mechanism finds a balance between
these two conflicting objectives. This balance is easiest to explain when the sender's information
has a binary structure. In this case, the prior distribution of the sender's information imposes a
budget constraint on the frequencies of various messages, whereas the distribution of the receiver's
information determines the sender's expected utility, which is linear in the frequencies of various
messages. The optimal mechanism sends messages with the highest marginal utility-price ratio.
I also derive interesting non-monotone comparative statics results with respect to the receiver's
private information for the binary example in which the sender is perfectly informed but the receiver
is partially informed. If the receiver's private information is either very precise or very imprecise,
then the sender's expected utility decreases and the receiver's expected utility increases in the
precision of the receiver's information. However, if the precision of the receiver's information is
intermediate, then these results can be overturned. Surprisingly, the receiver may become worse off
as he becomes more informed even though he is the only player who takes an action that directly
affects his utility. Thus, if there is an earlier stage when the receiver can publicly choose how
informed he will be, he may not want to be as informed as possible.
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2.7 Appendix A: Binary Case
When the receiver has private information, in general, the problem of finding the optimal mech-
anism becomes complicated, as Section 2.4 suggests. This section fully characterizes the optimal
mechanism when s and r are binary. More formally, assume that F puts strictly positive probabil-
ities only on si and S2 and that G (.Isi) and G (.182) put strictly positive probabilities only on ri
and r2.
The binary case splits into two subcases. In the first subcase, one sender's signal is more
favorable for acting than the other sender's signal, regardless of r. In this subcase, the sender faces
a tradeoff between the frequency and the persuasiveness of messages. As a result, neither the full
revelation nor the no revelation mechanisms are generally optimal. In the second subcase, different
sender's signals are favorable for acting depending on r. In this subcase, the sender faces a more
subtle tradeoff, which results in a variety of possible optimal mechanisms. In particular, both the
full revelation and no revelation mechanisms can generally be optimal.
Using the revelation principle, for any mechanism, we can find an equivalent mechanism that
sends at most four messages: (i) me that induces the receiver not to act for all r, (ii) mi that
induces the receiver to act only if r = ri, (iii) m2 that induces the receiver to act only if r = r2,
and (iv) mi,2 that induces the receiver to act for all r.
For notational simplicity, this section uses different notation than the rest of the chapter. In
particular, denote pj = Pr (sj), piij Pr (rilsj), uij u (ri, sj), Eigg = uipil, ki = , and
99, Prg(m= mK,s = sj) for ij 1,2 and K = {Q},{1},{2},{l,2}. Indexes i and j are
reserved for r and s, respectively. Note that ki is the cutoff posterior belief Pr (s 2 ) at which the
receiver ri is indifferent to act because
Eiii (1 - Pr (s2)) + iEi2 Pr (S2)
E [ulri] =r =r 0.
Pr (ri)
Aligned Preferences
If one sender's signal is more favorable for acting than the other sender's signal, regardless of r,
then the analysis is analogous to the binary example of Section 2.3. In particular, the sender faces a
tradeoff between the frequency and the persuasiveness of messages, which is resolved by the choice
of a mechanism that sends messages with the highest marginal utility-price ratio.
To make the analysis non-redundant, assume that uji < 0 < ui2 for i = 1, 2, k2 < ki, and
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P2 < ki. Strict inequalities rule out non-generic cases. Inequalities ui 2 > ui1 and k2 < k1 can be
obtained by relabelling elements of S and R, respectively. If uil and us2 had the same sign for some
i, then the receiver ri would take the same action regardless of the mechanism and the analysis
would be as if the receiver is uninformed as in the previous chapter. Finally, if P2 k1 , the no
revelation mechanism would induce the receiver to act for all r, and, thus, it would be optimal.
Under this assumption, the optimal mechanism can take the three forms that were identified in
Section 2.3, as follows from:
Proposition 2.6 If ui1 < 0 < Ui2, k2 < k1 , and P2 < k1 , then the optimal mechanism sends two
messages.
1. IfP1 |2 +aP 21 1  , it sends n1 ,2 and in: M1,2 with certainty if s = s2 and with probability
-12P2 if s= s 1 .Ull P1
2. If P112 + P2|1 < and p2 < k 2, it sends m2 and m: m2 with certainty if s = s2 and with
probability - f s = s1.
UL21 P1
3. 4f P12 + $P2|1 < and P2 k2, it sends m 2 and m1,2: m2 with probability ul
if s = S2 and with probability YlPl±!42P2 if s = s1.P1 UllU 2 2 -U 1 2U21
In all cases, mj reveals s 1 in that Pro (s 2 |m) = 0; m2 makes the receiver r2 indifferent to act in
that Pro (s2 |m2) = k2 ; and m1,2 makes the receiver r1 indifferent to act in that Pro (s2 |m1,2) = k 1 .
The receiver's expected utility under the optimal mechanism is strictly greater than that under the
no revelation mechanism only in case 1.22
The intuition for Proposition 2.6 is analogous to that in the binary example of Section 2.3.
The receiver ri acts upon receiving a message m under a mechanism # if Pr4 (s2 m) ki. If
the message m persuades the receiver r 1 to act, it also persuades the receiver r2 to act because
k 2 < ki by assumption. Thus, we can restrict attention to mechanisms with the three messages
Me, M 2 , and mi,2. To maximize the probability that the receiver acts, each message of the optimal
mechanism either makes the receiver exactly indifferent to act for some r (Pre (S2 mi,2 ) = ki
and Pro (s 2 |m 2) = k2 ) or makes the receiver certain that s = si so that it is optimal not to act
(Pre (S2 IMg) = 0).
22 f s and r are independent, then PiI2 = Pill = Pr(ri), so iigi can be replaced with uij for all i,j = 1,2 in all
expressions.
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Thus, the sender's problem is to maximize the probability that the receiver acts:
(k 2P212 + (1 - k 2) P2 11) q2 + ql,2
over probabilities qe, q2, and q1,2 of the messages me, m2, and mi,2 subject to the constraint
imposed by the prior distribution of s:
k 2 q2 + klq,2 = P2-
Similar to Section 2.3, we can interpret k2 and ki as unit prices of sending m2 and m1,2, and
the probabilities (k 2p 212 + (1 - k2 ) P211) and 1 as the marginal utilities of sending m 2 and mi,2. If
P112 + P21 > , then the marginal utility-price ratio is highest for mi,2, and the sender prefers
U22 U2te
to send mi,2 than m2, so the optimal mechanism sends mi,2 and me. If P112 + uP211 < then
the ratio is highest for m2, and the sender prefers to send m2 than mi,2. The optimal mechanism
depends on whether the no revelation mechanism induces the receiver r2 to act or not. If so
(P2 > k2 ), then it sends the messages m 2 and m 1 ,2, otherwise it sends the messages m2 and Me.
Misaligned Preferences
The main goal of this section is to illustrate the variety of possible optimal mechanisms in the case
where different sender's signals are favorable for acting depending on the receiver's signal. Note
that this case violates the single-crossing assumption of Section 2.4. For example, a school knows
whether a student is good at natural sciences or liberal arts, but the school does not know which
of these two qualities are valued by the employer.
All forms that the optimal mechanism can take are characterized by Proposition 2.7. Similar
to the previous section, to make the analysis non-redundant, I impose certain assumptions.
Proposition 2.7 If U12 < 0 < u11 , U21 < 0 < U22, and P2 > ki, the optimal mechanism sends at
most two messages.
1. If k 2  ; k 1 , it sends m2 and m1,2. The message m2 reveals 82 in that Pro (s21m2) = 1 and
the message m1,2 makes the receiver rl indifferent to act in that Pr 4 (s2|1m1,2) = k1 .
2. If k 2 > k1 , then depending on parameters, it sends either only m2 or both m2 and ml. If it
sends both m2 and m 1 , there are four cases in which each message mi either reveals si in that
Pr4 (silmi) = 1, or makes the receiver ri indifferent to act in that Pro (s 2 |mi) = ki.
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I only sketch the intuition for this proposition because it is quite tedious and involves the
consideration of many cases. Note that in this case, a message m that assigns a higher probability
to S2 is more persuasive for the receiver r2, and less persuasive for the receiver ri. The messages
mi and M 2 are always feasible because revealing si induces the receiver r 1 to act, and revealing s2
induces the receiver r 2 to act. However, if k2 < ki (part 1 of Proposition 2.7), then the message
mi,2 is feasible, but the message me is not. In this case, the sender wants to send M 1 ,2 as often as
possible. As a result, the optimal mechanism sends two types of messages: those that give minimal
possible evidence to make the receiver act regardless of his signal, and those that reveal s. In
contrast, if ki < k2 (part 2 of Proposition 2.7), then the message me is feasible, but the message
mi,2 is not. In this case, the optimal mechanism can take five different forms, which, in particular,
include the no revelation and full revelation mechanisms.
2.8 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. For any mechanism d, r = EO [sir], which implies that F is a mean-
preserving spread of H. Conversely, if F is a mean-preserving spread of H, then s has the same
distribution as r + z for some z such that E [zIr] = 0. Define 4 (it , -) = Pr (r < ~, r + z < s) for all
(~, -) E R x S. The marginal distribution of # is F and E [s - rIr] =E [zIr] = 0, # is a feasible
mechanism. Finally, f_00. G (m) dH (m) is simply the probability that the receiver acts. *
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Clearly, this example satisfies the single-crossing assumption of
Section 2.4 after the following change in variables: iF= -r. Thus, all results of Section 2.4 apply.
With this change of variables, F(s) = -s, and G,~(x) = Pr (i"> x) is equal to G (-x). I prove each
part in turn.
1. By Theorem 2.1 part 1, all mechanisms are equivalent if and only if s - r = G(s)-G(r) for
some positive b and all s E S, r E S, which is equivalent to G being linear on R.
2. By Theorem 2.1 part 2, dfi, is optimal if and only if the sender prefers to reveal si and S2
than to pool them at F where i E (-82, -si), which is equivalent to
s 2 -r r- siG(r) G(si) + G(s 2).
S2 - s1 s2 - 81
Clearly, this inequality holds if and only if G is convex on S.
3. By Theorem 2.1 part 3, 0,4, is optimal if and only if the sender prefers to pool si, S2, 83 at
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in than to pool si, S2 at iF and to reveal S3 for all possible si, S2, 83, ~, which is equivalent to
G (rno) > (83 - rno) (rrn) -" r" G (S3)
(S3 - r) G (S3 -- r)
for all r E S and S3 E S such that (r - rno) (S3 - reo) < 0. The change of variables r2 = 83 and
r1 = r completes the proof.
4. Lemma 2.1 implies that the described mechanism is optimal if there exists feasible (q, v) for
(2.9):
r (s) + (s-r)v (r) > G(r) for all (r,s) ER x S (2.16)
such that weak duality condition (2.11) holds with equality. I now construct (77, v) that satisfies
(2.16). Note that condition (2.16) bounds v only from one side for r ( S. In particular, v (r) >
G(r)-,(s) if r < s and v (r) <; (s)-G(r) if r > -. Thus, we can set v (r) = 0 if r < s and v (tR) - -K
s-r -- r-s
if r > - where K is sufficiently large. 23 For (r, s) E S x S, we can set:
G(s) { G( if s E [s, sc] ,
G (rc)+g (rc) (s - rc) if s E (sc,-],
v~ r) =g ( 
r ) if r E [ , s c] 
,
-g (rc) if r E(sc, -.
It is straightforward to verify that 17 is convex and greater than G and -v is a subderivative of 7.
Thus, (2.16) holds. Further, (2.16) holds with equality if (r, s) lies in the support of the described
mechanism. Thus, weak duality condition (2.11) holds. m
Proof of Proposition 2.3. First, note that if for all s, is strictly increasing in r for
some positive function b, then vH (r) crosses the horizontal axis at most once and from below for
all distributions H:
I (r2, s) dH (s) > E*i (ri, s) dH (s).
b (r2) ,s b (ri) 's
To prove the proposition, I construct the required b. Define 9(r) as s that solves u (r, s) = 0. If
there does not exist such s, set 9(r) = s if u (r, s) > 0, and set 9 (r) = - if u (r, -) < 0. The required
2 3To see that 0 > G(r)-7(s) if r < s, note that 71 (s) > G (s) for all s c S as follows from (2.16) if s = r.
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b is defined as a solution to the following differential equation:
dlnb(r) _ Olng(rls)
dr Or s=g(r)
Indeed,
is(r,s)\
-_ - g (rs) . u(r,s) + lng (rls) _ dln b(r) >0
Or b(r) (Or Or dr )J
because g(rs) au(r,s) are positive and u (r, s), g" - din b(r) have the same sign since they arebecaus -q Or ar oiieadu(,s, Or dr
increasing in s and are equal to zero at s = s(r). m
Proof of Lemma 2.1. The proof of similar results can be found in Anderson and Nash
(1987). However, to make the chapter self-contained, I prove this lemma.
Multiplying (2.7) by q and integrating them over S gives
(s) f (s) ds = R (s) d# (r, s).
Multiplying (2.8) by v and integrating them over R gives
IR S (r, s) v (r) d# (r, s) = 0.
Summing up these two inequalities gives
i r(s) f () ds (r (s) + ii (r, s) v (r)) dd (r, s) .
Integrating (2.10) over R x S gives
I (rIs) do (r, s) <I
.xS JRx S
(q (s) + ii (r, s) v (r)) d# (r, s) . (2.18)
Conditions (2.17) and (2.18) yield (2.11).
Suppose that inequality (2.11) holds with equality for some feasible (7, v) and #:
(2.19)
r(s) f (s) ds = Z (r Is) d# (r, s).
S JRxS
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(2.17)
Consider any other feasible q. Inequality (2.11) implies
7 (rl s) dI (r, s) J r (s) f (s) ds.
JRX S JS
Combining this inequality with (2.19) gives
( r s) d (r, s) < Z (rs) d# (r, s),
.xS R xS
showing that # is an optimal solution to the primal problem (2.6). An analogous argument proves
that (q, v) is optimal solutions to (2.9). Finally, combining (2.17) and (2.19) for optimal # and
(7, v) gives (2.12). m
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The proof of this lemma is omitted because it essentially repeats that
of Theorem 5.2 in Anderson and Nash (1987). m
Proof of Proposition 2.4. We start by proving the first part. The receiver's expected
utilities under any mechanism # and the no revelation mechanism #,, are:
EO [U) = JRXS i (~ , s) dF) d# (r, s) ,
EOg, [U) = JREi (~:, s) diF_ f (s) ds
= !RxS r , s) di) d (r , s) .
The first two lines hold because a message m induces the receiver to act if r > m and #,, sends
the message r, 0 regardless of s. The third line holds because the marginal distribution of s for any
mechanism # coincides with the prior distribution of s. For a mechanism #, denote the conditional
distribution of s given a message r by # (sir) and the marginal distribution of a message r by # (r).
Fubini's theorem gives
Eg [U] - IE [] =[n [fno (fS E (r, s) d# (sIr)) di] d# (r) (2.20)
- f [fT (fs i (F, s) d# (sIr)) dF d# (r).
By the single-crossing assumption, fS i (F, s) d# (sIr) > 0 for i"> r, so fno (fs ii (iF, s) d# (sIr)) di >
0 for r < rno. Since # (r) of any mechanism # that differs from 4,, puts strictly positive probability
on messages in [r, rno), the first integral in (2.20) is strictly positive. The analogous argument shows
that the second integral in (2.20) is strictly negative, so E [U - En [U] > 0 for any # that differs
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from # which proves the first part.
We now turn to the second part. The receiver's expected utility under ofi, is
E, [uI;) = (i, s) d f (s) ds
( i (~:, s) di'F do (r, s) .JRxS s)
Taking into account that i (F (s) , s) = 0 gives
E4oful [u] - Eg [u] = f(,(s),;)xs (f() it (i, s) di) d# (r, s) (2.21)
- f[r,F(s))x S ( *(s) i (i', s) diz) do (r, s) .
By the single-crossing assumption, i (F , s) > 0 for F > F, so f(s) i (F, s) dF > 0 for r > r(s). Any 4
that differs from of,, puts strictly positive probability on (F(s) , r]x S, otherwise fRx s i (, s) do (r, s)
is strictly negative. Therefore, the first integral in (2.21) is strictly positive. The analogous argu-
ment shows that the second integral in (2.21) is strictly negative, so Efuf [u] - E [u] > 0 for any
# that differs from #fll, which proves the second part. m
Proof of Theorem 2.1. I prove each part in turn.
The "only if" part of 1. Suppose to get a contradiction that there exist si, S2, and r such that
the sender is not indifferent to reveal si and 82 or to pool them at r. Consider two mechanisms
that differ only in that one sends different messages for s E [si, si + E1] and s E [S2 - E2, S21, and
the other sends the same message for s E [si, si + E1] U [s2 - E2, S21 where Ei and E2 are sufficiently
small and satisfy
/-s1+E1 182
i(r, s) f (s) ds + / (r, s) f (s) ds = 0.
Clearly, these two mechanisms are not equivalent. Therefore, if all mechanisms are equivalent, then
the sender is indifferent to reveal s1 and 82 or to pool them at r for all r E (F(~) , (s)) and all si,
S2 such that u (r, si) < 0 < u (r, S2):
G (F(si) Isi) - G (rls1) _ ((s2) I82) - C (rs2)
u(r, si) Li(r, s 2 )
Therefore, we can define the required b as G(F(s)s)-G(rls) which is positive and does not depend on
s.
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The "if" part of 1. Consider any mechanism #. Substituting (2.15) into (2.8) gives
JRX (rls) d# (r, s) = JRXSZ (F (s) | s) d# (r, s) .IRxS GJs~ xS~s
Taking into account (2.7) gives
RXS (rs) d# (r, s) = ? (F (s)Is) f (s) ds,
which implies that the probability that the receiver acts is the same for all mechanisms.
The "only if" part of 2. Suppose to get a contradiction that there exist s 1 , S2, and r such that
it is strictly better to pool si and s2 at r than to reveal them. Consider the mechanism that differs
from qjsij only in that it sends the same message if s E [s1 , si + 61] U [s2 - E2, s2] where Ei and 62
are sufficiently small and satisfy
I (r, s)f(s) ds + J E (r, s) f (s) ds = 0.
Clearly, this mechanism strictly dominates #fu1j.
The "if" part of 2. The complementarity condition (2.12) suggests that
,q (s) + ii (-r(s) , s) v (r) = Z7 (-r (s) I|s) for all s E S.
Taking into account that i (-F(s) , s) = 0 gives q (s) = Z (-r(s) Is) for all s E S. Note that the weak
duality condition (2.11) is satisfied with equality for 77 (s) = (-F(s) Is). Therefore, by Lemma 2.1,
#f ll is optimal if there exists v such that
C(F(s) Is) +ii(rs)v (r) ;> C(rls) for all (r,s) E R x S, (2.22)
which is equivalent to
G (rls2) - (r (S2) |S2) < v (r) < Z7 (F (si) 1si SO-Z (rTi
ii (r, S2) -U (r, si)
for all r E (F (3) , F(s)) and si, s2 such that r E (F (s2 ) , F(s1)). For r ( (F(1),F(s)), the existence
of v is obvious because (2.22) bounds v only from one side.
The "only if" part of 3. Suppose to get a contradiction that there exist si, S2, S3, r such that
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it is strictly better to pool si, s2 at r and to reveal s3 than to pool si, S2, S3 at ro. Consider the
mechanism that differs from #,, only in that it sends one message if s E [si, si + E1] U [s2, S2 + E21
and another message if s E [S3 - E3, S3] where E1, E2, and E3 are sufficiently small and satisfy
i1 +2 ii (r,,, s) f (s) ds + 3 i (r,,, s) f (s) ds = 0.i=1,2.s" si - 3
Clearly, this mechanism strictly dominates #,,.
The "if" part of 3. The complementarity condition (2.12) suggests that
7) (s) + i (ro, s) v (ro) = Z (rolIs) for all s E S. (2.23)
Note that the weak duality condition (2.11) is satisfied with equality for q (s) = (rolts) -
ii (ro, s) v/ (rno). Therefore, by Lemma 2.1, #,40 is optimal if there exists v such that
G (rnols) - ii (rno, s) v (ro) + i! (r, s) v (r) ;> G (r Is) for all (r, s) E R x S. (2.24)
First, for (r, s) E R x S such that u (r, s) = 0, (2.24) is equivalent to
G (F(si)|si) - G (rno<si) < (rno ls3) - G (F (83) |3) (2.25)
v (ro) 2.5
-ii(rno,si) !u (rno, S3)
for all SiS3 such that rno E (F (S3), F(si)). Taking the limit si, s3 -* So where so is the unique s
that solves u (rno, sno) = 0, inequalities (2.25) imply v (rno) = a(rno r sno
Second, for (r, s) E R x S such that u (r, s) # 0, (2.24) is equivalent to
C(rIs2) - ( (rnols2) + ")g( n""Isno) )((rnolsi) + " (rno, " "no ') -G(rsi)
ar / Sr /
(r, S2) -u(r, si)
(2.26)
for all r E (F (9) , F(s)), and si, s2 E S such that r E (F(s2 )ri(s1)). For r ( ((),?(s)), the
existence of v is obvious because (2.24) bounds v only from one side.
Inequality (2.25) requires that the sender prefers to pool si and S3 at rno than to reveal them,
which is satisfied because we can set si = S2. Inequality (2.26) requires that the sender prefers to
pool si, s2, 83 at rno than to pool si and S2 at r and to reveal S3 where 83 -+ Sno, which is satisfied
because it is satisfied for all S3 / sno and all functions are smooth. m
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Because fsii (r, s) do (sIr) = 0 for each r, there exists a vector function
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(vi, V2, qi, q2) from R x [0, 1] to [minsES ii (r, s) , 0] X [0, maxscS ii (r, s)] x [0, 1] x [0, 1] such that
-oi (F,e)<i!(F ,S)<o2(e ii (F , s) d# (s Ir
+ Ei-,2 vi (i, e) qi (F, e) Pr 4 (i (i~, s) = vi (i, e)|r = ~) = 0,
Pr p (vi (F, e) < ii (, s) < V 2 (~, e) Ir = r)
+ Ei=1,2 qi (iz', e) Pr 4 (ii (F, s) = vi (~, e) Ir =~) =e
for all (F, e) E R x [0, 1]. Define distribution p of (F, e, s) as follows. The marginal distribution of ~
for o coincides with the marginal distribution of F for 4. The conditional distribution of e given r is
uniform on the unit interval [0, 1]. The conditional distribution of s given F and e puts probability
P1 on si and probability 1 - pi on S2 where si, s2 satisfy Ei (F, si) = vi (F, e), ii (iF, s2) = v2 (i, e),
and P1 solves plvl (T, e) + (1 - Pi) v2 (F, e) = 0. Clearly, a satisfies the two properties. M
Proof of Proposition 2.5. I prove this proposition under weaker assumptions imposed in
Proposition 2.6. Denote -i = ^ (miri, sj) pj. A mechanism -y has to satisfy the receiver's incentive
constraints for reporting his true r and for acting whenever he receives ml:
i11P111 + U12P 1 2 > "11/J'21 + U121L2 2
UIIP11 + U12P1 2  11 (P1 - P2 1 ) + i 1 2 (P2 - #22)
Ul11I11 + 1112/12 0
i1111 + i421 1 2  Uiipi + U12P2 (2.27)
U21/1 21 + ii22P22 U21lPi + U22 A12
p21/P21 + U22/ 2 2 > 1121 (P1 - P11) + i22 (P2 - A12)
121/21 + ii22P22 > 0
121P/21 + 22/P22 i2lPl + i 2 2 P2.
Note that p and # are related by:
PijjPlj Pr (a = 1, r = ri, s = sj) = q4, 2Pi1 j for j = 1, 2,
/2jP2|j = Pr (a = 1, r = r2, S = sj) = #iP2|j + #j,2P21j3 for j 1, 2,
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which implies that li = 1,2 and p23 = 03, 2 + #'. Rewriting (2.27) in variables # gives:
i11402 + i12#$ < 0
i1 1 ,2 + U12# ,2 11 (P1 - 0 - 0i,2) + i12 (P2 - - 1i,2)
i 1 11, 2 + i12# ,2 > 0
i 1 1, 2 + i 12 # ,2 > ii1P + U12P2
U21402 + 122#$ > 0
U21 (i + #, 2) + 22(2 + 4 1,2 ) > ii21 (P1 - 01,2) + 122 (P2 - # ,2)
ii21 (012 + 011,2) + Ui22 2 1i2) > 0
U2l (2 ±' 1,2) + Ui22 2 1i,2) > ui21P1 + iUP2
which immediately implies that all constraints (2.28) except possibly #2 > 0 are satisfied. Finally,
#> > 0 follows from 110 + U1240 < 0, u21 01 + ii224$ > 0, 1 2 ,U22 > 0, and k 2 < ki (ii22 i 1 1 <
ii21i12)- 0
Proof of Proposition 2.6. The optimal mechanism # maximizes
Pr 0 (a = 1) P2|1d2 + P2[242 + #1,2 + 4 ,2
subject to
#' 0 forj 1,2 and K= {0},{2},{1,2},
04 +e#+0 1 ,2 =p 3 for j = 1,2,
U21#02 + U22# 2  0, (2.28)
i 1 ,2 + U124 ,2 > 0
U21#$ + U22#0 < 0 or #=1 0,
11 + U12#02 < 0 or #1 = 42 = 0.
Consider the relaxed problem that omits the last two constraints with strict inequalities. The
solution to the relaxed problem satisfies #2 = 0, 2101 + u22# 2 = 0, and ii511 2 + i12# ,2 = 0,
otherwise we can increase Pro (a = 1) by the following changes to the mechanism. If #2 z 0, change
-2 2 2 d if = +; 1 ii a et r 2 1
1,2 = + # a; 1 ,2 + 12#, 2 > change 1,2 = 1,2 + and either 2 -
~1 ~2 2 2 =0
-1 12 12 +Eand ~ ~6~~where 6 is a small
or 40 - e; if U21 0 + U2246 >0, change 41,2 = 1,2 + 2 a
positive number. These observations together with k 2 < ki imply that the solution to the relaxed
problem satisfies the last two constraints and, therefore, it also solves the original problem. The
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original problem simplifies to the maximization of
( 12 ( 22 ii12 2Pre(a = 1)= 1- P2-- +P1|2+ P2|1 2
\ 11 U21 U11
over #2 subject to
- #) 02 P1 + P2-U11 U21 2 U11
0 < p2.0- q2 <P2-
The solution to this problem is: (i) 02 0 if P12 + P2|1 > 'U;,(ii) #2 P2 if Pil2 + P2|1 <
21 1±P U21 ____ f1 2 - 12 + 1u-21 and
and u21pi + Ei22P2 < 0; (iii) 02 - i-2 1 UiP1+U12P2 P< 2i< and
Y, 02 1 1  
"21
ii21P1+ ii22P2 > 0. Finally, #1,2 = P2 _ -2 1 - i2 2 -01, , #2 0,
Recall that the receiver's value of information is defined as the difference between the receiver's
expected utilities under the optimal mechanism # and the no revelation mechanism #n,. Under
#,, the receiver's expected utility is
E [maxE4 [an (r, s)|r] =max {0, U21P1 + i22P2}-
Under #, the receiver's expected utility is
E [max E4 [au (r, s) Ir, m]] = ("nld ,2 +0' 12#, 2 ) + (i4212, 2 +2 224 ,2 ) + (i21#2 +-22# 2)
= 21# ,2 + U22 1 , 2
Ufl22U12U21 P2 in case (i),
0 in case (ii),
i21pi + u22P2 in case (iii).
The second equality holds because Ei, 2 + 12# 0,2 = =21#+ 22#91= 0. The equality for (i) holds
because #1,2 = P2 and 22  - P2. The equality for (ii) holds because #1,2 =,2,2 0. The
equality for (iii) holds because #11,2 = P1 - 01, ,2 = P2 , and u2l10' + U22 2 = 0. Therefore,
R's expected utilities under # and #no differ if and only if P112 + 'P2|1 > - *
Proof of Proposition 2.7. The optimal mechanism # maximizes
Pr 4 (a = 1) = Plid1 + P112#1 + P21101 + P21242 + #11,2 + #1,2
57
subject to
#1 0 forj = 1,2 and K = {0}{1}{2}{1,2},
#- + # + 0+1,2 = PJ for j = 1, 2,
iii101 + i2? > 0 for i = 1, 2,
Uii#, 2 + i2d ,2 > 0 for i = 1, 2,
E4iqi$i0 + 2#_i < 0 or 1_i #j_i = 0 for i 1, 2,
ii 1 4A + Ui2dj2 < 0 or #1 = #2 0 for i = 1,2.
Note that Ei1 Pro (s1im)+i2 Pro (s2|m) > 0 is equivalent to Pro (s2|m) < ki, and E21 Pro (slmIn)+
u22 Pr4 (s2 Im) > 0 is equivalent to Pre (S2 IM) k 2 . Therefore, the receiver r1 acts if Pro (S2 In) <
k1 , and the receiver r1 acts if Pro (s2|m) > k2. If k2 < k1, then no mechanism can send the message
me because Pr 4 (s2Im) < k2 and Pre (s2|m) > ki cannot both hold. On the contrary, if k 2 > k1 ,
then no mechanism can send the message mi,2 because Pro (s2 IM) > k 2 and Pr (82 |m) ki cannot
both hold. Consider these two cases in turn.
Let k 2 < ki and, thus, 1 = #2 = 0. Consider the relaxed problem with the constraints #j > 0,
4 + #2 + -,2 = Pj, ;4iid04 + U12#1 0, and i 11#{,2 + iE12#,2 > 0 for all K and j. Note that
the last two constraints imply isii (#I + #1,2) + £12 (#0 + #,2) > 0, so the solution to the relaxed
problem satisfies #1 = # = 0, otherwise we can increase Pro (a = 1) by the following changes to
the mechanism: ,2 = 4j,2 + #j and e3 = 0 for j 1, 2. Substituting # Pj - 45, the relaxed1,+71 an 010fo ,2 ,22
problem simplifies to: # and 42 maximize
Pr 4 (a = 1) 1- P111# - P112#202
subject to
d3 E [0, pg] for j = 1, 2,
i411 0 + U12 2  EllPl + U12P2.
The solution to this problem is (24, #2) (0, "Pi±1P2) It is also the solution to the original
problem because it satisfies all constraints of the original problem.
Let k 2 > ki and, thus, #11,2 =1,2 = 0- In the optimal mechanism, # = 0, otherwise we
can increase Pro (a = 1) by the following changes to the mechanism: 0' = 0#'+ and 00 = 0 for i
1,2. Consider the relaxed problem with the constraints #i, #4 > 0, #$ 4 =0- p1 , 14i0 +u12 2 > 0,
and ii21 #4 + £i22 #0 > 0 for all j = 1,2. Substituting #-= pj - #4, the relaxed problem simplifies
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to: #1 and #2 maximize
Pro (a = 1) = P1i1P1 + P112P2 + (1 - 2pili) #' + (1 - 2p1|2) #2
subject to
3 E [0, pg] for j = 1, 2,
i411i2 + u12# 2  1ii1P + U12p2,
U21# 2 + U224 2 >0-
The coefficients 1 - 2p11 and 1 - 2p1|2 in the objective function can have any sign and, therefore,
any extreme point of the constraints can be a solution to this problem. If P2 > k2 , the extreme
points of (#1,#2) are (0,p2), (0, "Ps "2 , (pip2). Ifp 2 < k2 , the extreme points of (0, 42)
are (0, p2), (0, 11P1 12P2 ,(-2 P2, p P +12P 2 (U22, -U21). All these extreme points can
be a solution to the original problem because they satisfy all constraints of the original problem.
2.9 Appendix C: Commitment Assumption
The assumption that the sender can commit to a mechanism is strong, but it allows us to abstract
from the sender's incentive constraint and find the best possible information revelation from the
sender's perspective, with the only constraint being that the receiver takes an action that maximizes
his expected utility given his information. As I argue in the introduction, in some real-life examples,
the commitment assumption is natural. Below, I provide three other kinds of situations that are
formally equivalent to assuming that the sender has commitment power. These other situations
are good approximations of many other real-life examples.
The first situation is based on public communication with a large population of heterogeneous
receivers. 24 Suppose that instead of one receiver, there is a unit measure of receivers indexed by
i E [0, 1] for whom vectors (ri, si) are independent and identically distributed. Assume that the
sender's ex post utility is equal to the measure of receivers who act f aidi." Denote #* as the
optimal mechanism in the original model with one receiver, and p* as the probability that the
receiver acts under #*. Define #P as a mechanism that applies #* to each i E [0, 1] independently.
2 4This situation is distantly related to the literature on cheap talk with multiple audiences (Farrell and Gibbons
(1989)) and multidimensional cheap talk (Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007)).
2'A technical issue arises with the existence of such a measure and the validity of the law of large numbers. However,
it can be bypassed using the appropriate interpretation of the integral (Uhlig (1996)).
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The mechanism &* is optimal in the environment with a unit measure of receivers because the
sender's utility is additive in the receivers' actions and (ri, si) are identically distributed.
The optimal mechanism can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game
between the sender and the receivers if the receivers are allowed to communicate with each other.
To see this, note that if the sender sends messages according to q$ and the receivers believe so, then
the measure of receivers who act is fixed at p* by the law of large numbers. The only reason why
the sender may want to deviate from qS is to increase the measure of receivers who act above p*.
However, this deviation can be detected and punished by the receivers if before taking their actions,
they announce what actions they are planning to take and compare the measure of receivers who
are going to act with p*. Moreover, it can be shown that if ri is independent of si, then q5 can be
supported as an equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game with public messages from the sender
and without communication between receivers.
If (ri, si) are dependent or there are finitely many receivers, then the optimal mechanism may
be unachievable to the sender, but she can still do better than the no revelation mechanism. For
example, suppose that the receivers are uninformed and suppose that u (si) = si = oi + z where
ci are independent and identically distributed, and z is independent of ac. We can interpret ai
as a receiver-specific taste for acting and z as an aggregate taste for acting, where both ai and z
are known only by the sender. It can be shown that in this example, the sender can support the
optimal revelation of ai but not of z as an equilibrium outcome of a cheap talk game.
In the case with multiple receivers, a mechanism can be viewed as an abstraction for Bayesian
updating by receivers. The sender does not literally send a separate message mi to each receiver i.
Instead, the sender makes a public announcement. If the receivers are not perfectly homogeneous
((ri, s) are not perfectly correlated), they make different inferences (draw different messages mi)
from the same announcement. For example, an announcement that a political party supports tax
reduction has different welfare implications for individuals with different income levels. Similarly,
a particular advertisement of a product has different welfare implications for consumers who value
different attributes of the product.
The second situation is based on reputation considerations and is used by Rayo and Segal
(2010) to motivate their model. Consider a repeated game in which each period i, the sender
plays a communication game with a new receiver i whose (ri, si) is independent and identically
distributed. If the history of play {ai, mi, ri, si}i is observable, the sender is sufficiently patient,
and receivers put non-trivial probability on the event that the sender is committed to the optimal
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mechanism #, then the sender can essentially build the reputation for playing the mechanism #
in each period as Fudenberg and Levine (1992) show. Real-life examples with a long-run sender
include grading policy, advertising, and credit agencies.
The third situation is based on verifiable communication with endogenous information structure
and is used by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to motivate their model. They show that the optimal
mechanism can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of the following game. First, the sender
chooses a mechanism #. Second, a message m is drawn according to # and is privately observed by
the sender. Third, the sender makes a verifiable report (in Milgrom (1981) sense) about the chosen
mechanism and the received message. Finally, the receiver forms a belief and takes an action. A
prosecutor persuading a judge to convict a suspect is a good example example of this situation.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Limited Authority for
Principal'
3.1 Introduction
A principal needs to elicit information from an agent in order to make decisions, but their inherent
conflict of interest makes truthful communication difficult. When the principal cannot credibly
give up her authority to make the final decision, the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982)
(hereafter CS) shows that the principal's decisions suffer from the agent's incentive to distort his
information in favor of his bias. When the principal can credibly delegate her decision-making
authority, the agent uses his information efficiently but his decision is biased. In reality, however,
the principal may be able to give up certain aspects of her decision-making authority, but not all,
due to institutional or technological reasons.
This chapter presents a model of limited authority: ex ante, the principal can credibly rule
out certain decisions as infeasible; but for the remaining decisions, she cannot commit to any
particular decision rule such as adopting the agent's recommendation without change ex post.
Real life examples of this type of limited authority abound. For instance, in a typical university
tenure system, the university has only two decisions given a department's recommendation on a
tenure case: promote the assistant professor or fire him. In the US House of Representatives, the
Rules Committee can establish a set of special rules to limit the amendment process when a bill is
introduced. In particular, the committee can adopt a structured rule that specifies the amendments
'This chapter is co-authored with Li Hao and Wei Li.
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to be considered and the time for debate. Finally, in a factory setting, the owner's choice of one
type of an assembly line may make the production of certain products impossible, but she can
still choose the final product within the capacity of the assembly line after hearing the manager's
recommendation.
Our model of limited authority presents an ex ante tradeoff for the principal in deciding how
much ex post authority to retain. On one hand, by retaining more decisions the principal can
make better use of the agent's reported information. On the other hand, more retained decisions
creates a bigger credibility problem: the information content of the report is lower because the agent
anticipates the principal's incentive to exploit it. Using the same general framework as CS, we show
that under the optimal limited authority, finitely many decisions are retained. The agent partitions
the state space and makes a recommendation from the set of retained decisions for each partition
element, and the principal always follows the recommendation and never randomizes. Moreover,
the principal is strictly better off under the optimal limited authority than in any CS equilibrium.
Intuitively, by ruling out some decisions, the principal reduces her incentives to distort decisions
recommended by the agent, which allows the biased agent to make more precise recommendations
than in the cheap talk game.
To better understand the tradeoff for the principal under limited authority, in particular the
properties of the retained decisions, we turn to the example with uniformly distributed state and
convex loss function, which is a slight generalization of the uniform-quadratic example commonly
used in the communication literature. We fully characterize the principal's optimal limited authority
in this case. To begin with, in the optimal limited authority, all the retained decisions are above
the principal's ex post optimal decisions-in the direction of the agent's bias-given that she learns
the partitional elements. Second, retained decisions are more evenly distributed under the optimal
limited authority than the induced decisions in a CS equilibrium. Intuitively, in a CS equilibrium
each induced decision is ex post optimal because the principal has no commitment power, and
thus the agent induces decisions that grow in distance between each other in the direction of his
bias. In contrast, under the optimal limited authority the principal restricts the set of decisions she
can choose from, which reduces the agent's incentive to distort his recommendations due to their
conflict of interest. This increases the possible number of decisions that can be credibly retained,
and decreases the distance between them. Third, we show that, contrary to the predictions of both
the cheap talk and delegation models, the principal does not necessarily maximize the number of
decisions that can be credibly retained. Intuitively, allowing more decisions ex ante can make the
63
principal worse off by reducing the communication quality because the credibility problem distorts
the choices of the decisions. In particular, some decisions may be used with almost zero probability,
but their presence still forces the principal to move other retained decisions away from the ex ante
optimal ones.
This chapter is directly related to the literature on delegation initiated by Holmstrom (1984).
He shows that the optimal outcome under full commitment of the principal is achieved by restricting
the set of decisions and delegating decision-making authority to the agent. This chapter analyzes
the environment in which the principal cannot delegate authority to the agent, but can restrict
the set of decisions. Closely related are Dessein (2002) and Marino (2007), who study the optimal
delegation problem where the principal can veto the agent's decision and replace it with some
default decision, and Mylovanov (2008), who instead assumes that the principal can choose the
default decision ex ante. Less related to our work, Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and Szalay (2005)
analyze how restricting the set of decisions affects influence activities and information acquisition
respectively. Sections 3.2.3 and 3.5.1 discuss the related literature in greater detail.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the limited authority model
by adding to the cheap talk game a first move by the principal choosing the set of retained decisions.
Section 3.2.3 provides detailed motivations for our limited authority assumption. Section 3.3 derives
general properties about the optimal limited authority by first characterizing it as a solution to
a constrained maximization problem. This characterization provides an equivalent interpretation
of our limited authority model as a delegation game in which the principal chooses the delegation
set but cannot commit to not changing the agent's decision within the set. Section 3.4 provides
a full characterization of the example with uniformly distributed state, convex loss functions for
both the principal and the agent, and a state-independent bias for the agent. Section 3.5 compares
the principal's welfare under optimal limited authority to various organizational forms studied in
the existing literature. We find that the principal's ex ante expected payoffs are similar under the
optimal limited authority and optimal delegation, and both are significantly higher than that under
the most informative cheap talk equilibrium. Section 3.6 briefly discusses extensions of the model.
All proofs can be found in the appendix.
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3.2 Model
3.2.1 Setup
This chapter analyzes the CS model with one modification. In CS the set of decisions is a real line;
we instead assume that, ex ante, the principal can credibly restrict the set of decisions from which
she makes decisions ex post. The model specified in this section is called a model of limited authority
throughout the chapter. It has two natural interpretations suitable for different environments,
namely, the cheap talk game and the delegation game. We first present the model using the cheap
talk game, and then comment briefly on the delegation game.
Formally, there is an informed agent A (he) and an uninformed principal P (she). Payoffs of A
and P, denoted by uA (y, 0) and up (y, 0), are both functions of the decision y and the state of the
world 0. The timing of the cheap talk game is as follows:
1. P chooses a decision set Y, a compact subset of the real line.
2. A observes Y and privately learns 0, drawn from the interval (0, 1] according to a positive
probability density function f (0).
3. A sends a cheap talk message m from the interval [0, 1).
4. P receives m and makes a decision y E Y.
All aspects of the game are common knowledge. We make the CS assumptions on functions
u^ (y, 0) and up (y, 0), which are maintained throughout the chapter:
Assumption 3.1 There exists a function u and a scalar b > 0 such that u A (y, 0) = u (y, 0, b) and
up (y, 0) = u (y, 0, 0). Moreover,
1. u is twice continuously differentiable in all variables.
2. uy, (y, 0, /) < 0 for all y E R, 0 E [0, 1], and # E [0, b].
3. uy(y* (0) , 0, /) = 0 for some function y* (0), and for all 0 E [0, 1] and 0 E [0, b].
4. uYo (y, 0, #) > 0 for all y E R, 0 E [0, 11, and 3 E [0, b].
5. uyg3 (y, 0, f) > 0 for all y C R, 0 E [0, 1], and / E [0, b].
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Parts 2 and 3 imply that both A and P's preferences are single-peaked. Parts 1-3 together
imply that y'(0) = arg maxyER U2 (y, 0) is well defined and continuous in 0 for all 0 E [0, 1] and
i = A, P. Part 4 is a sorting condition, which ensures that both yA (0) and yp (0) are increasing in
0 for all 0 E [0, 1]. Finally, part 5 guarantees that yp (0) < yA (0) for all 0 E [0, 1].
In the delegation game interpretation of the model, first P chooses a delegation set Y, and
then A chooses some y from Y, which P can approve or change to some other 9 in Y. The only
formal difference between this interpretation and the above cheap talk interpretation is that in
the delegation game A makes a choice y from Y, instead of sending a cheap talk message. The
reduction in A's strategy space, from the set of messages [0,1] in the cheap talk game to the set Y
in the delegation game, turns out to be immaterial to our characterization of the optimal limited
authority. This claim will be formally established as part of the proof of Proposition 1 in the next
section. 2 As a result, the delegation game and the cheap talk game are two interpretations of the
same limited authority model.
3.2.2 Solution Concept and Definitions
The solution concept we use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (hereafter PBE). A PBE is P's choice of
Y, A's report strategy - : 2R x (0, 1] -- A[0, 1], P's decision strategy p : 2R x [0, 1] -+ AY, and P's
belief p : 2R x [0, 1] -- A (0, 1], such that strategies are optimal given players' beliefs, and beliefs
are derived from Bayes' rule whenever possible.3 Formally, the equilibrium conditions are, for all
Y c R, M E [0, 1], for m* in the support of o-(IY, 0), and for y* in the support of p -i), mn:
Y E arg max UP (y, 0) p (y|, rn) a-(fn , 0)f (0) dy dO dffi,
YCR Yx [0, 1] x [0,1]
m* E arg max UA (y 0)P(yp, dyihc[0,1] JEM
y* E arg max UP (y, 0) p ( m( dO,
yEY 0
p |Ym-(m|E )f (0)
Lo o (m|Y,0) f (0),dO
2 The claim is obviously true if we restrict the attention to equilibria where P uses a pure strategy on the equilibrium
path. The proof of Proposition 1 establishes the claim allowing for the possibility of random decisions by P.
3 A technical issue arises with the existence of the conditional distribution function, p (8IY, m), which can be
bypassed using the notion of distributional strategies (see Milgrom and Weber (1985)) and Theorem 33.3 of Billingsley
(1995).
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A PBE of the delegation game is defined analogously, with the only difference being that A's
mixed strategy is a mapping from the set of states [0, 1] to the set of probability distributions over
the set Y chosen by P, instead of to the set of distributions over the message space [0, 1].4
Regardless of the interpretation of the limited authority model, we adopt the following defin-
itions. The decision y is induced by 0 (or equivalently 0 induces y) in a PBE if y is chosen by P
with positive probability when the state is 0 in this PBE, or
o-(m|Y, 9)dm > 0.
I{m:P(yY,m)>0}
The decision y is induced in a PBE if y is induced in at least one state. A PBE is informative
if there are at least two induced decisions, and uninformative otherwise. The uninformative deci-
sion yp is defined as yp = arg max f6 uP (y,8) f (0) dO. Finally, a PBE is a partition equilibrium
yER
({} O~jn {f j,{=1) if {i}20- is a partition of (0, 1], and {y}"U 1 C Y is a set of induced decisions
where
0 = o < 01 < ... < n= (3.1)
y1 < ... < Yn,
such that any 0 E (Oi-1, 0] induces decision yi for all i = 1,.. . , n. Condition (3.1) is called the
partition condition. Clearly, a partition equilibrium can be supported as a PBE of the delegation
game where the delegation set Y chosen by P on the equilibrium path has the following properties.
First, it is minimal, in that each decision y E Y is induced; and second, it is veto-free, in that P
chooses the same y chosen by A.
Two remarks are in order. First, all CS equilibria can be supported as a PBE in this framework.
Indeed, consider any CS equilibrium. The following strategies and beliefs constitute a PBE. If P
chooses f = R, then both A and P's strategies and beliefs are given by the CS equilibrium. If P
chooses i 4 R, then A sends uninformative messages; P believes so and makes the best decision
out of f based on her prior belief. This observation implies that a PBE always exists.
Second, similar to the CS model, for each PBE there exists an outcome equivalent PBE in which
all messages in [0, 1] are sent on the equilibrium path. Therefore, we cannot refine the set of PBE
using standard equilibrium refinements such as those of Cho and Kreps (1987) which restrict out-
4 In the cheap talk game, it is without loss of generality to restrict the set of messages to [0, 1], as in CS. In the
delegation game, we have implicitly assumed that A cannot choose lotteries. This assumption is non-consequential
to our analysis, as established later in Proposition 1.
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of-equilibrium beliefs.5 This chapter mostly focuses on PBE that maximizes P's expected payoff,
which we refer to as the optimal PBE. Such a refinement is natural if P does not only choose Y
at the first stage, but also announces the outcome she plans to implement with the chosen decision
set Y.
3.2.3 Discussion
The imperfect commitment assumption that ex ante the principal can credibly restrict the set
of decisions available to her ex post, but she cannot commit to any specific decision rule deserves
further discussion. Below we provide three motivations. Our first motivation is formal, and is based
on the incomplete contracting approach initiated by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1988). Our limited authority model describes a contracting environment in which the authority
to make final (irreversible) decisions resides with the principal, but only these final decisions are
verifiable.6 In this environment, all the principal can do is to ex ante exclude some decisions from
what she may choose ex post. In the same spirit of the observable-but-not-verifiable assumption
in the incomplete contracting literature, our restrictions on contractibility are certainly severe. In
particular, in our limited authority model neither communication by the agent to the principal, such
as reports on his information or recommendations to the principal, nor decision rights is verifiable.
Allowing reports or recommendations by the agent to be verifiable would of course turn our model
into an exercise in mechanism design without transfers; likewise, allowing the decision rights to
be contractible would change our model into an optimal delegation problem. Both these problems
have been extensively studied in the literature; see for example the more recent works by Kovac and
Mylovanov (2009) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008). The innovation in this chapter is instead to
study a more primitive contracting environment than the full-commitment framework initiated by
Holmstrom (1984), while at the same time demonstrate what "simple" contracts can achieve relative
to the no-contracting, cheap talk framework of CS. Furthermore, from an applied point of view,
there are contracting situations for which our limited authority model is appropriate. For example,
5Some refinements for cheap talk games have been proposed in the literature but they do not generally select a
unique equilibrium. A notable exception is due to Chen et al. (2008), which selects the most informative equilibrium
under some regularity conditions.
6 Hart and Moore (2004) impose a similar contractibility assumption. They assume that ex ante the parties
can restrict the set of outcomes over which they bargain ex post. However, the parties cannot commit to any
specific mechanism according to which the outcome frorn this restricted set is chosen ex post. Also, Hermalin et al.
(2007) propose a similar approach to model situations in which a contract has ambiguous provisions. That is, each
contingency in a contract is associated with a set of outcomes from which the final outcome is chosen. In this context,
the imperfect commitment assumption requires that the same set of possible outcomes should be associated with
each contingency.
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it may be prohibitively costly for the agent to present physical evidence of his communication with
the principal in the court. Similarly, to delegate formal authority to the agent, the principal may
need to sell relevant productive assets to the agent, which may be impractical because the same
assets are used by the principal for other purposes.
The second motivation for the imperfect commitment assumption is technological, and presumes
a contracting environment where verifiability of any reports or decisions is completely absent.
For example, making certain decisions may require a specialized equipment which is prohibitively
expensive to procure ex post. In this case, not procuring the equipment ex ante commits the
principal to not making the decisions that use the equipment. Similarly, in many organizations,
managers make decisions using software packages, such as SAP ERP. This software is typically
adjusted to the specific needs of each organization so that certain decisions are made unavailable,
such as trading of some products at certain prices in a financial company. In addition, it may be
impractical to give control over this software to those who have relevant information for decision
making in an organization. This technology thus allows the principal to restrict her decision set
without making it possible for her to commit to decisions based on the agent's reports. It is worth
noting that between the two aspects in the standard full-commitment model, the principal's ability
to make certain decisions infeasible and her ability to commit to not changing the decision made
by the agent, the first one may be accomplished through some technology while the second one is
often technologically harder or even impossible.
The third and final motivation for the imperfect commitment assumption is institutional, and
is based on realistic assumptions about how decision rights are allocated in organizations. In many
organizations, managers typically make critical decisions based on information supplied by their
subordinates, but are held accountable for the final decisions. Organization rules often prohibit
managers from delegating their decisions to their subordinates, but allow managers to credibly
commit to not taking certain decisions. This is the kind of organizational setting that makes our
limited authority model applicable. The same situation may also arise in a multi-level hierarchy
in which contracts can be written only among certain parties. For instance, our limited authority
model applies in a multidivisional organization with the headquarters, a division manager, and the
manager's subordinate, where enforceable contracts can be written only between the headquarters
and the manager.
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3.3 General Analysis
In this section we provide a general analysis of the optimal PBE in our limited authority model.
We start by characterizing the optimal PBE as a solution to a constrained maximization problem
in Proposition 3.1. This is a useful result that we exploit further in the uniform-convex loss setup
in Section 3.4 to completely characterize the optimal PBE. Here we use it to establish the main
result of the section, Proposition 3.2, that the optimal PBE strictly improves the principal's welfare
relative to the most informative equilibrium of CS. Under further assumptions on the preference
functions uA and uP, Proposition 3.3 provides a tight upper bound on the agent's bias parameter
b for the principal to benefit from limited authority relative to the CS model.
Our first result establishes the existence of optimal PBE under limited authority and charac-
terizes its basic properties. In particular, it shows that the optimal PBE is a partition equilibrium
with a finite number of induced decisions.
Proposition 3.1 An optimal PBE exists and is a partition equilibrium with a finite number of
elements. Moreover, among all partition equilibria ({{O} -0 , =yjL1 ) with a finite n, it maximizes
= 1 0a . (yi, O)f (O)dO subject to, for each i = 2, ... n,
u A (y,, 0,_1 = A (y,_11 , _1) (3.2)
oi 
riSuP (yi, ) f ()dO > up (yi_1, 0) f (0)dO. (3.3)
We start the proof of Proposition 1 by characterizing all PBE. First, we exploit the assumptions
on the payoff functions uA and up to show that any PBE in the cheap talk game can be supported
as one in the delegation game, meaning that we can restrict attention to PBE's in which P's
equilibrium decision set Y is minimal and veto-free. Second, we prove that any PBE is a partition
equilibrium with a finite number of elements. The proof of the finiteness is quite standard, except
that the distance between three rather than two adjacent induced lotteries is bounded away from
zero. Third, in any PBE, the adjacent incentive conditions are sufficient for all incentive conditions
of P because P's payoff function is strictly concave. Further, in any PBE in which P does not
randomize over the set of decisions upon receiving a message, P never has incentives to deviate to
higher decisions, because A has an upward bias and even he weakly prefers not to deviate to higher
decisions.
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To complete the proof of Proposition 1, we characterize optimal PBE. First, we show that in
any optimal PBE, P never randomizes. The proof is involved because of the finiteness of decision
set Y.7 We show that for any PBE with non-degenerate lotteries, P can increase her payoff by
replacing each non-degenerate lottery with the higher decision in the lottery. The observation
above that in any non-degenerate lottery y < y', A strictly prefers the higher decision y' implies
that P can improve the quality of communication by A by increasing the probability weight on y'.
By putting all the weight on y' instead, she makes the (now degenerate) lottery more attractive
so that A recommends y' for a set of higher states than in the old PBE. Since P prefers a lower
decision for the same set of states, she is strictly better off. Finally, the problem of finding the
optimal PBE reduces to a constrained maximization problem where the set of feasible choices is all
partition equilibria with a finite number of elements that satisfy A's indifference conditions (3.2)
and P's adjacent downward incentive conditions (3.3). The solution to this problem exists by the
maximum theorem.
Clearly, P cannot do worse than in any CS equilibrium, as she can replicate any CS equilibrium
outcome by restricting the set of decisions to those induced in the CS equilibrium. Our second
result shows that P can in fact do strictly better.
Proposition 3.2 P's expected payoff is strictly higher in the optimal PBE than in any informative
CS equilibrium.
In a CS equilibrium, each induced decision is ex post optimal for P in that it maximizes P's
expected payoff over all possible decisions y E R given P's belief about the state after receiving a
message from A. Therefore, P's incentive conditions (3.3) are not binding in an informative CS
equilibrium, and she can marginally increase any induced decision yi without violating (3.3). As P
increases yi, by the envelope theorem, her expected payoff is unaffected by the introduction of ex
post inefficiencies, but it increases marginally due to an increase in the partition thresholds 0i_1
and Oi. For example, as 0 i_1 increases to 0'i_1, an upwardly biased A induces yi-i instead of a
higher decision yi for states 0 C (i-1, 0'>1], which increases P's expected payoff.
We can strengthen Proposition 3.2 by showing that P can still strictly improve her expected
payoff by restricting the set of decisions even when there does not exist an informative CS equilib-
rium. More formally, suppose that an informative CS equilibrium exists whenever b is less than b*,
7 In CS P's payoff function is strictly convex in a decision and the set of decisions is convex. Thus, upon receiving
a message, P has a unique optimal decision.
71
with two decisions y1 and Y2. Then there exists E such that for all b less than b* + -, E sufficiently
small, P's expected payoff is strictly higher in the optimal PBE than in any CS equilibrium. By
Proposition 3.2, for b less than b*, P can increase either yi or Y2 to achieve the desired PBE. By
continuity of u, these new induced decisions still constitute a PBE in which P's expected payoff is
strictly higher than that in the uninformative CS equilibrium at b = b* + -.
Under additional assumptions on the function u, we can further strengthen Proposition 3.2. We
show that P's expected payoff is strictly higher in the optimal PBE than a babbling equilibrium if
and only if delegation is valuable under full commitment. Adopting a definition from Alonso and
Matouschek (2008), we say that delegation is valuable if P can improve on the uninformed decision
yp by committing to letting A choose between at least two decisions.
Proposition 3.3 Let un(y, 0) = -(y - yP(0))2 and uA(., 0) be symmetric around yA(0). P's
expected payoff is strictly higher in the optimal PBE than in any CS equilibrium if and only if
delegation is valuable.
The "only if' part is immediate, because by Proposition 3.1 the optimal PBE is a partition
equilibrium and any partition equilibrium can be implemented through delegation as the incentive
conditions (3.3) for P are absent in delegation under full commitment. The proof of the "if' part is
based on a result due to Alonso and Matouschek (2008). They show that if delegation is valuable,
then P can improve on implementing the uninformed decision yP by letting A choose between
exactly two decisions. We show that these two decisions satisfy P's incentive condition (3.3), and
thus can be induced in a PBE.
3.4 Uniform-Convex Loss Example
This section focuses on a slight generalization of the leading example of CS. In particular, we
assume:
Assumption 3.2 f(0) = 1 for 0 E (0,1], u(y,0, 3) = -l(ly - (0 +f)|), where 1 is increasing and
convex with 1(0) = l'(0) = 0.
Assumption 3.2 includes the leading uniform-quadratic example as a special case with 1(z) = z 2 .
Clearly, Assumption 3.2 satisfies Assumption 3.1, so Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. We focus on
72
this example because it is widely used in applications as a building block. 8
This example is particularly well-behaved to apply the constrained maximization program given
in Proposition 3.1. In leading to the main result of this section, a complete characterization of the
optimal PBE in Proposition 3.5, we provide a few results that have independent interests and a
solution approach that yields further insights about the optimal PBE. We first establish that in
the optimal PBE each induced decision is higher than what is ex post optimal conditional on P
learning the corresponding partition element. As a result, P's incentive conditions (3.3) take a
particularly simple form. In Proposition 3.4, we show that binding these conditions yields both
an upper bound on the number of induced decision in the optimal PBE, and a PBE that achieves
this upper bound. We then solve the full-commitment problem of maximizing P's expected payoff
with a fixed number of induced decisions, subject only to the partition conditions (3.1) and the
agent's indifference conditions (3.2). The solution provides a lower bound on the number of induced
decisions in the optimal PBE when it satisfies P's incentive conditions (3.3). The optimal PBE
can be then characterized by considering all partition equilibria with a number of induced decisions
between the lower bound from the full-commitment problem and the upper bound from Proposition
3.4.
3.4.1 Maximal Limited Authority
From Proposition 3.1, an optimal PBE exists and it is a partition equilibrium that satisfies A's
indifference conditions (3.2) and P's adjacent downward incentive conditions (3.3). In the present
uniform-convex loss model, these conditions can be rewritten as: for all i = 2, ... n,
Bi_ i + b - yi_1 = yi - Gi_1 - b; (3.4)
lyi - yii <; ly* - yi_1, (3.5)
where y*' j(0i_1 + O) is P's ex post optimal decision conditional on the interval (8i_1, Oi]. We
now show that induced decisions yi are higher than ex post optimal y* for all i = 1,. .. , n.
Lemma 3.1 In any optimal PBE ({Oi}O, {yi}-1), yj > y* for each i 1,...,n.
8There is another uniform-quadratic example that has been analyzed in recent papers including Gordon (2007)
and Alonso et al. (2008). In this example, A has an outward rather than upward bias such that his payoff is given by
uA (y, 0) = - (y - b - cO) 2 where b < 0 and b + c > 1. Intuitively, an outwardly biased A prefers extreme decisions
when the state of the world is extreme. In the example with outwardly biased A, there exists an equilibrium with a
countable number of induced decisions which eliminates an integer problem peculiar to the leading example of CS.
Therefore, in some applications, an example with outwardly biased A is simpler to analyze.
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The first part of the proof of the above result establishes that if yi y for some i = 1,. .. , n in
the optimal PBE, then P's (i + 1)-th incentive condition binds. This holds for the general model set
up in Section 3.2, not just the uniform-convex loss model here. The intuition is that if yi y* and
the (i + 1)-th condition is slack, P can obtain a greater expected payoff by marginally increasing
yi without affecting any incentive condition. Her payoff gain is clear: a higher yi moves her closer
to her ex post optimal decision given the same belief of the states; and the resulting increases in
thresholds Oi-1 and Oi mean that A now recommends yi for a set of higher states, making P better
off by the same argument as in Proposition 3.2.9 The second part of the proof of Lemma 3.1 uses
the special structure of the uniform-convex loss model to show that yi y is incompatible with
binding P's (i + 1)-th incentive condition.
We now restate the constrained maximization problem of Proposition 3.1 for the uniform-convex
loss setup by substituting out A's indifference conditions (3.4). The choice variables are {yi}"1.
By partition condition (3.1), Oo = 0 and 0, = 1, so the objective function becomes
n .0
up=- / (10 - yil) dO (3.6)
i=1,' 0i--I
The constraints are
Y1 < ... < Yn, (3.7)
Y1 + Y2 > 2b, (3.8)
yi+1 - yi-1 ;> 4b, for each i = 2, . . ., n - 1, (3.9)
Yn + Yn-1 < 2 (1 - b). (3.10)
Conditions (3.7) are part of the partition condition (3.1). Condition (3.8) ensures that 01 > 0;
0,_1 < 1 is implied by condition (3.10); and 01 < 02 < ...0n-2 < 0-1 follow from (3.7). Conditions
(3.9) and (3.10) are equivalent to (3.5) for i = 2,... ,n by Lemma 3.1. Condition (3.10) takes
a different form because 0, = 1 by partition condition (3.1), instead of being determined by A's
indifference condition in (3.4).
9In the general model, this result implies that in an optimal PBE the highest decisions y, and yn_1 satisfy y, > y,
and Yn-1 > y*,1, and that no two adjacent decisions yi and yi+1 are below y! and y*+1 respectively. Further, in the
hypothetical problem of full commitment with a fixed number of decisions introduced in Section 3.4.2, every decision
yi is strictly higher than y*.
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Observe that conditions (3.9) and (3.10) place constraints on the distance between decisions,
and thus the possible number of decisions, in the optimal PBE. We now proceed to characterize the
maximum number of decisions that P can possibly use in an optimal PBE for a given bias b. More
importantly, we show that there always exists a PBE in which the maximum number of decisions
is induced.
Proposition 3.4 The number of decisions induced in an optimal PBE is strictly less than 1/(2b) +
1. Conversely, there exists a PBE with n induced decisions for any positive integer n < 1/(2b) + 1.
Note that conditions (3.8) and (3.10) require that b < 1. This is consistent with the above
proposition, as the maximum number of decisions that P can possibly use in any PBE is 1 if b >
The second part of Proposition 3.4 is established by construction. A PBE that achieves the upper
bound on the number of decisions in an optimal PBE in the present uniform-convex loss model is
called maximal limited authority. The construction binds all P's incentive conditions (3.9), with
symmetric and equidistant decisions.10 It is instructive to compare the maximal limited authority
with the most informative CS equilibrium. In a CS equilibrium, the distance between subsequent
induced decisions grows at the rate 4b, that is, yi+1 - yi = yi - yi-1 + 4b for i = 2,...,n - 1.
Therefore, the number of induced decisions n in any CS equilibrium has to satisfy 2n(n - 1)b < 1.
In contrast, under limited authority, the distance between two subsequent induced decisions does
not grow. In fact, under the maximal limited authority with N induced decisions, binding P's i-th
incentive condition we have yi+I - yi-I = 4b for all i = 2, ... , N - 1. As a result, N is the largest
integer n satisfying 2(n - 1)b < 1, which is greater than the number of induced decisions in the
most informative CS equilibrium.
Although both the upper bound on the number of decisions in an optimal PBE and the con-
struction of a PBE that achieves the upper bound are specific to the uniform-convex loss setup,
there is a more general logic behind the result that the number of decisions under maximal limited
authority is larger than that in the most informative CS equilibrium. In a CS equilibrium, each
induced decision yj is ex post optimal conditional on the corresponding interval (Oi-1, Oi) because
P has no commitment power. In contrast, because our limited authority model gives P some com-
mitment power, in a partition equilibrium, P's incentive conditions are given by (3.3), requiring
"When n = 2, the maximum limited authority coincides with the full commitment solution introduced in Lemma
3.2, so P's incentive condition does not bind. See the proof of the proposition in the appendix.
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only that P prefer yi to the adjacent lower decision yi-1 conditional on (Oi-1, Of]. Therefore the
partitioning of the state space (0, 1] under limited authority need not be as rightward skewed as in
a CS equilibrium, and more decisions can be induced as a result.
3.4.2 Optimal Limited Authority
Before characterizing the optimal PBE, it is useful to consider the hypothetical problem of maxi-
mizing (3.6) subject to constraints (3.7), (3.8), and
yn-1 + yn < 2(1 + b), (3.11)
where we have dropped P's incentive conditions (3.9) and (3.10), but added (3.11) to ensure that
0,_1 < 1. This hypothetical problem has the interpretation of the case of full commitment, with
the restriction to a finite number n of decisions, and is informative about the limited authority
model.1 1 The solution also provides an upper bound on what P can achieve in an optimal PBE if it
has n decisions. Denote the solution as YFC _ {yFC 1 . (We write yfC instead of yfC (n; b)
whenever it can be done without loss of clarity.) The following lemma provides a characterization
of yFC (n)
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that b < 1. For any natural n, YFC (n) is given by yFC _ + A(- ,
i = 1,... , n, where A > 0 is uniquely determined by
21(yfC) = 1 (b + A/2) + 1 (lb - A/21).
For b > , the optimal full commitment solution has the single decision of 1. In contrast, for
b < j, under full commitment for any n optimal decisions yFC are equidistant, that is, all decisions
S= 1,..., n are A apart and symmetric around 1. In order to minimize P's expected payoff given
by (3.6), the decisions need to be equidistant to make the partition of the state space uniform in
that Oi - 8_1 is the same for all i = 2, ... , n - 1. The uniform partition in turn minimizes the loss of
information, which can be loosely understood as the average residual uncertainty of the state of the
world provided that P learns the partition elements (see Section 3.5 for more details when the loss
11 Melumad and Shibano (1991) show that the optimal decision set is equal to [b, 1 - b] in the full commitment
model in which P can commit to not to change A's recommendation without the restriction to a finite number of
decisions. The solution given in Lemma 3.2 becomes arbitrarily close to [b, 1 - b] as n -> oo. To see this, note that
as n -- 00, A -+ 0 and (n - 1)A -* 1 - 2b.
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function is quadratic). That decisions yfc are symmetric around 1 is also intuitive, because P is
unbiased, that is, yP (0) = 0.12 Finally, Lemma 3.2 implies that as n increases, the maximized value
of Up in the hypothetical full-commitment problem strictly increases. In fact, a robust feature of
models with full commitment is that more decisions can only improve A's communication quality
because P commits to not using the information A revealed strategically.
Solution yFC (n), however, may violate P's incentive conditions (3.9) and thus become infeasible
under limited authority. We now turn to the problem of maximizing P's expected payoff (3.6)
by choosing a set of a fixed finite number n of decisions, subject to all constraints (3.7)-(3.10).
Denote the solution to this problem as YLC (n) _ {yLC(n)}7 , and we refer to it as the n-optimal
limited authority as it takes n as given. A few observations are immediate. First, obviously,
yLC(1) = yFC(1) for any b, with yLC(1) = . Second, for each n > 2, by Proposition 3.4, yLC (n)
exists only if and only if
b < bLC (n) (3.12)
2 (n - 1)
Third, for n > 3, the solution YFC(n) to the full commitment problem satisfies P's incentive
condition (3.9), and hence yLC(n) yFC(n), if and only if b < bFC(n), where bFC(n) is uniquely
determined by
21(1/2 - (n - 1)bFC(n)) l(2bFC(r)). (3.13)
This follows because the above definition of bFC is simply the evaluation of the condition in Lemma
3.2 at A = 2b, so the distance A between two adjacent decisions yFC and yFC is greater than or
equal to 2b if and only if b < bFC(r). 13 Intuitively, when b or n is small, the decisions under YFC(n)
are sufficiently far apart from each other so that P would not want to deviate to the lower decision
yi-1 when A recommends yi. For n = 2, it turns out that yFC( 2 ) given in Lemma 3.2 is always
incentive compatible for P, and thus yLC( 2 ) = yFC(2 ).14 Since yFC( 2 ) exists if and only if b < 1,
we write bFC(2)
"If we focused on PBE that maximized A's expected payoff instead of P's, then the optimal decisions would tend
to be symmetric around . + b because A has the upward bias b > 0.
1 3Since 1 is convex, the right-hand side of the condition in Lemma 3.2 is increasing in A regardless of whether
A > 2b or A < 2b. The remaining incentive condition (3.10) of P can be shown to be equivalent to 01 > 0, which is
always satisfied under YFC(n). For details see the proof of Lemma 3.2 in the appendix.
"'The only incentive condition of P is (3.10). This is equivalent to 01 > 0, which is satisfied because in this case
01 = 1 - b and b < . See the proof of Proposition 3.4 in the appendix for details.
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The following lemma characterizes the n-optimal limited authority yLC(n) for n > 3 and
b E (bFC(n), bLC(n)). The crucial feature is that P's incentive conditions (3.9) all bind under
yLC(n). That is, under any yLC(n), whenever some of P's incentive conditions must bind because
b > bFC(n), P is indifferent between implementing each recommended decision yLC and replacing
it with the adjacent lower decision yC for each i = 2,... ,n - 1. Otherwise, if some, but not all,
incentive conditions (3.9) bind, then it would be possible to modify the decisions to make them
more equidistant and P better off. For example, if yi+1 - yi-1 > 4b for some i, then we could
increase yi-1 or decrease yi+1 without violating any incentive condition of P. That all incentive
conditions of P must bind if any of them binds is an intuitive result due to the assumption of
uniform distribution of the state, and this result is what makes the characterization of YLC(n)
relatively straightforward. It turns out that the characterization of yLC(n) depends on whether n
is odd or even. In both cases, the decisions {y}U are symmetric around I, which is intuitive
-1=2'
because the state is uniformly distributed and the loss function 1 is convex. When n is odd, the
decisions are all equidistant at 2b. When n is even, the decisions are equidistant in an alternating
manner, with yLC - L C equal for all odd i and for all even i respectively but strictly smaller foryi+ 1
odd i.15
Lemma 3.3 Fix any n > 3 and b E (bFC(n), LC(n)). The n-optimal limited authority yLC(n) is
given by yC = + 2b (i - n+1) + (b - !A 1 ) for odd i, and y7c + 2b (i - n+') - (b - !A1)
for even i, where A1  2b if n is odd and A1 < 2b determined by
2
if n is even.
Given the above characterization of the n-optimal limited authority decision set yLC(n) for
each fixed n and for all b E (bFC(n), bLC(n)), we can now present the main result of this section.
This is a characterization of the optimal PBE, achieved by comparing P's expected payoffs under
"
5Having all yLf - yfc equal to 2b is not optimal when n is even, because the number of such differences is not a
multiple of the number of incentive conditions in (3.9). Starting from a set of decisions {yi}?_ 1 that are equidistant
at 2b and symmetric around }, we can increase P's expected payoff by increasing yi for all odd i and decreasing it
for even i by the same amount.
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all feasible decision sets. By (3.12) and (3.13),16
bFC (n) <bLC (n + 1) <bFC (n -
Since P prefers yFC (n - 1) to yFC (i) and yLC (i) for all i < n - 1, we can restrict the search
for the optimal PBE in the interval [bFC ( F) , bC (n - 1)) to yFC _ 1), yLC(n) and yLC (n+ 1).
Proposition 3.5 Suppose that 1(z) = z2. For each n > 3, there exists b(n,n - 1) e (bLC(n +
1), bFC(n - 1)) such that the induced decisions in the optimal PBE are given by yLC(n) for all
b E [bFC (n),b(nn - 1)), and by yFC(n - 1) for all b E [b(n, n - 1),bVC (n - 1)).
The logic behind the comparison among YFC(n - 1), yLC(n) and yLC(n + 1), which holds
for all loss function 1 that satisfies Assumption 3.2, can be seen as follows. First, observe that at
b = bFC (n), the optimal decision sets under full commitment and limited authority are identical:
yFC(n) _ yLC(n). P's expected payoff jumps down discontinuously at bFC(n) if decisions change
from YFC(n) to YFC(n - 1). In contrast, yLC (n) changes continuously with b at bFC(n), conse-
quently P is strictly better off with yLC(n) than with YFC(n - 1) if b is sufficiently close to and
greater than bFC(n). Second, at b just below the cutoff value bLC (n+ 1), P strictly prefers YLC(n)
to YLC(n + 1). This follows because under yLC(n + 1), the lowest partition threshold O'C(n + 1)
equals 0 at bLC(n + 1), so effectively only n decisions are recommended by A and approved by P.
Since YLC(n) is available at bLC(n + 1) yLC(n + 1) is dominated for P: the additional decision in
yLC(n + 1) does nothing to improve her expected payoff, but distorts the quality of her decisions,
making her worse off. Therefore, the cutoff value bLC(n + 1) is not relevant for P's search for
optimal PBE in the interval [bFC (F) , bC (n - 1)).
As b increases in the interval (bFC(n), bC(n - 1)), P's expected payoff decreases under each of
yFC(n - 1), yLC(n) and yLC(n + 1). Under the assumption of 1(z) = z2, the proof of Proposition
3.5 in the appendix ranks the rate of decrease for the three sets of decisions. In particular, we
show that P's expected payoff decreases slower under YFC(n - 1) than under YLC(n) for any
b E (bFC(n), bFC(n - 1)), and in turn slower under YLC(n) than under yLC(n + 1) for any b E
(bFC(n), bLC(n + 1)). We then show that at bFC(n - 1), P strictly prefers YFC(n - 1) to YLC(n).
16Note that the function g (k, b) - 21(1/2 - (k - 1)b) - 1(2b) is decreasing in b for b E (0, bLC (k)) and is equal to
o at bFC (k) for all k. The first inequality holds because g (n, bLC (n + 1)) 21 ( ) - 1 (1) <0 for any convex loss
function 1. The second inequality holds because g (n - 1, bLC (n + 1)) 1 > 0.
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Shifting the indices forward by 1 and noting that yLC (n) yFC (n) at bFC (n), we have that P
strictly prefers yLC (n) to yLC (n i 1). This evaluation then allows us to establish the proposition.
Proposition 3.5 makes it clear that the optimal limited authority does not generally coin-
cide with the maximal limited authority. This is reflected in two ways. First, when b falls in
[bFC(n), bLo (n + 1)) yLC (n + 1) is available but is never optimal. Indeed, as observed above, for
any loss function 1 that satisfies Assumption 3.2, P strictly prefers yLC(n) to YLC(r + 1) for b
sufficiently close to and lower than bLC(n + 1). Second, when b falls in (b(n, n - 1), bFC(n - 1)),
yLC(n) is available but P strictly prefers yFC(n- 1). Thus, unlike in the solution to the hypothet-
ical full-commitment problem, P's payoff does not necessarily increase with the number of decisions
under limited authority. Intuitively, in an optimal PBE, P retains fewer decisions in order to relax
the incentive conditions due to limited authority. 17
Our result that the optimal PBE under limited authority does not always maximize the number
of induced decisions contrasts strongly with CS and models with full commitment. This may be
counterintuitive, but recall that we have restricted the search for the optimal PBE under limited
authority to decision sets that are minimal and veto-free. Thus, in characterizing the decision set
yLC(n) for each fixed n, we have imposed the condition that all n decisions are induced in some
states, and precluded the standard reasoning that adding a decision cannot make P worse off.
Instead, each additional decision in our model presents P with a credibility problem. In a PBE
with a larger number of induced decisions there is better information transmission, which would
benefit P, everything else being equal. This better information transmission, however, is achieved
due to P's commitment to ex-post suboptimal decisions. As a result, P may prefer a PBE with
worse information transmission, but better decision-making.
3.5 Welfare Comparison across Organizational Forms
Many existing papers have analyzed extensions of the CS model that improve communication
quality and thus P's welfare. We categorize these papers into six organizational forms: cheap talk,
delegation, persuasion, informational control, noisy talk, and limited authority. Then we compare
P's ex ante expected payoffs under these organizational forms. All the payoff comparisons are based
on specializing the uniform-convex loss example of Section 3.4.2 to the quadratic loss function.
1 7 By Proposition 3.5, in the familiar uniform-quadratic case, the number of induced decisions under the maximal
and optimal limited authority is the same only for b E [bLC(n + 1), b(n - 1, n)).
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3.5.1 Organizational Forms
Our first organizational form is CS's cheap talk model in which neither P nor A has any commitment
power. In the CS model, there are essentially three players: nature, A, and P. Nature draws the
state of the world 0 E . A privately observes the state 0 and sends a message m E M to P, who
then makes a decision y E Y.
Let us introduce a fourth non-strategic player to the CS model who takes an input i E I and
returns a possibly stochastic output o E 0 according to some prespecified mapping 4 : I -+ AO,
where AO denotes the set of lotteries over outcomes 0. The fourth player can either replace one
of the players or be a mediator. Each possible way that a fourth player could be introduced into
the game corresponds to a different organizational form. Note that a strategic fourth player is just
a particular non-strategic player who uses a certain (equilibrium) mapping. Thus we can analyze
either a fourth player designed by P, whose mapping maximizes P's expected payoff; or a fourth
player with an equilibrium mapping, which corresponds to a strategic player or to a modification
of the CS environment.
We first discuss organizational forms where the fourth player replaces another player (Figure
3-1, left panel). There are two such forms: delegation and persuasion, which correspond to the
replacement of P and A respectively by a fourth player. Delegation refers to P's commitment
power: under delegation, A sends a message m to the fourth player instead of to P, and the fourth
player then makes a decision y according to 4D : M --> AY. Such delegation encompasses both
optimal delegation and full delegation: the former corresponds to to a fourth player designed by
P and the latter corresponds to A being the fourth player respectively.18 Persuasion refers to A's
commitment power: under persuasion, the fourth player observes the state 0 and sends a message
m to P according to 4PM : E- AM.' 9
We turn next to organizational forms where the fourth player is a mediator (Figure 3-1, right
panel). There are three such forms: informational control, noisy talk, and limited authority, which
correspond to information, message, and decision mediation, respectively. Informational control
refers to A's information structure: under informational control, the fourth player privately observes
"'Holmstrom (1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Martimort and Semenov (2006), and Alonso and Matouschek
(2008) study optimal delegation in which a third player is restricted to deterministic decision rules. Goltsman et al.
(2009), and Kovac and Mylovanov (2009) study optimal stochastic delegation. Dessein (2002) studies full delegation
and analyzes how it compares to cheap talk. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Krishna and Morgan (2001), and Mylovanov
(2008) study veto-delegation.
"Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) analyze optimal persuasion that maximizes A's expected payoff. Clearly, full
information transmission maximizes P's expected payoff.
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Figure 3-1: Classification of organizational forms
the state 0 and returns a signal 0 E e according to 0IC : e -> AO; A privately observes the signal
0 and sends a message to P, who makes a decision.20  Noisy talk refers to the quality of the
communication channel between A and P: under noisy talk, the fourth player receives a message
m from A and sends a perturbed message m- E M to P according to #NT : M -* AM.2'
Finally, limited authority refers to the set of decisions available to P: under limited authority, P
receives a message from A and then recommends a decision y to the fourth player, who implements
a decision - E Y according to #RA Y -* AY. This chapter focuses on P's optimal deterministic
limited authority (deterministic in that a decision mediator is bound to use a deterministic mapping
ORA : Y -+ Y). Note that limited authority is equivalent to letting P make any decision from the
restricted set ORA (Y), which justifies the setup of our model.
3.5.2 Payoff Comparisons
In this section, we compare P's highest ex ante expected payoffs within each organizational form.
To begin with, Proposition 3.6 calculates P and A's expected payoffs for a small bias b under
optimal limited authority.
Proposition 3.6 The first term in Taylor expansion around b = 0 of P and A's expected payoffs
under optimal limited authority is equal to -1b 2 and -b 2 respectively.
2 0Ivanov (2010b) studies optimal informational control, while Austen-Smith (1994), and Fischer and Stocken (2001)
study a non-optimal informational control. The extensive literature on information acquisition and reputational cheap
talk is also related to informational control, but there are additional elements added to the CS model.
21 Goltsman et al. (2009) characterize optimal noisy talk. Furthermore, there are a number of papers that can
be represented as a particular type of a message mediator: Krishna and Morgan (2004) analyze back and forth
communication between the agent and the principal; Blume et al. (2007) study communication with perturbed
messages; Ivanov (2010a), Li (2010), and Ambrus et al. (2010) study communication with a strategic message mediator
and a sequence of strategic message mediators, respectively.
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To understand the intuition behind Proposition 3.6, it is useful to decompose P and A's expected
payoffs as the sum of the loss of information and the loss of control:
Up = -E (y - 0)2] - IE [(ym -- E [9|m])2 - E [Var (0|m)]
P's Loss of Control Loss of Information
UA = -E (y - (0 + b))2] = -E [(ym - IE [m] - b)2] - E [Var (8|m))
A's Loss of Control Loss of Information
where ym, E [0|mi], and Var (0|m) are the decision taken, the expectation, and the variance of the
state 0 given a message m (under P's beliefs), respectively. The loss of information is defined
as the expected conditional variance of the state given P's belief at the time of decision making.
Therefore, the loss of information captures the residual uncertainty that P has after communication
took place. P and A' loss of control is defined as the expected loss from making decision ym instead
of the ex post optimal decision given the message m.
Now we calculate the loss of information and the loss of control under optimal limited authority.
By Proposition 3.5, adjacent induced decisions are symmetric around 1 and approximately 2b apart
from each other (yi ~ -+ (i - "-1) 2b). Therefore, the loss of information can be approximated as
Pr ((Oi-1, O]) Var (01 (Oi- 1 , Oi]) ~Var (8| (Oi_1, 0]) ~ b2  3 b2
i= 1
and P's loss of control can be approximated as
3Pr((O6-1,i]) (yi-E[O| ((,]])2 b12
where the last equality follows from A's indifference conditions (3.4). Analogous calculations show
that A has essentially no loss of control. Summing up the loss of information and the loss of control
yields Proposition 3.6.
Next we compare P and A's expected payoffs for a small bias b under all organizational forms
(see Table 1).22
2 2 We believe that these results hold more generally with a caveat that each row of Table 1 is multiplied by some
constant. In particular, we expect them to hold if P's and A's payoffs are given by arbitrary smooth loss functions
nY (y, 0) = -l (1y - 01), UA (y, 0) - - 1A (1y - (0 + b)I). Intuitively, as the bias goes to zero, the distance between
any two subsequent decisions also goes to zero. Therefore, the loss functions can be approximated by quadratic
functions, and the distribution function can be approximated by a piecewise uniform distribution.
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Informational Optimal Full Limited Noisy Cheap
Persuasion
Control Delegation Delegation Authority Talk Talk
up 0 b2 -b 2 -b-2 4b2 _1b -1b3 3 3 5' 3
UA -b 2  0 _8b_ 1b2 1b -bI 3 35 3 3 3
Table 1. P and A's expected payoffs under all organizational forms.
To understand these payoff comparisons, we decompose P's expected payoff into the loss of
information and the loss of control. In terms of loss of control, in all organizational forms, either
P or A has essentially no loss of control, and thus the other party has a loss of control equal to
b2 . Under delegation and limited authority, P has commitment power and effectively delegates
authority to A to improve information transmission, and her loss of control b2 is simply due to
A's bias. Next, we turn to the loss of information. There is essentially no loss of information
under delegation and persuasion because the state is almost fully revealed. The loss of information
is approximately b2 under informational control and limited authority because induced decisions
are approximately 2b apart from each other. 23 Under cheap talk and noisy talk, however, the
partition is coarse such that the distance between adjacent decisions grows at the approximate rate
4b, leading to a much larger loss of information of approximately jb. Combining these two parts
lead to the payoff comparisons in Table 1.
The above intuition suggests that P and A's expected payoffs are still given by Table 1 under A's
optimal organizational forms, except for A's optimal delegation, which coincides with full delegation.
It is also straightforward to characterize P and A's expected payoffs under combinations of different
organizational forms. However, the first term in Taylor expansion of P and A's expected payoffs
will depend on whether we are looking at P or A's optimal combination of organizational forms.
For example, if both P and A have full-commitment power (a combination of persuasion and
delegation), then they can eliminate the loss of information and split the loss of control arbitrarily
such that P and A's expected payoffs on the Pareto frontier are given by UA = - (ab)2 and
Up = - ((1 - a) b)2 , where a C [0, 1].
2 3This connection between limited authority and informational control is due to limited commitment power of both
A and P. Under limited authority, P makes the decision space discrete to relax her incentive conditions, whereas
under informational control, P makes the state space discrete to relax A's incentive conditions.
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Figure 3-2: P's expected payoff under Optimal delegation (OD), Limited authority (LA), Cheap
talk (CT), Full delegation (FD), Information control (IC) and Noisy talk (NT)
Figure 3-2 illustrates P's expected payoff under all organizational forms for all possible values
of the bias b E (0, 1). As we can see from the figure, for the whole range of A's bias, P's expected
payoffs are considerably lower under cheap talk and noisy talk than under all other organizational
forms. P's payoff is of the same order of the bias under informational control, delegation, and
limited authority. In particular, P's payoff under limited authority is almost as high as P's payoff
under optimal delegation despite the fact that only finite decisions can be induced under limited
authority. Moreover, P receives a higher payoff under informational control than under limited
authority when A's bias is small whereas the opposite is true when A's bias is large. Although
these payoff comparisons alone do not indicate which organizational form should be chosen due to
differences in environment, they do suggest that organizations can potentially benefit from credibly
ruling out some decisions ex ante even if it cannot fully delegate the decision-making authority.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Our model of limited authority aims to explore and understand the environment in which the
principal has some degree of commitment power, but not all. The remainder of this section contains
a discussion of how the optimal equilibrium may be affected by different assumptions about the
communication process and contracting environment as well as some thoughts for further research.
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Because only finitely many decisions can be induced in any optimal equilibrium under limited
authority, one may wonder whether the principal benefits from a finite decision set per se, that
is, when the principal's decision space is discrete. It can be shown that in the uniform-quadratic
setup in Section 3.4, the equilibria in the CS model with a discrete set of decisions are similar to
equilibria in the CS model with a continuous set of decisions, but with a modified smaller bias.
Therefore, by discretizing the set of available decisions, the principal can effectively decrease the
agent's bias and thereby improve communication.2 4 In fact, under the optimal limited authority
given in Proposition 3.5, the agent's effective bias disappears such that a uniform partition becomes
feasible.
One possible critique of the limited authority model is that parties can renegotiate, after the
agent's recommendation, to a decision not in the prespecified set if both prefer to do so. To address
this issue, we can strengthen our solution concept and look for the optimal renegotiation-proof
equilibrium. In our model the scope for renegotiation is limited for two reasons. First, because
transfers between the parties are not allowed, both the principal and the agent must prefer the
renegotiated decision to the optimal equilibrium decision. Second, in any PBE there is unresolved
uncertainty about the state of the world after the agent's recommendation, and thus the principal
does not know to which decision, if any, she should renegotiate. In the uniform-quadratic setup,
we can show that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists, and has a maximal possible number of
induced decisions that can be supported as an equilibrium.
Another critique is that if the principal can credibly restrict the set of decisions ex ante, then
she may also be able to commit to transfers contingent on decisions. Following the literature on
communication and delegation, we rule out such transfers in the limited authority model.2 5 Note
that with transfers, the principal can do at least as well as in the limited authority model by
committing to no transfers for decisions in the prespecified set and very large transfers for decisions
outside the set. In fact, with transfers, the principal can achieve the first best outcome, which
maximizes the sum of the principal and agent's expected payoffs, if there are no monetary frictions.
However, not all decision rules can be supported with transfers. For example, the principal's and
the agent's optimal decision rules are not achievable. Further, if there are frictions, such as when
24 This result resembles that of Alonso and Matouschek (2007) who show that the principal's commitment power
reduces the agent's "effective" bias.
" Monetary transfers may be explicitly ruled out by law, or implicitly ruled out if the parties involved are very risk
averse with respect to money. However, the assumption that there are no transfers is strong. Even though explicit
transfers between parties may be ruled out, the parties can effectively "burn" money, which generally improves their
welfare (see, for example, Austen-Smith and Banks, 2000).
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the agent is protected by limited liability or if the principal can "burn" money, then there is a
tradeoff between making efficient decisions and leaving a quasi rent to the agent. Due to this
tradeoff, there is incomplete information revelation for high states of the world, even though full
information revelation is feasible. 26
In the current model, the principal never vetoes the agent's recommendation in equilibrium. A
further topic of research is to extend our model to allow veto to happen in equilibrium. One way
to model this is to imagine that there is some small, exogenous probability that the principal can
observe the true state after hearing the agent's recommendation, and may consequently desire to
change her decision (still within the prespecified decision set) given this information. In this case,
it is without loss of generality to restrict to equilibria in which the principal follows the agent's
recommendation when she does not learn the state and otherwise makes a choice independent of
the recommendation. Thus, any equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3.1 remains feasible, and
further, the principal can do better by adding any decision that is chosen with zero probability in
equilibrium so long as her incentive conditions (when she does not learn the state) are unaffected.
The interesting question is how the principal optimally modifies the decisions that are used with
positive probabilities when she does not learn the state, in order to retain more decisions that she
will use when she does. Answering this question can further our understanding of the principal's
tradeoff between maintaining the flexibility of responding to new information and establishing the
credibility of letting the agent best use his private information.
3.7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1: We prove the proposition through a series of lemmas.
First, we establish that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to PBE's in which
all decisions in P's equilibrium choice Y are induced, each message from A's is a recommendation
of some probability distribution over Y, and no recommendation is vetoed by P. This is a version
of the revelation principle adapted to our setting. Fix any PBE and the subgame after P has made
the equilibrium choice Y. We refer to any response by P to a message m from A as a lottery, and a
particular choice from Y as a degenerate lottery. We say that two PBE's are outcome equivalent if
26 This result is analogous to that of Krishna and Morgan (2008) who consider a communication game in which
the principal can commit to transfers contingent on messages and the agent is protected by limited liability. Kartik
(2009) obtains a somewhat similar result. He shows that in a model of communication with lying costs, there is
pooling for high states of the world.
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they both result in the same (random) mapping from states to decisions on the equilibrium path.
Lemma 3.4 Consider a PBE with P's equilibrium choice Y. There exists an outcome-equivalent
PBE with P's equilibrium choice Y C Y, where Y is the union of the supports of all induced lotteries
and for any induced lottery there is a unique y in its support chosen by A as a message.
Proof: Fix any PBE and the subgame after P has chosen the equilibrium Y. Since up(-, 0)
is strictly concave, there are at most two decisions y and y' in Y that are optimal given the
equilibrium belief of P conditional on any m. Thus, a non-degenerate lottery has exactly two
decisions. Moreover, if y and y' in Y satisfying y < y' are in the support of some lottery, then
(y, y') n Y = 0; otherwise, strict concavity of up(-, 0) implies that the lottery would not be optimal
for P. Finally, no two induced lotteries have the same support. Otherwise, if y, y' E Y with y < y'
are in the common support of two distinct lotteries induced after A chooses m and m' respectively,
then one of them, say the lottery following m', first order stochastically dominates the other. Since
uyfl > 0, P being indifferent between y and y' given the belief conditional on m implies that A
strictly prefers y' to y given the same belief. Thus, there are states in which A is supposed to choose
m but would find it profitable to deviate to m' to induce the lottery following m', a contradiction.
By the same argument, if y, y' E Y with y < y' are the support of some induced lottery, y' is not
induced as a degenerate lottery.
Let k be the union of the supports of all induced lotteries following Y. We construct an
outcome-equivalent PBE where P chooses Y instead of Y on the equilibrium path and A's message
space is restricted to P's choice of set of decisions on and off the equilibrium path. For any choice
of P that is not k, including Y, let the continuation in the new PBE be such that A chooses the
lowest decision in the set chosen by P regardless of realized 0 and P chooses a decision that is
optimal in the set given her prior belief. It remains to specify the continuation equilibrium in the
new PBE following k that is outcome-equivalent to the continuation equilibrium in the original
PBE following Y. For each degenerate lottery y E Y induced in the continuation equilibrium
following Y after A chooses some message m, let A choose y in the subgame following Y and let
P's belief be the same as in the original PBE conditional on m; and for each non-degenerate lottery
where P randomizes between y and y' with y < y' following Y after A chooses some message m',
let A choose y' in the subgame following Y and let P's belief be the same as in the original PBE
conditional on m'. All equilibrium conditions are satisfied in the new PBE following k as they are
a subset of the equilibrium conditions in the original PBE following Y. Further, by construction Y
88
is part of the new PBE, because Y is part of the original PBE, and the equilibrium payoff for P is
greater than or equal to the payoff from choosing yp. QED
Second, we show that in any PBE the number of induced lotteries is finite. Denote {y, y'; w} as a
lottery induced in some continuation game after P has chosen Y, with P choosing y with probability
w E (0, 1) and y' > y with probability 1 - w. We adopt the convention that a degenerate lottery is
represented by y' = y. The proof of Lemma 3.4 implies that any two distinct lotteries {yi, y'; wi}
and {y2, Y'; W2} can be ordered, with the first lower than the latter, such that yi < y' < Y2 < Y2,
with at least one strict inequality and y' = Y2 implying that y' > Y2-
Lemma 3.5 The number of decisions induced in any PBE is finite.
Proof: Fix some PBE and the subgame after P has chosen the equilibrium Y. Let {y, y4; wi},
i = 1, 2, 3, be three distinct induced lotteries, in increasing order. Since both {y2, Y2; W2} and
{y3, y3; W3} are induced, there is a state b such that
w 2u (y2, b) + (1 - =2)uA(y2, 0) w 3 A (Y3 , b) + (1 - w3 )u
Since uA(-, b) is strictly concave, yA(N) E (y2, y'). Further, since UA > 0, the lottery {y2, Y'; W2 } is
not induced for any 0 > 0, as
w 3 (u( 3, 0) - uA(y 3 , 0)) + (1 - W3 )(uA y6) - u 0
; uA(ys, 0) - UA(ys, 0)
> w 2(u(2, 0) - uA(y 2, 0)) + (1 - w2 )(uA 0) - A
with at least one inequality being strict. This implies that {y2, y2; W2} can only be induced if the
state 0 is smaller than 0. As a result, we have yp(b) > yi; otherwise, since up > 0, a similar
argument as above would imply that P prefers the lottery {y1, yj; wi} to {y2, y2; W2 } for all 0 < 0
but then {y2, Y; W2} would never be induced. It then follows that y1 < yP(b) < yA( ) < Y,
Since yP(O) < yA(O) for all 0 E [0, 1] and are both continuous, there exists e > 0 such that
yA(8) - yP(O) > E for all 0 E [0,1]. There can be at most one induced decision greater than yP(1)
and one lower than yp(O). The lemma then follows immediately. QED
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By the first two lemmas, for any PBE, it is without loss of generality to assume that the
equilibrium Y has a finite number of decisions, and each decision y E Y is induced either in a
degenerate lottery or in a lottery with another decision y' E Y. Denote the induced lotteries as
{yi,y ; wi}, i = 1,... ,n, in increasing order. Since uA > 0, there is a partition {O} % of the
state space [0,1], with 0o = 0 and 0, = 1, such that each {yi, y'; wi}, i = 1,...,n, is induced in
state 0 E (8i-1, O]. The necessary equilibrium conditions are A's indifference conditions: for each
partition threshold Qi, i 1, . . . , n - 1,
GiuA (y,, O) + (1- Wi)UA(y, ,) = Wi+ 1uA (yi+1, 0i) + (1 - ui+1)uA (yi1, Of); (3.15)
and P's incentive condition for each lottery {yi,y ; w}, i 1,..., n,
-G0i -Goi
] (wi (yi, 0) + (1 - wi)up(y, 0))f (0)d0 > ' ( up , 8)f ()d0 (3.16)
'i- 1 6 _ J i1
for y=  ;,y5 and all j = 1, . . . , n. If in addition,
n .gO 
.
(wiu'u(yi, 0) + (1 - wi)up(y', 0))f (0)d0 ;> / (yP, 0)f (0)d0
so that P's expected payoff is greater than that from making an uninformed decision, then the
above necessary conditions are also sufficient for PBE.
Third, we simplify the incentive conditions for P.
Lemma 3.6 In any PBE, P's incentive conditions (3.16) must all be slack except for =y_ yi, y$, yi+1.
Further, if yi = y for all i, then P's incentive conditions except for (3.3) are all slack.
Proof: We first argue that adjacent incentive conditions are sufficient for all incentive conditions.
Consider all P's incentive conditions for {yi, y ; wi}. Since P prefers {yi, y'; wi} to yi1 conditional
on (Oi-1, O], the most preferred decision conditional on the interval is higher than y'. By the
strict concavity of up, P strictly prefers y'_ 1, and hence {yi, y ; wi}, to all decisions lower than
Y1 conditional on (Oi-1, 80]. By the same argument, P strictly prefers {yi, y'; wi} to all decisions
higher than yi+1 conditional on (Oi-1, Oi].
Next, we argue that the adjacent upward incentive condition is satisfied if all induced lotteries
are degenerate. To see this, note that in any partition equilibrium A's indifference conditions (3.2)
hold. Since uyg > 0, A being indifferent between yi and yi+1 in state 0i implies that P strictly
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prefers yi to yi+1 in the same state. By up > 0, P then prefers yi to yi+1 for all 0 < Oi, and in
particular, for any 0 E (Oi-1, Oi]. QED
Fourth, we show that if an optimal PBE exists, then on the equilibrium path, P never random-
izes over the set of decisions.
Lemma 3.7 For each PBE in which lotteries are induced, there exists another PBE in which only
degenerate lotteries are induced and P obtains a higher expected payoff.
Proof: Fix some PBE with induced lotteries {yi, y ; wi}, i 1,... , n, in increasing order. We prove
this lemma in two steps. First, we show that there is another PBE in which P's equilibrium choice
of Y contains only y', i = 1, ... , n, and each decision y' is induced in a degenerate lottery. Each
new threshold 0i is given by (3.15) where wi and wi+1 are set to 0. Since y2 < y' < yi+1 : y ,
the concavity of uA(i) and A's indifference condition at Oi between y' and y'+, imply that
u IA(y,) uA (y,i) and uA(yi+i, i) > UA(yi+1i). Then, since uA > 0, using the implicit
function theorem applied to (3.15) gives that the solution to (3.15) decreases in wi and wi+1,
which implies that each new threshold Oi is higher than the original threshold 0i. The distribution
function of the state 0 conditional on [i_1, i], given by (F(0) - F(Oi-1 ))/(F(i) - F(Si_1 )), first-
order stochastically dominates the distribution function of the state 0 conditional on [0i-1,Oi),
because it is decreasing in Oi I and ki. Since the difference u(y, 0) - up(y' 1 , 0) is increasing in 0
by the assumption of u 0 > 0, P prefers y' to y>l conditional on [oi_1, I], because in the original
PBE, P prefers y' to y>I conditional on [0 i_1, Qi]. Since the downward incentive conditions are
satisfied, Lemma 3.6 implies that we indeed constructed a new PBE.
Second, we show that P obtains a higher expected payoff in the new PBE than in the original
PBE by transforming the original PBE into the new PBE in such a way that P's expected payoff
continuously increases. We continuously decrease each lottery weight z79i from wi to 0, one lottery
at a time starting at i = 1 and ending at i = n, while increasing thresholds 0i and bi-1 to always
satisfy A's indifference conditions (3.15). Note that all other partition thresholds are unchanged
when we continuously decrease di alone. The partial derivative of P's expected payoff with respect
to tChi is given by
(up(yi, 0) - up(y', 0))f (0)d0,
which is negative because P prefers y' to yi conditional on (Ni_1, ei (recall that P is indifferent
between y' and yj conditional on (i_1, 0i], so the argument from the previous paragraph applies).
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Thus, as we decrease Ci continuously, the direct effect on P's expected payoff is positive. The
partial derivative of P's expected payoff with respect to 0i is equal to f (bi) multiplied by
Giiu'(yi, Oi) + (1 - i9)u (y , Ni) - (wi+1uP(yi+1, 0i) + (1 - wi+1)u (Yi+,1,0))
=i(wi+1(up(yi, up) - (yi+1, b)) + (1 - wi+1)(u (yi, i) - up (yi+1 km
+ (1 - ibv)(wi+1(up (Yi) - u (yi+I, bi)) + (1 - wi+1 )(up (Y',) - +
> ib-(wi+1(uA (y, Oi) - uA (yi+1, b)) + (1 - wi+ 1 )(uA (Y ) -5 A _ Oi (+1
+ (1 - ?iL')(wi+1(uA(y, 0b) - uA(yi 1 , Qi)) + (1 - wi+ 1)(UA(y,,) - U(i, i)))
= GiuA(y,, Ni) + (1- i)uAy$ ,) - (wi+1 A(yi+ 1 , i) + (1W- 1) (Yi+1, i))
=0,
where the inequality follows from uy > 0, and the last equality follows from A's indifference
condition between {yi, ys; Gi9} and {yi+1, 1+1 ; wi+I} in state 02. Because we replace one lottery at a
time starting at i = 1, the lottery {yi_1, yi_1; wi_} must be degenerate. By construction wi_ 1 = 0
when we decrease ii, so analagously the partial derivative of P's expected payoff with respect to
bi-1 is equal to f multiplied by
u i( ( 1 ) - (nivup(yi, k-1) + (1 - zi'i)up(y_, bi 1 -)
> Gi(uA(yi_1, O-1) - up(yi, 9_1)) + (1 - jij)(UA(yI_1, Ok-I) - uA(yl, Oi-1))
=u(y_ 1, i_1) - (i7uA(yi, Nji) + (1 - ii)u(yi, Ni-1))
=0.
Thus, as we decrease Ci continuously, the indirect effects of increased i-i1 and Oi on P's expected
payoff are also positive. Finally, if we suppose that at least one induced lottery in the original PBE
is non-degenerate, then the direct effect will be strictly positive, which implies that P's expected
payoff is strictly higher in the new PBE. QED
Fifth and last, we show that an optimal PBE exists. Combining the above lemmas, we have
already established that an optimal PBE, if one exists, is a solution to the constrained maximization
problem where the objective is P's expected payoff and the feasible choices are all partition equilibria
with a finite number of elements.
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Lemma 3.8 An optimal PBE exists.
Proof: Let us consider a relaxed problem in which strict inequalities of the partition condition (3.1)
are replaced with weak inequalities. By Lemma 3.5, the number of induced decisions n is uniformly
bounded. Thus, the relaxed problem is a constrained maximization problem with finitely many
variables. There exists 7 such that we can impose Iyi I 7 for all i = 1, ... , n without affecting the
maximization problem.2 7 These constraints, lyI < V, together with a finite number of constraints
(3.2) and (3.3) determine the compact set for variables {O}_o , {y2 }U 1 over which the continuous
function , uP (yi, 0) f(0)dO is maximized. Clearly, there exists a solution to this relaxed
problem. Finally, we need to show that the value of the relaxed problem is achievable with strict
inequalities (3.1), which will prove the existence of an optimal PBE. If some of 0; or yj coincide,
we can take the maximal subset {0} c {0}%_ and a corresponding subset of induced decisions
Iyj' C f.j t , /Yj'
{y7} c {yj}=U such that all 0' and y are distinct. These { O}'o and {y }L 1 will satisfy (3.2)-
(3.3) and strict inequalities of the partition condition (3.1). Moreover, this modification does not
change P's expected payoff. QED
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.1. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Consider a CS equilibrium ({O}i ,{yi} ) with n > 2. We prove
that for any sufficiently small 6, there exists a PBE with P's equilibrium choice {y!'
{yi, ... ,yj + 3, ... ,yn}, and the corresponding partition {0 -j {Oo,...,O9j_1(3),OB(3),...,O0}.
Moreover, we prove that P's expected payoff in this PBE is strictly higher than in the CS equi-
librium. By the implicit function theorem applied to A's indifference condition (3.2), 0 j-1(6) and
Oj(6) are continuous functions in a neighborhood of 6 = 0 with
d% _1(3) _ -u (yj,O ij-) .oj1
do 8-0 u(yj, s-1) - A (Yj-1, 0 j-1)
d6 _() _ y(yjOB) oj .d =0 -0
- for j 4n-
-a A=0 nyj+1, Sj)_-UA (yj, Sj)
Forj 1 andj n we have d-() - don(8) = 0 because Oo (6) = 1 - O (6) -0.5=0 |o - ( =o -
2 7 There can be at most one induced decision above y(l) and one induced decision below y(O). Moreover, there is
at least one induced decision in [yp (0) , yp (1)]. Let us define gi (y2, 01) as yi that solves uA (yi, 01) = U(y2, 01)
and gn (yn-1, On-i) as yn that solves uA (yn-,On-1) - uA (Yn, O,_1). The functions gi and gn are decreasing in the
first argument and increasing in the second argument which implies that y1 > gi (yp (1), 0) and y < gn (yP (0), 1).
Therefore, lyil < max {|gi (yP (1),0)| , Ign (yP (0), 1)1} = for all i.
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In the CS equilibrium, f0  up(yi, 0)f(0)d0 > fO up(yi 1 , 0)f(0)dO for all i because y =
argmaxyER u (y,0)f(0)dO. Therefore, incentive conditions (3.3), fEi u(y,0 )f(0)dO >0il
6, p 8
f u (yfil1 , 0)f(0)dO, hold for all i because functions up (y, 0), 5_1 (6), Oj(6) are continuous, andi--1
6 is sufficiently small.
The derivative of P's expected payoff with respect to o at 6 = 0 is given by
(up(yj-1, Oj-1) - up(Yj, Oj-1)) f (oj-1) d6o = +
-6f(O u) '0j1(S +(uP(yj, Oj) - up (yj+ 1, j)) f (0j) d ) + J yu(yj,0)f(0)d0d6 =O 0j-1
The last term in the above expression is 0 because yj = arg maxycR _ u(y, 0)f(0)dO. The
second term is positive for j # n because up(yj, 0) - up(yj+1, j) > 0 holds by (3.2) and uyp > 0;
and > 0 holds by u(yg,09) > 0 and uO(yj+1,0G) - E4 (yj, 0j) > 0. More specifically,
uA(y, 0j) > 0 holds by (3.2) and uA > 0, whereas uA(yj+1, 0j) -uA(yj, 0j) > 0 holds byu A > 0.
Analogously, the first term is positive for j # 1. To sum up, the above expression is positive for all
j. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.3: For the "only if" part, recall from Proposition 3.1 that any opti-
mal PBE is a partition equilibrium. The claim then follows immediately, because any partition
equilibrium can be implemented by delegation under full commitment.
For the "if' part, we use a result obtained by Alonso and Matouschek (2008). They show
that if delegation is valuable then there exists 0* E (0, 1) such that S (0*) < 0 < T (0*), where
T (0*) =f (y^ (*) - y' (0)) f (0) dO and S (0*) fo (yA (0*) - y' (0)) f (0) dO. The decision
rule (0) given by
y { (0*) + T (*) - S (0*) if 0 > 0*,
YA(*) + S (0*) - T (*) if 0 < 0*,
satisfies A's indifference condition (3.2) at 0* because A's payoff function is symmetric around yA( 0 ).
Moreover, the difference in P's expected payoff under g(0) and the uninformative decision yp is
equal to -4T (0*) S (0*), and is positive. The decision rule # (0) satisfies P's incentive condition
(3.3) that P prefers decision yA(Q*) + T (0*) - S (0*) to yA(0*) + S (0*) - T (0*), as otherwise she
would prefer decision yA(o*) + S(0*) - T (0*) to g(0). Thus, (0) can be supported as a PBE.
QED
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Proof of Lemma 3.1: Suppose that in the optimal PBE, yj < y* for some i = 2,..., n. We first
show by contradiction that P's (i + 1)-th incentive condition binds. Suppose not. Consider mar-
ginally increasing yi, keeping all other decisions unchanged. We know from the proof of Proposition
3.2 that 02-1 and Oi both increase, with all other thresholds unaffected. By the concavity of up(., 0),
P's i-th incentive condition is slack and hence unaffected because yi-1 < yi < yi. Similarly, her
(i - 1)-th incentive condition remains satisfied because 9i-1 increases as yj increases. The proof of
Proposition 3.2 has already established that P's expected payoff is increased when either O; or Gi_1
increases. Her expected payoff is further increased because yi moves closer to her ex post optimal
decision y* on (0j, O+1]. A contradiction.
The above result immediately implies that y, > y*. For each i = 2, ... , n - 2, note that P's
(i + 1)-th incentive condition binding implies that yj < y*+i < yi+1, so we can rewrite it as
yi+1 + y2 = Oji + Oi. Using (3.4) for 02 and Gi+1, we then have
Yi+2 - y = 4b.
However, if yi y*, from A's indifference conditions (3.4) we would have
yi+1 - yi > 4b + (yi - yi-1) > 4b,
which contradicts P's binding (i + 1)-th incentive condition. This establishes the lemma for i
2, ... ,n - 2.
Next, we show that Yn-i > y* 1. Suppose not. Consider marginally increasing Yn-1 and
decreasing yn in such a way that On-1 remains unchanged. Then P's n-th incentive condition
is unaffected. However, this increases P's expected payoff because by assumption Yn-1 Y*-1,
yn > y*, and because On-2 increases as a result of increasing Yn-1. A contradiction.
Finally, it can be verified using the proof of Proposition 3.5 that y1 > y* at the optimal PBE.
Note that this result is not needed for rewriting P's incentive conditions (3.5). QED
Proof of Proposition 3.4: Adding up condition (3.9) for i = 2,...,n - 1, we have
yn + Yn-1 - (Yi + Y2) > 4b(n - 2).
Also, using conditions (3.8) and (3.10), we have 2b(n - 1) < 1, or n < 1/(2b) + 1.
For the converse, let n be a positive integer strictly less than 1/(2b) + 1. By definition of N,
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1/(2N) < b < 1/(2(N - 1)). Note that N > 2 if and only b < 2.
If n = 1, then there exists a babbling equilibrium with the induced decision V1(1) = .
If n 2, suppose that b < j and consider the "full commitment" problem of choosing two
decisions y1 and Y2 with 0 < y1 Y2 < 1 that maximizes P's expected payoff
U(2) = - J (lyi - 01) dO - l(ly 2 - 01) dO,
subject only to A's indifference condition 01 = 2(y 1 + Y2) - b. The first order conditions with
respect to yi and Y2 are
BU(n) _1
WY = - (l(Y2 - 1) + l(yi - 0il)) - l(yi) 0;
By1 2
9U (n) 1
= - (1(y2 - 01) + l(lyi - 0il)) + 1(1 - Y2) = 0.(9Y2 2
The above conditions imply that yi = 1 - Y2. It is straightforward to verify that the second order
condition is satisfied. The above first order conditions become identical, and we can rewrite it as
21((1 - A)/2) = l(b + A/2) + l(lb - A/21),
where A = Y2 - Y1. By the convexity of 1, the right hand side is increasing in A, so there is a unique
A E (0, 1) satisfying the above condition. The solution to the full commitment problem is then
given by V1(2) = 1(1 - A) and p2(2) = 1(1 + A), with 01 = 1 - b. Note that b < 1 implies that
01 > 0. The incentive condition of P is satisfied at this solution, because V (2) + V2 (2) = 1 < 1+01.
We can thus take the solution to the full commitment problem to be a limited authority PBE.
Since the solution has p2(2) - V1(2) = A > 0, it gives P a strictly higher payoff than making the
uninformed decision of 1.
Finally, for any n > 3, consider the set of n decisions Y(n) given by V;(n) = - + 2b (i - n)
for each i = 1,..., n. Then, by A's indifference condition, 0% = Vi(n) for each i = 1,.. ., n - 1. It
is straightforward to verify that conditions (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) are all satisfied. The expected
payoff for P under this construction is given by
U(n) = -2 l(V1(n) - 0) dO - (n - 1) ( 1(92(n) - 0) dO. (3.17)
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It is straightforward to show that U(n) > U(n - 2): the difference is given by
U(n) - U(n - 2) = 2 J (1 (p2 (n) - 0) - 1(() - 0)) dO > 0,
where Vi (n) is the smallest decision under the construction for n, and 92 (n) the second smallest
decision for n and the smallest for n - 2 (that is, 2 (n) = V1(n - 2)).
The above argument immediately implies that the expected payoff to P under the above con-
struction with n decisions is greater than making the uninformed decision of 2 for all n > 3 and
odd. To complete the proof of the proposition, we only need to show that the above construction
Y(4) for n = 4 dominates making the uninformed decision of 2 for P. (This step is necessary
because the payoff formula (3.17) does not apply to the case of n = 2.) It is straightforward to
show that
-14 
-0i
l(11/2 - 01) do - l( - 0) dO
0 J i i--i
-p3+b -1/2 -V3
> [12± 1(0 - 1/2) dO - 1(i 3 -0 ) do] + /2(1(o - 1/2) - l(3 - 0)) dO]
-1/2 - 3 +b
+ [ (/211/2 - ) do - ' 1( - 3) dO
V 2 y3
=0,
where the first line follows because 1 is a more extreme decision than the corresponding decisions
Y1, 92 and y4 outside the interval [p2, V3 + b], and the second line follows because each term in the
bracket is zero. 28 QED
Proof of Lemma 3.2: For n = 1, it is trivially true that yFC(1) =. For n = 2, YFC( 2 ) is
derived in the proof of Proposition 3.4. Fix any n > 3. Arguments similar to the proof of Lemma
3.8 in Proposition 3.1 can show that yFC (n) exists. We will guess and verify later that conditions
(3.7), (3.8), and (3.11) are not binding at yFC (n). Denote A, = yFC - FC.
To get a contradiction, suppose that there is i such that Aj -f Ai- 1. The derivative of P's
280ne integral that appears in U(4) is f 4 1 (y4 - 0) dO. It is equal to f, 1(0 - V3) dO by a change of variables.
The first part of the latter integral, from 93 to y3 + b, is the integral that appears in the last bracket.
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expected payoff with respect to yi is
BU(ni) _1 1
O = -2 [l(Yi+1 -Oi) - (yi - i01)] - - (lyi-1 - Oi-ID - l(yi - Oi]By. 2 2
= + b) + '1 - b -1 + b) - '1- b (3.18)
where we used A's indifference conditions. Since 1 is convex, Un has the same sign as Ai - Ai_1
regardless of whether A > 2b or A < 2b. Thus, P's expected payoff can be increased by changing
yi to decrease |Ai - Ai_ 1 |. A contradiction.
Thus, the optimal decisions satisfy yFC - yFS = A > 0 for all i = 2, ... , n, so the optimum is
interior. From A's indifference conditions, we have Oi - i-1 = A for all i = 2, ... , n - 1. Since the
state is uniformly distributed, we can rewrite P's expected payoff as
1-01 -02 
-1
U(n) =- 1(lyi - O|)dO - (n - 2) 1(ly2 - O|)dO - l(Iyn - OI)dO. (3.19)
To find A, we differentiate (3.19) with respect to y1 and yn. From the two first order conditions we
immediately have i(yi) = (1 - yn), and thus y1 = 1 - y, = (1 - (n - 1)A)/2. The two conditions
then become identical, and are given by
&U(n) 1
- = - (l(b + A/2) + 1(Ib - A/21)) - l((1 - (n - 1)A)/2) = 0. (3.20)By1 2
We claim that there exists a unique A E (0, 1/(n - 1)) that solves (3.20). Since 1 is convex,
U(n)/8y1 is strictly increasing in A regardless of whether A > 2b or A < 2b, so there can be at
most one value of A that solves (3.20). At A = 0, we have &U(n)/&y1 < 0 because by assumption
b < 1; and at A = 1/(n - 1), we have OU(n)/&y1 > 0. Thus, a unique A E (0, 1/(n - 1)) exists
that solves (3.20). Condition (3.20) is a necessary condition for A to be optimal. Since there exists
a unique solution A, (3.20) is also sufficient.
To complete the derivation of yFC(n), we verify that the dropped constraints are satisfied.
Condition (3.7) is satisfied because A > 0. Condition (3.8) is equivalent to y1 > b - !A. This is
satisfied if A > 2b since A < 1/(n - 1) implies that yi > 0; it also holds if A < 2b, because in
that case it is implied by (3.20). Finally, condition (3.11) is satisfied because given yn = 1 - Y1 it
is implied by (3.7). QED
Proof of Lemma 3.3: The lemma follows immediately from the three claims below.
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Claim 3.1 P's incentive conditions (3.9) bind at yLC (n) for b L [bFC (n) , bC (n))
Proof: To get a contradiction, without loss of generality suppose that there exists i, i = 2, ... , n -2,
such that Yi+2 - yi = 4b and yi+1 - Yi-1 > 4b at yLC(n). Denote Ai = yi+1 - yi. Below we
will change one decision yA in such a way that all conditions (3.7)-(3.10) are still satisfied and
Ak - Ak_1| is decreased. Condition (3.18) then implies that P's expected payoff increases with
this change, leading to a contradiction. If Ai > Ai_ 1 (and thus Ai > 2b > Ai+1 = 4b - Ai), then
decrease yi±1 slightly. If A2 > Ai_ 1 , then there are two cases. If i - 1 = 1 or yi - Yi-2 > 4b, then
decrease yi slightly, otherwise (yi - Yi-2 = 4b), increase yi-1 slightly. QED
Claim 3.2 For any n > 3 and odd, and b E (bFC bLC YLC by y
2b (i - n+) for all i = 1, I..., In.
Proof: By Claim 3.1, yi+2 - yi = 4b for all i = 1, .. . , n - 2. Then, yi = y + 2b(i - 1) for i odd, and
yi = y2 + 2b(i - 2) for i even. Further, Oi - O-1 = 2b for all i = 2, ... , n - 1. Using the assumption
that the state is uniformly distributed, we can rewrite P's expected payoff (3.6) as
U(n) =- 0 l(|y1 - 0|)dO - 2 1 02 l(1y2 - 0|)dO
n- 20 1.1
n 3 10 l(y 1 + 2b - 0|)dO - l(|yn - 0|)dO. (3.21)
The first order conditions with respect to y1 and y2 are
OU(n) n - 1
yi = -l(yi) + l(1 - yn) - [l(3b - A 1/2) - l(b + A 1/2)] = 0;
&U(n) n - 1
Oy2 = [l(3b - A 1/2) - l(b + Ai/2)] = 0
By2 4
where Ai = y2 - Y1. It follows immediately that y1 = 1 - yn and A1 = 2b. Furthermore, it is
straightforward to verify that the second order condition with respect to y1 and y2 are satisfied at
Y1 = 1 - yn and A1 = 2b. Finally, (3.7) is satisfied because A, E (0, 4b), and (3.8) and (3.10) are
equivalent to 2b (n - 1) < 1, and thus are satisfied because b < bLC(n). QED
Claim 3.3 For any n > 2 and even, and b E (bFC (n) IbLC (n)), yLC(n) is given by y C -
2+ 2b (i - ) for odd i, and y 2 = 11 + 2b (i - "2) for even i, where A 1 < 2b is uniquely
determined by (3.14).
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Proof: Similar to Claim 3.2, we can rewrite P's expected payoff (3.6) as:
U(n) - 01 l(Iy1 - 0|)dO - n 2 02 l(ly2 - 0|)dO
-2 -02 1
2 210 l(|y + 2b - 0|)dO - l(|yn - 0|)dO. (3.22)
The first order conditions with respect to yi and Y2 are
1 n -2
-i(yi) + I[l(b + A 1/2) + l(Ib - A 1 /2)] - n [l(3b - A 1/2) - l(b + A 1 /2)] = 0;
l(1 - yn) - I[l(b + A1/2) + l(Ib - A1/2)] + n 2 [1(3b - A1/2) - l(b + A1/2)] = 02 4
where A1 = Y2 - Y1. It follows immediately that yi 1 - yn and A1 satisfies (3.14). Furthermore,
we can easily verify that the second order condition with respect to y1 and Y2 are satisfied. Finally,
(3.7) is satisfied because Ai E (0, 4b), and (3.8) and (3.10) are equivalent to 2b (n - 1) < 1, and
thus are satisfied because b < bLC(n).
To see that there is a unique A1 E (0, 2b) that satisfies (3.14), note that since b > bFC(n), the
left-hand side of (3.14) is strictly smaller than the right-hand side at A1 = 2b. As A decreases,
the left-hand side of (3.14) increases while the right-hand side decreases because 1 is convex. At
A = 0, the left-hand side of (3.14) is strictly greater than the right-hand side because b < bLC(n).
It follows that there exists a unique Ai E (0, 2b) that satisfies condition (3.14). QED
Proof of Proposition 3.5: First we establish a series of claims.
Claim 3.4 Suppose that 1(z) = z 2 . For each n > 3, dUFC(n - 1)/db > dULC(n)/db for all
b E (bFC (n),FC (n - 1)), where UFC (n - 1) and ULC (n) are P's expected payoff under yFC(n 1)
and under yLC (n) respectively.
Proof: Consider YFC(n - 1). For b < bFC(n - 1), from condition (3.13) for n - 1 we have A given
in Lemma 3.2 is strictly greater than 2b. From (3.19) for n - 1, using the Envelope Theorem we
have
dUFC(n 
- 1) (n - 2)[(A/2 + b) - l(A/2 - b)].
db
It is straightforward to see from the first order condition (3.20) that yFC(n) is decreasing in n for
fixed b and increasing in b for fixed n. Since yjC(n) =(1 - 2b(n - 1)) at b = bFC(n), we have
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yFC(n - 1) > !(1 - 2b(n - 1)) for all b > bFC(n). It then follows from the convexity of I that
dUFC(n - 1) > -(n - 2)[1(2b +- b/(n - 2)) - l(b/(n - 2))].
db
Using the assumption of 1(z) = z2, we immediately have
dUFC(ri - 1) > -(n 1 )1(2b).
db
Next, suppose that n is odd and consider yLC(n). From (3.21), using the Envelope Theorem
we have
dULC( ) = -2(n - 1)[l(2b) - 1(1/2 - (n - 1)b)]. (3.23)
db
Since b > bFC(n), from condition (3.13) we have 21(1/2 - (n - 1)b) < 1(2b), and thus
dULC(n) < 
-(n 1)l(2b),
db
establishing the claim for the case of n odd.
Lastly, suppose that n is even and consider yLC(n). From (3.22), using the Envelope Theorem
we have
dULC~n 1db - -- (n - 2)(n + 1)1(3b - A1 /2) + I-n(n - 3)1(b + Al/2) ± (n - 1)1(b - Al/2). (3.24)
db 2 2
For fixed b, the above is clearly increasing in Ai. Evaluating the above at Ai = 2b, we then have
dULC(r) < -(n 1)1(2b),
db
establishing the claim for the case of n even. QED
Claim 3.5 For any 1 that satisfies Assumption 3.2, and for each n > 3, dULC(n)/db > dULC (n+
1)/db for all b E (bFC(n), bLC(n + 1)).
Proof: First, suppose that n is odd. Using the first order condition (3.14) for n+I we can rewrite
(3.24) for n + 1 as
dULC(n + 1) - -(n - 1)[l(3b - A 1 /2) + l(b + A1 /2)] - 21(b + A1 /2) + 2nl(yfC(n + 1)).
db
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Since I is convex, we have
1(3b - A1 /2) + l(b + Ai/2) > 21(2b).
Further, (3.14) implies that 1(b + A 1 /2) > 1(yIC(n + 1)). Thus,
dULC(n +1)_ (Cn+1)]
db < -2(n - 1)[1(2b) - l(y1C (n + 1))].
The lemma then follows from yLC (n + 1) < 1 - (n - 1)b and (3.23).
Second, suppose that n is even. Using the first order condition (3.14) we can rewrite (3.24) as
dULC~n) - (n + 1)[l(b + A 1 /2) + l(b - A 1/2) - 2l(yLC(n))] - (n - 1)[1(b + A 1/2) - l(b - A 1 /2)].db
Since Ai < 2b, from (3.14) we have
1(b + A 1/2) + l(b - A 1/2) - 2l(yLC(n)) < 1(2b) - 21(1/2 - (n - 1)b).
Thus
dU LC~ndb > -(n + 1)[l(2b) - 21(1/2 - (n - 1)b)] - (n - 1)[1(b + A1/2) - l(b - A 1/2)].db
The lemma then follows from Ai < 2b and (3.23) for n + 1. QED
Claim 3.6 Suppose that 1(z) = z 2 . Then, for any n > 3, UFC (n- 1) > ULC(n) at b = bFC(n 1
Proof: From Lemma 3.2 and condition (3.13), at bFC(n - 1) all n - 1 decisions in yFC( 1)
are 2bFC(n - 1) apart, that is, A given in Lemma 3.2 is equal to 2bFC(n - 1). Further, from A's
indifference conditions we have Oi = yfC (n - 1) for all i = 1,... , n - 2. We distinguish two cases.
First, suppose that n is odd. By Lemma 3.3, all n decisions in yLC(n) are also 2bFC(r - 1)
apart, with 0 = yC(n) for all i = 1, ... , n - 1. Note that yC(n _ 1) - y C(n) = bFC( - 1).
Using (3.19) and (3.21), we can show that the difference between P's expected payoff UFC(n - 1)
under yFC(n - 1) and ULC(n) under yLC(n) is given by
UFC~ - 1) _ ULC r 2bFC(n-~1) 
Y FC(n-i)
U n FC U n LC ()d8 - 2 FC (0) dO.
.0 /,'C(n-1)-bFC(n_1)
Using the assumption of 1(z) = z2, we can explicitly compute yFC(n - 1) in terms of bFC(r _ 1)
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and use it to show that the above is strictly positive.
Second, suppose that n is even. In this case, under yLC(n) the thresholds Oi remain evenly
spaced, with i+1 - ( 1). Note that yf(n - 1) - yLC(n) = jAi where Ai as defined
by condition (3.14). As in the case of odd n, using (3.19) and (3.22) we can show that the difference
between P's expected payoff UFC(n - 1) under yFC(n - 1) and ULC(n) under yLC(n) is given by
/-bFCLC~n)__ LCU FC (n - 1) - ULC(n) j=Fc(n1)+A/2 l(O)dO - 2 J 1(0)dO
bFC (__g/ LC
-3bFC (n-1)-Aj/2 .2bFC(n-1)1
+(n/2 - 1) f l(O)dO - l(0)dO.
[2bFC~n1 JbFC(ng_1)±i/
Using the assumption of 1(z) = z 2 , we can explicitly compute Ai from equation (3.14), and use it
to show that the above is strictly positive. QED
Now, observe that yLC(n) = yFC(n) at b = bFC(n), and recall from Lemma 3.2 that yFC(n)>
yFC(n - 1). Then, from Claim 3.4 and Claim 3.6, we have that for any n > 3, there exists
b(n,n- 1) such that UFC(n - 1) < ULC(n) for b E (bFC(n), b(n, n -1)) and UFC(n - 1) > ULC(r)
for b E (b(n, n -1), bFC(n -1)]. Next, since Claim 3.6 implies that ULC(n) = UFC(n) > ULC(n + 1)
at b = bFC(n), it follows from Claim 3.5 that ULC(n) > ULC(n+ 1) for all b E [bFC(n), bLO (n+ 1)).
Finally, using the assumption of 1(z) = z2, we can easily show that for any n > 3, U(n) > UFC(n-1)
at b - bLC(n + 1) where U(n) is P's expected payoff under Y(n) ={ + 2b (i - "+,) In . Since
ULC(n) > U(n) by the definition of YLC(n), from Claim 3.4 we have b(n, n - 1) > bLC(n+ 1). This
concludes the proof of Proposition 3.5. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.6: As it is clear from the proof of Proposition 3.5, P's expected payoff
(3.6) can be bounded below and above by substituting yFC (n) and yFC (n + 1), respectively,
where n is the largest integer smaller than - - v2 + 1. Since A (n; b) and A (n + 1; b) given by
Lemma 3.2 are equal to 2b + 0 (b2 ), P's expected payoff for k = n, n + 1 is
Uj = I- (k - 1) A3 - (k - 1) b2 A _ 1 (1 - (k - 1) A) 3
12 12
(2b)2  b2 
_0 + o (b2) = 4 b2 + o (b2)12 3
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Similarly, A's expected payoff is
UA = - (k-) A3 - b(1- (k-1) A)- (1-(k- 3 + (
QED
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